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ABSTRACT

When Chinese National Offshore Oil Corporation, Ltd. ( CNOOC) attempted to
buy American-owned Unocal Corporation, it unleashed a “perfect storm” in Washington.
Members of Congress immediately called upon President Bush to invoke his Exon-Florio
authority to prevent the transaction.

After the president claimed action would be

premature, Congress quickly coalesced to block the deal. The Chinese expressed surprise
at the political backlash and ultimately CNOOC was forced to withdraw its bid.
The purpose of this study is to explain the fervor that arose over CNOOC’s
proposed acquisition of Unocal. The study builds upon the theoretical approach of new
institutionalism which emerged in response to the shortcomings of theories that
diminished the importance of political values and collective choice in foreign policy
making. Since institutionalism emphasizes the significance of history and assumes the
infusion of societal values over time, the study applies historical research methodology to
the case study. Sources of data include the U.S. Constitution, statutes, judicial opinions,
congressional hearings and reports, White House papers, administrative rules, and
published biographies. Secondary sources include the media, journals, and think-tank
publications.

ii

The study examines how the president and Congress rely upon formal rules for
making policy, and how these rules reinforce the status quo and create obstacles for
change.

Over the years, the president has acquired greater foreign policy making

authority which has upset the balance of power between the two decision-making bodies.
Since policy making is incremental, members of Congress have needed to be resourceful
in devising informal mechanisms for change. One such mechanism is politicization of an
event to raise public awareness, elevate an issue to the top of the policy agenda, and build
coalitions essential to passing legislation.
The research finds that competition between the president and Congress over
foreign and national security policy authority is played out in Washington and is reflected
in policy outcomes. In the Unocal acquisition case, politicization allowed members of
Congress to advance their agenda to tighten up the president’s process for reviewing
foreign acquisitions and to give Congress greater oversight authority.
This study is important and timely because China has become a major player in
the global economy and is driving the global search for new and reliable sources of
energy. As China extends its reach, competition with the U.S. and other major energy
importers will increase.

Although competition is considered essential for a healthy

capitalist economy, other factors influence whether competition will have a positive or
negative impact on competitors. One of these factors is the perception of how China’s
emergence in the global economy will affect U.S. national security. The future of U.S.China relations will depend upon the ability of our political institutions to achieve
balance and compromise in energy, foreign trade, and national security policies.
iii
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

Early in 2005 the Chinese National Offshore Oil Corporation, Ltd. (CNOOC)
expressed interest in purchasing American-owned Unocal Corporation. The Chinese
company’s proposal unleashed a “perfect storm” in the world of Washington politics.1
Claiming that the foreign acquisition of an American oil corporation would threaten
national security, a group of U.S. legislators called on President Bush to invoke his ExonFlorio authority and prevent the transaction.2 But when the Bush Administration stated
this action would be premature, Congress quickly coalesced to block the deal. The speed
with which Congress reached consensus to intervene in the proposed transaction was
exceptional. At the same time, media coverage elevated the event in the public’s eye and
further politicized the issue of foreign acquisitions of American businesses.
The Chinese expressed surprise about the reaction in Congress, emphasizing that
CNOOC had proposed a routine business transaction and the company’s management
had made every effort to be transparent and comply with American law. Heated debates
1

In 1997, Sebastian Junger adopted the phrase “perfect storm” as the title of his book
about the 1991 Nor’easter storm. Here, we use it to describe a perfect situation where a
rare combination of circumstances occurs to generate a political outcry that results in
policy change.
2

The Exon-Florio Amendment to Section 721 of the Defense Production Act of 1950 was
initially introduced in Congress to order the executive branch to examine trade with
countries that had a large trade surplus. The law has evolved over time and will be
discussed in detail in chapter 4.
1

ensued, lasting throughout the summer until the eleventh hour when CNOOC directors
finally withdrew the bid just before it was to go to the Unocal stockholders for a vote on
August 10, 2005. In spite of severe criticism against China, Beijing did not escalate the
issue beyond strongly admonishing Congress for its tactics. The CNOOC bid slowly
faded from the American press but continued to be a point of discussion in Congress as
key legislators sought greater oversight of foreign mergers and acquisitions under
statutory authority of the Exon-Florio Amendment and how it was being implemented.
Meanwhile, the Chinese were particularly perplexed by the national security
concerns voiced by American legislators. Ever since the 1980s, the Chinese leadership
had pursued a foreign policy based on the principles of “independence and peace.” The
primary goal had been to accelerate economic growth so as to attain a higher standard of
living for Chinese citizens and the consensus in China was that economic growth can best
be realized in a peaceful global environment. For more than two decades, the U.S.
government had supported China’s cooperative approach and encouraged China to
become more engaged in the global economy. Given the mutually beneficial economic
relationships that had developed between the two nations, why would the U.S. Congress
oppose CNOOC’s bid to purchase a failing U.S. corporation when mergers and
acquisitions are a basic feature of competition in the capitalist market?
The purpose of this study is to explain the fervor that arose in Congress over the
CNOOC bid.

We examine American political institutions from a socio-historical

perspective which views these institutions as being embedded with values that are
reflected in the formal rules for policy making that develop over time. Although formal
2

rules reinforce institutional stability, they often create obstacles and constraints that
inhibit efficient policy making and restrict institutional actors from accomplishing their
own policy goals. As a result, institutional actors often turn to informal mechanisms for
creating change.
Sometimes these informal mechanisms are straight forward and transparent, and
eventually become formalized. But sometimes these mechanisms are obtuse and difficult
to comprehend. For this reason, scholars have relegated informal policy making to the
“black box” where the process may be obvious or intuitive to institutional actors, but
appears mysterious to outside observers. This mystery is especially ominous when the
outside observers are from a foreign nation and have not been immersed in the American
culture and values which have shaped the formal rules and have influenced the political
dynamics that take place within the “black box.”
The study is an attempt to delve into the obscurity of the “black box” where actors
filter information and devise alternative mechanisms for circumventing or overcoming
the formal rules that are inherently resistant to change. The analysis examines the
dynamics of formal constraints and informal mechanisms of change, how these dynamics
may elevate a particular issue to the top of the foreign policy agenda and, by doing so,
may influence political outcomes which have broader implications for future policy
making.
This dissertation considers these institutional characteristics within the context of
a changing world – a twenty-first century global economy adjusting to China’s global
expansion and America’s heightened sense of vulnerability and increased emphasis on
3

national security. This specific case study investigating the political reaction which
surfaced when Chinese-owned CNOOC attempted to acquire a floundering Americanowned corporation is both important and timely. China has become a major player in the
global economy and China’s economic growth is driving its global search for new
sources of energy. As China extends its reach, competition with the United States and
other major energy importers will increase.
Although competition is considered essential for a healthy capitalist economy,
other factors influence whether competition will have a positive or negative impact on the
competitors.3 Perhaps most significant, is that China’s emergence in the global economy
has occurred at a time when there has been increased discussion about “peak oil,”
increased concern that global supplies of recoverable fossil fuel are decreasing, and
increased concern about the impact of greenhouse gases generated by the burning of
fossil fuels. If China’s demand for energy continues to increase at its current rate, global
fuel shortages will be accompanied by increased costs worldwide. As a result, American
citizens may no longer be able to enjoy the low-priced energy and steady economic
growth that they have come to take for granted.4

3

Flynt Leverett and Jeffry Bader, “Managing China-U.S. Energy Competition in the
Middle East,” The Washington Quarterly (Winter 2005-06): 187-201. Leverett and
Bader cite Henry Kissinger’s concern that competition over energy is likely to cause
international conflict. The authors argue that “prudent” management of the competition
for Middle Eastern oil will be necessary to avoid friction between China and the U.S.
See also Caroline Daniel, “Kissinger Warns of Energy Conflict,” Financial Times, June
2, 2005; and Robert A. Manning, The Asian Energy Factor: Myths and Dilemmas of
Energy, Security and the Pacific Future (New York: Palgrave, 2000).
4

For an introduction to this debate see, for example, Gal Luft and Anne Korin, “The
Sino-Saudi Connection,” Commentary 117, no. 3 (March 2004): 26-29; and Dan
4

China’s aggressive development policies may also impact the global balance of
power which, in turn, will influence how nations perceive their need for national security.
Although the capitalist economy is based on free trade and the United States values free
trade, the U.S. government also uses trade policies to influence foreign governments and
promote American ideals.

If China pursues global expansion and negotiates trade

agreements which do not impose similar policies or do not aspire to achieve similar
ideals, it may undermine the preeminence of the United States in the global economy.
This may lead to a change in the balance of power among nation states and threaten U.S.
national security.
Past studies have shown that corporations seeking to extend their operations
beyond national boundaries face a number of issues they do not face when operating
within the borders of a single nation-state. There are risks and conflicts that arise in
trying to do business in nation-states with different cultures, values, and political systems.
Historically, there has been a perception that the interests of global corporations are
identical with the interests of the governments in the home countries of those
corporations. This perception has been reinforced by the international relations literature
dominated by the realism and balance of power theories.
However, theories that explained foreign policy during the Cold War have less
explanatory power today. After the fall of the Soviet Union, the United States claimed
status as the most preeminent world power; but during the last decade China has emerged

Blumenthal, “China and the Middle East: Providing Arms,” Middle East Quarterly 12,
no. 2 (Spring 2005): 11-19.
5

as a major player in the global economy.

In addition, the United States has lost

negotiating power as terrorist groups have expanded their activities. Terrorism in the
twenty-first century extends beyond the boundaries of the nation-state and threatens
national security at the same time that it challenges the tenants of traditional international
relations theories.
New theories are needed to understand the complexity of U.S.-China relations in
which the two nations espouse contradictory ideologies, yet pursue foreign policies which
have created mutual dependence on one another for economic growth. The lines of
demarcation are becoming blurred as the Chinese Communist Party is abrogating some of
its economic powers to private corporations, while the U.S. Congress is reining in
capitalist corporations with increased regulatory constraints.
This study builds upon the theoretical approach of new institutionalism. The
theory first emerged in response to the shortcomings of realism and other strains of
thought which diminished the importance of political values and collective choice. While
institutionalism has substantial explanatory powers, recent theory-building efforts have
focused on distinguishing separate strains within the institutional school of thought. This
study challenges bifurcation of the theory by identifying a common theoretical core.
This approach to institutionalism assumes the significance of an institution’s
history and the infusion of societal values over time. These factors affect the institution’s
structure and role within the polity. In the United States, policy makers operate under the
rule of law, which the founders intended to be transparent, and these rules constitute
institutional constraints which reinforce stability. The tendency towards institutional
6

stasis benefits society by creating a sense of security which is important in a democratic
society where individualism prevails and where individuals are expected to take
responsibility for planning their futures. These institutional rules and values encourage
innovation and entrepreneurship, but the system of checks and balances (and the
constraints it imposes on political actors) affects legislative efficiency and makes it
difficult for Congress to react quickly and enact laws in a timely manner.
This approach looks at the endogenous institutional factors that impact decision
making, but also acknowledges that external factors – such as the role that the U.S. and
China play in the global economy, increased competition for steady and reliable supplies
of energy, and predictions concerning peak oil – play a role in decision making. When
CNOOC began its quest to purchase Unocal, the company thought it was playing
according the rules of the American capitalist economy.

Even CNOOC’s foreign

advisors, who assisted with crafting the proposal, seem to have been caught off guard
when they did not foresee the reaction in Congress. The significance of the ongoing
political tug-of-war between the U.S. president and Congress concerning foreign
commercial transactions seems to have escaped others as well, including U.S.-China
analysts and international economists, who also expressed surprise over the politicization
of CNOOC’s business proposal.
This study aims to build an awareness of how the built-in tension between the
executive and legislative branches causes U.S. legislators to resort to informal
mechanisms to accomplish their personal agendas. It delves into the question of whether
the proposed CNOOC purchase really constituted a national security threat, or whether
7

there were other motives behind politicization of this particular business transaction. The
research indicates that the underlying reason for bringing the proposed acquisition to the
public’s attention was to build support for modifying the Exon-Florio Amendment. Even
though Congress had passed the Exon-Florio Amendment decades earlier, presidents
have intervened in very few business interactions and have prohibited only a handful of
deals from being consummated. For years, legislators had been calling for increased
oversight over the president’s implementation of the statute. But they faced institutional
constraints which weakened their ability to reform the Exon-Florio provisions. This case
study shows how individual members of Congress acted strategically to politicize
CNOOC’s proposed acquisition of Unocal as a means of overcoming these institutional
constraints.
The complexity of this single event and the depth of misunderstanding by the
Chinese and other foreign observers call for examination of three separate, yet integrated,
matters affecting U.S.-China policy. The first concerns China’s unique approach towards
economic development and integration into the world economy. The second concerns the
fragmented approach towards policy making in the United States and its impact on U.S.China policy decisions. The third concerns the impact of September 11, 2001 on the
lives of American citizens and elevation of national security on the U.S. policy making
agenda.
Chapter 2 sets the stage for analyzing the politicization of CNOOC’s bid for
Unocal by discussing China’s development strategy and the need for continually
increasing energy supplies to support economic growth. Chapter 3 lays the foundation
8

for understanding the incessant competition between the U.S. president and Congress by
examining the historical process of institutionalization in which formal rules were
developed and values were embedded in the political system. Chapter 3 also examines
how the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks empowered the presidency and ultimately
led the 109th Congress to reach a consensus that congressional oversight over the
president’s Exon-Florio authority needed to be strengthened. These two chapters set the
stage for the case study analysis in Chapter 4.
Chapter 4 distinguishes laws that govern domestic mergers and acquisitions from
those that govern foreign mergers and acquisitions. It discusses the legislative history of
the Exon-Florio Amendment which was enacted to delegate authority to the president to
prevent foreign mergers and acquisitions when national security was at stake. Once
implemented, members of Congress realized the shortcomings of the Exon-Florio
Amendment, but found it difficult to correct those shortcomings within the formal
constraints imposed by the institutional structures, rules, and standards. Analysis of the
Unocal case shows how members of Congress resorted to informal mechanisms,
including politicization of this specific event, to accomplish their policy goals.
Chapter 5 continues the story of the Unocal by examining the outcomes of the
perfect storm that the CNOOC bid unleashed in 2005. Politicization of the event unified
Congress in moving forward to modify the Exon-Florio Amendment, but the coup de
grâce came several months later when Congress learned that the United Arab Emiratesowned Dubai Ports World was purchasing London-based Peninsular and Oriental Steam
Navigation Company which operated ports in the United States. The chapter argues that
9

the back-to-back foreign acquisitions proposed by CNOOC and Dubai Ports World,
within the context of the need for heightened national security after 9/11 and a growing
phobia of China’s dominance in the global market provided the impetus for members of
Congress to use informal mechanisms to reassert their legislative prerogatives and take
back power from the presidency. In short, the analysis shows that the CNOOC deal fell
victim to a domestic power struggle in the United States.
The rest of this introductory chapter focuses on the development of the theoretical
approach for this case study.

First we review the realist approach to the study of

international relations and how it assumes a national consensus regarding foreign policy
decisions. Then we explain how new institutionalism emerged in response to the realist
approach as a means of “bringing the state back in” to the discussion of international
relations and how institutional theory allows for consideration of the role that domestic
conflict plays in determining foreign policy outcomes.

Finally, we describe our

theoretical approach and methodology in more detail.

I. LITERATURE REVIEW
A. Realism
In our quest to answer the Unocal puzzle, we first turn to international relations
theory as it developed after World War II when nations divided into two major camps –
those which adhered to a capitalist world-view and those which adhered to a communist
world-view. The chasm created by this bi-polar world, dominated by the United States
and the Soviet Union, led international relations scholars to focus foreign policy concerns

10

on the distribution of power, the causes of war, and the conditions necessary for peaceful
coexistence.5 At the same time, there was a movement towards bringing more credibility
to the field of study by emphasizing the importance of developing a scientific approach.6
Since then, international relations scholars have held to the tenet that intellectual progress
depends on rigorous theory and systematic empirical testing; that is, better theory and
better methods of theory testing are necessary for the field to be relevant to policy makers
and those concerned with foreign policy issues. The presumption is that policy makers
would make better decisions if they could identify the causal forces that drive
international relations and foreign policy.7
It is within this context that realism emerged as the favored approach to the study
of international relations.8 Realists assume the structure of the international system is
defined by the formal arrangement and position of states within that system. The primary

5

Morton Kaplan, System and Process in International Politics (New York: Wiley, 1957);
Hans Morganthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New
York: Free Press, 1967); Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State, and War (New York:
Columbia University, 1979); and Chris Brown and Kirsten Ainley, Understanding
International Relations, 3rd ed. (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005).
6

See for example, David J. Singer, “The Incomplete Theorist: Insight without Evidence,”
in Contending Approaches to International Politics, ed. James N. Rosenau and Klaus
Knorr (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 1969).
7

Jeffry A. Friedan and David A. Lake, “International Relations as a Social Science:
Rigor and Relevance,” ANNALS of the American Association of Political and Social
Science 600 (July 2005):137.
8

Joseph S. Nye Jr. and Sean M. Lynn-Jones, “International Security Studies: A Report of
a Conference on the State of the Field,” International Security 12 (Spring1988): 8. Two
primary schools of realist thought were elaborated by Hans Morgenthau (political) and
Kenneth Waltz (structural), but we will not distinguish between these schools here.
11

attribute of the system is that it lacks central authority. Anarchy “provides both the
motivating rationale for state behavior as well as the ontological essence that drives
international policies – the search for security in a hostile, violence prone, self-help
international system.”9 In this environment, self-preservation is of primary importance.10
Because self-preservation is subject to each state’s position within the system, and is
dependent upon the distribution of power, states must constantly compete for power.11
During the Cold War, realism provided a means for understanding the on-going
power struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union (and other communist
states) and proposed that balance of power is a necessary condition for peace. Upon the
collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States emerged as the dominant power and some
scholars began to suggest that realism had lost its explanatory power.12 But Waltz
defended the realist approach by emphasizing that unipolarity is the “least durable of

9

Darryl S.L. Jarvis, “Multinational Enterprises, International Relations and International
Business: Reconstituting Intellectual Boundaries for the New Millennium,” Australian
Journal of International Affairs 59 (June 2005): 205.
10

Paul R. Viotti and Mark Kauppi, eds., International Relations Theory: Realism,
Pluralism, Globalism and Beyond (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1999), 55-57.

11

Kenneth N. Waltz, “Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory,” Journal of International
Affairs 44, no. 1 (Spring/Summer 1990): 21-38; and Hans Morganthau, Politics among
Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Free Press, 1967).
12

Stefano Guzzini, “The Enduring Dilemmas of Realism in International Relations,”
European Journal of International Relations 10, no. 4 (December 2004): 533-568;
Margarita H. Petrova, “The End of the Cold War: A Battle or Bridging Ground between
Rationalist and Ideational Approaches in International Relations?” European Journal of
International Relations 9, no. 110 (March 2003): 115-163; and Charles W. Kegley, Jr.,
“The Neoidealist Moment in International Studies? Realist Myths and the New
International Realities,” International Studies Quarterly 37 (June 1993): 131-146.
12

international configurations” – just as “nature abhors a vacuum, so international politics
abhors unbalanced power” – and so the power struggle will continue.13 Therefore, when
China initiated its “open door” policy and began the journey towards rapid economic
development, realists began to view this policy as a strategy for global expansion and an
effort to tip the balance of power in China’s favor.
Although realism is compelling for its parsimony and its ability to explain the
dynamics of states vying for power within an international system, its adherents have
recognized that the international system is simply one factor “shaping and shoving”
foreign policy.14 There is also a need to open the “black box” of domestic politics and
look at the various domestic systems and institutions that contribute to the formation of
states’ foreign policies.15 This is especially the case in trying to understand why the U.S.
Congress reacted so vehemently to CNOOC’s proposed acquisition of Unocal, and to
13

Kenneth N. Waltz, “Structural Realism after the Cold War,” International Security 25
(Summer 2000): 28; and Michael Mastanduno, “Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist
Theories and U.S. Grand Strategy after the Cold War,” International Security 21 no. 4
(Spring 1997): 88.
14

Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State, and War (New York: Columbia University, 1979),
70-72; and Kenneth N. Waltz, “Reflections on Theory of International Politics: A Reply
to My Critics,” in Neorealism and its Critics, ed. Robert O. Keohane (New York:
Columbia University, 1986), 322-46.
15

G. John Ikenberry, David A. Lake, and Michael Mastanduno, “Introduction:
Approaches to Explaining American Foreign Economic Policy,” International
Organization 42 (Winter 1988): 5; Stacie E. Goddard and Daniel N. Nexon, “Paradigm
Lost? Reassessing Theory of International Politics,” European Journal of International
Relations 11 (March 2005): 24; Sheldon W. Simon, “Is there a U.S. Strategy for East
Asia?” Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International & Strategic Affairs 21
(December 1999): 325-343; and Peter A. Gourevitch, “The Second Image Reversed: The
International Sources of Domestic Politics,” International Organization 32 (Autumn
1978): 882, 901.
13

understand how Congress was able to achieve a consensus to block the acquisition with
speed which is uncharacteristic of the fragmented system of American policy making.
B. New Institutionalism
To understand the role that domestic political institutions play in facilitating or
inhibiting financial transactions in a global economy we turn to the analytical approach of
new institutionalism. New institutionalism delves into the “black box” of domestic
politics by looking at institutions as mechanisms for channeling and constraining
individual behavior and shaping policy outcomes. Because new institutionalism places
the “black box” within the context of the larger world, this approach allows us to
integrate our analysis of U.S. domestic politics with the twenty-first century global
environment characterized by China’s expanded approach to economic development and
America’s new emphasis on homeland security.
The theoretical approach of “new institutionalism” first emerged in response to
the shortcomings of realism and other strains of thought which diminished the importance
of political values and collective choice. March and Olsen observed that the ideas behind
this new approach
deemphasize the dependence of the polity on society in favor of an
interdependence between relatively autonomous social and political
institutions; they deemphasize the simple primacy of micro processes and
efficient histories in favor of relatively complex processes and historical
inefficiency; they deemphasize metaphors of choice and allocative
outcomes in favor of other logics of action and the centrality of meaning
and symbolic action.16
16

James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, “The New Institutionalism: Organizational
Factors in Political Life,” The American Political Science Review 78 (September 1984):
738.
14

Although “far from coherent or consistent,” new institutionalism claims a “more
autonomous role for political institutions” without denying the importance of social
context of politics, the economy, or the motives of individual actors.17
As interest in this approach increased, attempts at theory building were so
extensive and so diverse that it became unclear as to what exactly new institutionalism
was, how it could be distinguished from other approaches, and how it could be
measured.18 Hall and Taylor proposed that some of the ambiguities could be dismissed
by recognizing that institutionalism is not one unified body of thought. Instead, they
suggested the three schools of thought emerged to “elucidate the role that institutions
play in the determination of social and political outcomes.”19 While it would be beyond
the scope of this dissertation to fully elucidate these approaches, a brief summary of the
three bodies of thought is relevant to the development of our theoretical framework.
The first approach, historical institutionalism, seeks to improve upon political
theories which focus on micro-analysis by “bringing the state back” into the discussion.20
Although influenced by the structural-functionalist view that the polity is a system of
interacting parts historical institutionalism does not accept the idea that individuals are
17

March and Olsen, 738.

18

B. Guy Peters, Institutional Theory in Political Science: The ‘New Institutionalism’
(New York: Continuum Press, 2005), 44.
19

Peter A. Hall and Rosemary C.R. Taylor, “Political Science and the Three New
Institutionalisms,” Political Studies 44, no. 5 (December 1996): 936.
20

Theda Skocpol, “Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current
Research,” in Bringing the State Back In, ed. Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and
Theda Skocpol (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1985), 9.
15

the driving force.21 Instead, historical institutionalism builds upon theories that assign
importance to formal political institutions by examining them during their formative
periods.22 The premise is that history is important because institutions create a system of
collective values as they are being formed and these values are embedded in the
structures of the institutions and thereby affect the policy-making process.23 One needs
an understanding of institutional legacies in order to fully understand subsequent policy
outcomes.24
Over time, historical institutionalism evolved into a complex framework centered
on the impact of formal administrative and political institutions on policymaking.
According to Skocpol, this approach “views the polity as the primary locus of action, yet
understands political activities, whether carried out by politicians or by social groups, as
conditioned by the institutional configurations of governments and political party
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systems.”25 Rather than focusing exclusively on state autonomy, Skocpol suggests that
institutionalism should focus on four factors:
(1) the establishment and transformation of state and party organization…;
(2) the effects of political institutions and procedures on the identities,
goals, and capacities of social groups…; (3) the “fit” – or lack thereof –
between goals and capacities of various politically active groups, and the
historically changing points of access and leverage allowed by a nation’s
political institutions; and (4) the way in which previously established
social policies affect subsequent politics.26
By contrast, the second approach of rational choice institutionalism was largely
inspired by the application of conventional rational choice assumptions to the study of
congressional behavior. Assuming that individuals tend to make decisions based on
maximizing utility, legislators have multiple preferences, and political issues are
multidimensional, rational choice theorists have tended to conclude that it would be quite
difficult to achieve the majority votes needed to pass legislation in Congress.27 But, as
Hall and Taylor point out, empirical research shows the opposite; there is a strong
tendency towards stability in congressional decision making.28
To resolve this paradox, rational choice institutionalism focuses on “the
importance of institutions as mechanisms for channeling and constraining individual
25

Theda Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Political Origins of Social
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behavior.”29 Individual actors are still expected to maximize their personal utilities, but
they are constrained by institutional structure, rules and procedures.30 Or, as Ostrom
suggests, rational actors are “fallible learners” who will engage in a “continuous trialand-error process until a rule system is evolved that participants consider yields
substantial net benefits.”31

Either way, institutions tend to be characterized by the

majority of actors, rather than any one individual.
Rational choice theorists suggest individuals define their goals and preferences
independent of, but subject to the constraints of, institutions. Proponents of this approach
emphasize that it allows political actors to have multiple goals.32 For example, individual
legislators may be motivated by a desire to be re-elected, the need to secure campaign
contributions, aspirations for power or position within the legislature, and ideological
commitment to specific policy outcomes at the same time that they are subject to
constraints imposed by legislative coalitions and committee membership and their
political party.33

Rational choice institutionalism is attractive because it helps us
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understand how political actors respond to the incentives and constraints introduced by
their institutions at the same time that it permits us to see how individuals have an interest
in shaping institutions to meet their personal goals.
Scott asserts that the third approach of sociological institutionalism disagrees with
the rational choice perspective and suggests that the institutional forms and procedures of
modern organizations are the result of cultural values and practices.34

Sociological

institutionalism defines institutions broadly to include “symbol systems, cognitive scripts,
and moral templates” that guide human actions.35 This approach also focuses on the
interactive relationship between institutions and individual actions. Although actors may
be purposive or rational, institutions influence their behavior by providing scripts to
follow, and actors influence institutions by asserting their preferences.36
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In comparing these approaches, scholars have emphasized both similarities and
differences.

For example, Thelen focuses on distinguishing rational choice

institutionalism from historical institutionalism.

She suggests that rational choice

theorists, working at the mid-range of theory building, often attempt to develop grand
theories with more general theoretical claims; whereas, theorists who adopt historical
institutionalism often focus on a limited range of cases that are unified in space and/or
time.37 Thelen identifies another difference in the approaches to hypothesis building.
While rational choice theorists derive their research questions from situations in which
observed behavior seems to deviate from theoretical expectations, historical
institutionalism theorists often begin with questions that emerge from observed events.38
Although both approaches are interested in identifying and understanding
regularities in politics over time, Thelen concludes the main distinction is that the rational
choice approach emphasizes coordinating functions and equilibrium order while the
historical approach emphasizes historical process.

Rational choice theorists see

institutions as holding together a particular pattern of politics while historical
institutionalism theorists tend to reverse causality to suggest that institutions “emerge
from and are sustained by features of the broader political and social context.”39
The exercise of distinguishing among different approaches to new institutionalism
has value in trying to isolate the theory’s essential elements, but the risks associated with
37
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this exercise are dilution of the theoretical richness and loss of its explanatory powers.
For example, although the rational choice approach may lend insight into individual
decision making within the institutional context, the impact of individual decision making
on political outcomes may not be understood without understanding the institutional
structure and functions. Similarly, the study of an institution’s historical evolution may
provide insight into institutional constraints, but it may not be able to explain why
individual actors within an institution prefer certain choices over others or why some
actors may have greater ability to influence colleague’s choices than others.
Rather than distinguishing among the three approaches to new institutionalism,
this study is based on the assumption that there are common elements in the institutional
research to suggest a unified theory. It suggests that the theoretical core includes the
significance of an institution’s history and infusion of societal values that affect the
institution’s role within the polity. Within this context, the focus is on the “black box”
where formal rules govern yet informal mechanisms shape and filter political interests in
order to produce policy outcomes.40 The general framework for looking into the “black
box” of domestic politics is described below.

II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
A. An Integrated Theoretical Approach to U.S. – China Foreign Policy
Institutionalism refers to an approach to the study of political institutions which
includes a set of ideas and hypotheses concerning the relations between institutional
40

Ellen M. Immergut, “The Theoretical Core of the New Institutionalism,” Politics and
Society 26 (March 1998): 25.
21

characteristics and political actors. It assumes that institutions are shaped by history and
infused with shared values that influence their structures, rules, and standards. These
endogenous characteristics create stability and predictability needed for long term
planning. At the same time that these formal structures, rules, and standards facilitate the
actions of political actors, they also create constraints. As a result, political actors will
tend to adapt, but one way that they adapt is to rely upon informal mechanism for
creating policy change.
This dissertation develops an integrated theory by adopting core elements of the
historical, rational choice, and sociological approaches to new institutionalism that were
discussed in the literature review above. The following premises constitute the core
elements of the theoretical framework:
1.

The premise that history is important because institutions create a system

of collective values during their formative stage, and these values are embedded in
institutional structures that affect the policy making process.
2.

The premise that institutional actors tend to base decisions on maximizing

utility, but political issues are complex and multidimensional, and institutional actors
must constantly weigh multiple preferences.
3.

The premise that democratic institutions are characterized by formal

constraints that provide institutional stability, but allow for informal mechanisms that
permit individual actors to assert their own preferences in the decision making process.
4.

The premise that the success of an individual legislator in Congress

overcoming institutional constraints that impact foreign policy making depends upon
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manipulation of a variety of factors, including: (a) public awareness, (b) constituent and
party support, (c) coalition building, (d) presidential support, and (e) timing.
This approach to institutionalism suggests that policy change is incremental and
gives weight to the significance of previously enacted laws. In explaining how policy
change takes place, the dissertation considers the content of existing law and legislative
proposals as well as the reasons why individual actors conceived of or chose to support
various policy alternatives. By grasping the motivation behind the actors’ policy choices,
it will be possible to gain a better understanding of the strategies that the actors develop
to persuade others to support their policy alternatives. One of the best ways to get at the
heart of policy initiatives is to analyze the actors’ discourse.41
The dissertation’s theoretical approach assumes that when corporations enter into
the global capitalist market, they organize their economic activities so as to maximize
profits. This assumption holds true regardless of whether the corporation is private
enterprise or a jointly-owned public/private entity. A corollary of this assumption is that
corporations are motivated to manage risk in the global capitalist market and that they
have a variety of strategies at their disposal. Some of the risks are political and social
instability, bureaucratic complications, local interference with national laws, high fees
and administrative charges, undeveloped infrastructure, and supply problems.

Risk

management strategies include encouraging the country of origin to establish stable
diplomatic relations with the host country, encouraging the host country to improve the
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legal environment for foreign investment in local enterprises, relying upon the protections
provided by international law, crafting creative financial arrangements for doing business
within the host country, and integrating foreign capital, labor, and other resources into the
enterprises operations within the host country.42
The approach also assumes that foreign policy decisions do not take place within
a vacuum; they are influenced by the international environment as well as the domestic
environment.

One of the most outstanding characteristics of the international

environment in 2005 was China’s emergence as a major economic power. After a decade
of explosive growth, there was no indication that China’s economy would break pace
with its impressive track record. In fact, China’s foray into the capitalist world economy
had become so successful in stimulating the domestic economy that it became part of a
comprehensive strategy for developing geopolitical alliances that was virtually
inconceivable when communist China and capitalist America first entered into diplomatic
talks under the Nixon Administration.
Another feature dominating the global environment in 2005 was the U.S. war on
terror which followed the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on the World Trade Center.
For the first time in recent memory American citizens had been subjected to a sense of
vulnerability and fears of subsequent attacks on their homeland. As a result, national
security took on a new meaning in the American psyche and came to play a new and
more prominent role in both domestic and foreign policy making.
42
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This global environment has set the stage for our inquiry into why Congress
politicized CNOOC’s business proposal to acquire the underperforming Unocal
Corporation. The research questions that we address in the study are as follows:
1.

What are the roles and responsibilities of the executive and legislative

branches in overseeing foreign mergers, acquisition, or takeovers?
2.

What laws may the president or Congress invoke in order to block a

particular foreign merger, acquisition, or takeover?
3.

Are there different laws and procedures for blocking a foreign merger,

acquisition or takeover for economic reasons as opposed to national security concerns?
4.

If one branch of government perceives either an economic or a national

security threat and the other branch does not, must the branch perceiving the threat
obtain consent or support from the other branch in order to prevent the merger,
acquisition or takeover?
5.

Are there certain situations in which one branch or the other may act

independently?
6.

What mechanisms did Congress employ to block CNOOC’s proposed

acquisition of Unocal?
7.

What role did individual legislators play in the attempt to block the deal

and what were their individual beliefs as to why the deal needed to be blocked?
8.

Since Congress is comprised of independent actors, and the policy making

process is fragmented, how can Congress influence executive action when current laws
do not require action and a threat is deemed imminent?
25

B. Methodology
This study uses historical research methodology which focuses on analysis of
original documents. Since the study is concerned with identifying the constraints that
political institutions create and the opportunities for implementing policy change the
researcher sought sources of data that would provide specific content of the policy
proposals that the actors promoted. This data was found in the following types of
documents: (1) legal sources such as the Constitution, statutes, and judicial opinions; (2)
official government documents such as congressional reports, white house papers, and
administrative rules; and (3) presidential and legislative testimonials found in published
biographies.

The study supplements these original sources with secondary sources

including media sources such as newspapers, magazines, radio/television transcripts, and
public opinion polls; peer-reviewed journals; and think tank publications.
Initially, the research design included a survey instrument that was sent to all
members of the 109th Congress. The survey included both multiple choice and openended questions designed to be broad in nature to provide interviewees latitude in
prioritizing and bringing out issues of greatest importance to them. Although some
legislators responded, there was an overwhelming reluctance to participate in a written
survey, or to respond to follow-up telephone calls or email inquiries from anyone other
than members of their own congressional districts.
The survey was attempted during an election year and the responses support the
author’s hypothesis that legislators’ individual actions are driven primarily by the desire
for re-election. This motive leads legislators to focus their individual policy agendas on
26

issues perceived to be of priority to their constituents. Since the survey response was not
statistically significant, the study relies upon the sources of data described above. Any
comments received from legislators will be treated as anecdotal and will be reinforced by
documentary evidence.
While direct access to the president and executive staff would have been ideal, it
was not possible given the president’s leadership style and the confidential treatment of
foreign business transactions within the White House. Foreign policy and international
relations scholars have long encountered similar difficulties in acquiring detailed
information about the decision making process. The information is hard to find and often
incomplete. In recent years, there has been an information explosion with increased
access to information over the World Wide Web, but care must be taken to ensure
authenticity of the information. At the same time, the media has become much more
involved in interviewing individuals involved in the decision-making process and in
analyzing their decisions. There has also been an increase in autobiographies in which
decision makers feel a need to document their own actions and perceptions of the
process.43 These secondary sources added to interpretation of the political environment,
but our analysis primarily relies on official White House documents, press releases, and
statements to the media.
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III.

CONCLUSION

This chapter suggests that CNOOC unleashed a “perfect storm” in 2005 when it
proposed to purchase American-owned Unocal Corporation. Although CNOOC claimed
the bid was simply a business transaction, members of Congress claimed it was a threat to
national security and immediately called upon President Bush to invoke his Exon-Florio
authority to prevent the transaction. On the surface, it appeared to the Chinese that
Congress politicized the CNOOC bid to prevent China from developing its economy.
This study questions why Congress felt compelled to intervene in this particular business
proposition.
Traditional international relations theories which assume foreign policy is based
upon a struggle for power cannot explain how domestic politics influence a nation’s
foreign policy decisions. For this, the study turns to the approach of new institutionalism
which focuses on an examination of what happens within the “black box” of domestic
policy making. The study suggests that an understanding of institutional constraints and
the mechanisms that institutional actors employ to overcome these constraints may lend
insight into foreign policy making and help explain why some foreign policy issues are
politicized while others are not.
The study adopts a socio-historical approach to new institutionalism which
requires the laying of a foundation for the analysis by placing the event of CNOOC’s bid
for Unocal within the context of that particular point in history. Chapter 2 describes
China’s rapid and continuous economic growth, the energy resources needed to maintain
this growth, and the disparity between demand and domestic supplies. The facts indicate
28

that China has no alternative but to look outside its borders for access to energy supplies
that will continue fueling economic development.
The socio-historical approach also assumes institutions are infused with values
and that these values influence the institution’s structures, rules, and standards, and
ultimately the leaders’ decision making processes. Chapter 3 examines the historical
processes which have shaped American political institutions. It discusses how these
institutions have been infused with values that transcend the values of any one individual
within the institutions, and how these values are essential to the survival and expansion of
the capitalist economy.
In crafting the American Constitution, the Founding Fathers established an
institutional structure which provided political stability. The Constitution also defined
separate powers for the executive and legislative branches, but incorporated a system of
“checks and balances” which prevents either one of the institutions from becoming too
powerful. As a result, policy making in the United States is fragmented and inefficient
and often times difficult to predict. When CNOOC contemplated its bid for Unocal, the
corporation focused on the business opportunity but failed to foresee that the bid would
become entangled in an institutional struggle between Congress and the president over
foreign policy powers.
Chapter 4 discusses the details of the Unocal case. It begins with the laws that
govern mergers and acquisitions in the United States and focuses specifically on the
Exon-Florio Amendment. An examination of the 2005 congressional hearings indicates
that the Exon-Florio Amendment, and Congress’s concern about how it had been
29

interpreted and implemented by the presidency, was at the heart of the Unocal acquisition
controversy. The analysis in this chapter shows how informal mechanisms and strategies
serve as a means of overcoming the institutional inefficiencies of the American political
system.
Sometimes these mechanisms operate within the “black box” of policy making in
Congress and, in spite of laws requiring transparency, may be hidden from public
scrutiny. Even though we may never be able to discover all the details of deals that are
negotiated in private, we may acquire more insight into the policy outcomes through case
studies that analyze the informal methods that key decision makers use to accomplish
their policy goals.
Chapter 5 draws conclusions as to why and how some members of Congress used
informal mechanisms available to them to politicize the CNOOC bid for Unocal.
Extending the analysis beyond the House of Representative’s enactment of Resolution
344 (which focused on preventing CNOOC from acquiring Unocal and received so much
press) provides for greater understanding as to why politicization of CNOOC’s proposal
was instrumental to achieving long-sought statutory changes in the Exon-Florio
provisions. In 2006, as Congress was debating an amendment to Exon-Florio to provide
greater oversight of presidential authority over foreign acquisitions, United Arab
Emirates-owned Dubai Ports World attempted to control Peninsular and Orient Steam
Navigation, a British company that operated terminals at several American ports. This
case study shows how politicization of CNOOC’s bid for Unocal helped Congress defeat
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the Dubai Ports World acquisition and set the stage for future legislative oversight of
foreign acquisitions of American corporations.
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CHAPTER TWO:
THE UNOCAL PUZZLE

I. CHINA’S DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY
A. Entering the Global Economy
Self-reliance had been a major strategic priority for nearly three decades under
Mao’s leadership. Then in the late 1970s after Deng Xiaoping came to power, China’s
leadership began to look outward for economic growth.44 Exhausted by the disruptions
and uncertainties of perpetual political campaigns, the Chinese people embraced the idea
of stabilizing their economy and raising their standard of living to levels enjoyed by the
world’s more developed countries. At the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Congress in
December 1978, the Chinese Communist Party initiated a “fundamental change in its
domestic as well as its foreign policy priorities.”45 These changes required an openness
that had not been seen for decades as exemplified by the State Statistical Bureau’s 1979
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publication and widespread distribution of national economic data which was a first step
towards greater transparency in the Chinese economy.46
The Party confirmed its backing of economic liberalization at the 1980 National
People’s Congress by appointing Zhao Zhiyang as prime minister and Hu Yaobang as
secretary-general of the Party. Zhao Zhiyang called for abandoning “once and for all”
the idea of self-reliance and urged the nation to enter the world markets.47 Secretarygeneral Hu Yaobang proclaimed China’s foreign policy should be based on the principles
of “independence and peace,” that is, independence to pursue relationships that would
promote China’s economic goals and a peaceful environment that would not threaten
China’s national security.48
The leadership endorsed gradual transformation from a centrally planned
economy toward a more market-based economy as they pursued policies that would
accelerate economic growth and lead to higher standards of living.49 Although stateowned industries continued to dominate key sectors, the government began to privatize
small and medium sized state-owned enterprises and allow the emergence of a non-state
sector led by private entrepreneurs. The private sector continued to grow, and by 2001,
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimated that the non-state sector accounted for
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three-fourths of industrial output, approximately half of gross domestic product, and 60
percent of nonagricultural employment.50
Since recovering a seat in the United Nations,51 China has established economic,
political, and cultural relations with capitalist nations world-wide and has become
increasingly integrated into the global economy. But membership in nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs), such as the IMF, the World Bank (WB), and its affiliate, the
International Development Association (IDA), the World Trade Organization (WTO),
and the ASEAN Regional Forum, has been accompanied by very strict conditions.52
These conditions, in turn, have led to liberalization of trade and investment which
accompanies capitalist management practices, borrowing technological innovations, and
engaging in joint ventures with foreign business partners.53

In spite of occasional

menacing rhetoric, China’s leadership has focused on diplomacy rather than costly
military activities to accomplish economic development goals.54
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China’s economy began to take off almost immediately after adopting the “opendoor” policy which sought foreign investment as a means of stimulating the economy.55
From 1980 to 2005, China reports that its GDP grew at an average rate of 9.6 percent
(adjusted) per year, reaching 1,823 trillion yuan (2.23 trillion U.S. dollars).56 The IMF
estimates that GDP based on purchasing-power-parity per capita GDP grew from $419 in
1980 to $6,193 in 2005.57 The United Nations (UN) estimates that per capita income has
grown from less than $400 in the 1980s, to an estimated $1,500 - $3,000 in 1993.58 Rural
per capita income alone has grown by a factor of more than four in the last thirty years,
reaching $1,700 in 2007.59
Foreign trade and investment increased significantly after the Chinese
government established Special Economic Zones (SEZs). In 1950, the total value of
China’s imports and exports was about $1.1 billion, less than one percent of total world
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trade. Although world trade experienced a six-fold increase from 1950 to 1978, China’s
total share of that world trade stagnated due to disruptions caused by Mao zedong’s
political campaigns.
In the eight years after China introduced the open door policy, the state approved
8,332 foreign-funded enterprises and committed $19.14 billion to foreign investment.60
From 1978 to 2003 the country’s trade increased at an average annual rate of fifteen
percent, and its share of total world trade increased from less than one percent to more
than five percent, while its national ranking in world trade (merchandise) jumped from
thirty-second place in 1978 to third place in 2004.61
By 2004, the government had begun encouraging foreign investment by allowing
foreigners to establish investment corporations in China. The only qualifications were
“fine credit and economic strength” (which consisted of meeting stipulated financial
requirements, such as the total sum of $400 million property the year before applying to
invest in China), more than ten foreign invested enterprises, and invested sum of
registered capital actually paid of more than $10 million in China.62 During 2004, trade
and investment deals were made with Thailand, Malaysia and eight other Southeast Asian
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countries and by 2005 China had opened free-trade talks with South Korea, Pakistan,
Australia and Iceland.
In 2004, China surpassed the United States as Japan’s largest trading partner. But
historical animosities over Japan’s occupation of China during World War II kept the
relationship from blossoming. In addition, the two Asian countries were competing over
access to Siberian oil and China lost the larger prize. Then tensions began to escalate
when China began oil exploration in the South China Sea where Japan had claims of
sovereignty.63 This heightened the concern in Beijing regarding military protection for
China’s access to oil.
In addition to Asia, the Chinese government has also established a foothold in the
developing countries in Africa and Latin America.

In 2000, the China-Africa

Cooperation Forum was formed to promote trade and investment in forty-four African
countries.64 Since then, several high level delegations have visited the continent and
Beijing has negotiated partnerships with governments in the Angola, Nigeria, Chad,
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Congo, Libya, Niger, Sudan, and the Central African Republic. Chinese trade with Africa
more than tripled from 2000 to nearly $30 billion in 2004.65
In 2004, while visiting Brazil with a number of business leaders, President Hu
announced $20 billion in new investments for oil and gas exploration and related
projects. This global outreach became a source of concern in Washington as some White
House advisors and legislators in Congress feared a weakening of U.S. influence in these
regions.66 Aside from the competition for trade, observers began to worry that Beijing
was striking deals with governments that do not adhere to international laws, support
human rights agendas, or promote democratic ideas. Although Chinese Deputy Foreign
Minister Zhou Wenzhong has stated that Beijing tries to “separate politics from
business,”67 the boundaries are not clear, especially when foreign regimes have different
interests and adhere to different values.
B. Producing Energy for Economic Growth
1. Economic Growth Spurs Energy Demands
Throughout its history, China had been primarily an energy exporter. But the
structural changes initiated by Deng Xiaoping and carried forward by today’s leaders
have led to unprecedented industrial growth and technological progress accompanied by
65
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explosive economic development. These changes, along with the demands of a surging
population, have led to significant increases in energy consumption and rapid shifts in oil
trade patterns.

In 1990, China exported nearly five times as much crude oil as it

imported. But China became an energy importer for the first time in its history in 1993
as crude oil imports grew to twice the size of exports.
The surge in economic growth and demand for energy is shown in Tables 1 to 3
below.
Table 1 – GDP Based on Purchasing-Power-Parity Per Capita from 1980 to 2005
YEAR
GDP
YEAR
GDP
YEAR
GDP
$ 419
$ 1,329
$ 3,852
1980
1990
2000
$
476
$
1,483
$ 4,211
1981
1991
2001
$ 543
$ 1,713
$ 4,606
1982
1992
2002
$ 617
$ 1,967
$ 5,087
1983
1993
2003
$ 728
$ 2,236
$ 5,641
1984
1994
2004
$ 840
$ 2,495
$ 6,196
1985
1995
2005
$ 920
$ 2,758
1986
1996
2006
$ 1,037
$ 3,020
1987
1997
2007
$
1,175
$
3,517
1988
1998
2008
$1,251
$
1989
1999
2009
Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook, 2005
Table 2 – Chinese Data on Energy Production and Consumption
Energy Production (104 tce)

103,216 (=100)

Coal
Crude Oil
Natural Gas
Hydropower

74,533
22,916
3,351
2,416

(72.2)
(22.2)
( 3.2)
( 2.3)

124,033 (=100)
Energy Consumption (104 tce)
Coal
88,481 (71.3)
Crude Oil
30,188 (24.3)
Natural Gas
2,863 ( 2.3)
Hydropower
2,501 ( 2.0)
Source: China Energy Statistical Annual (1996-1999)
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Table 3 – Total Primary Energy Production and Consumption (Quadrillion Btu)
Year
Production
Consumption

1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
18.1
17.5

24.3
22.0

29.4
27.0

35.1
34.9

35.3
35.5

63.2
67.1

Source: EIA, International Energy Annual, Short Term Energy Outlook, Table 3a, Table
3b (Forecast values)
Table 3 shows that China’s total primary energy consumption rose by twenty-six
percent from 17.5 to 67.1 quadrillion Btu in the twenty-five years from 1980 to 2005.
Although China uses less energy per capita than more developed countries, its energy use
is very inefficient. In 2006, the International Energy Administration (IEA) estimated that
China’s energy consumption per GDP was five times that of the U.S. and twelve times
that of Japan.68 Industrial processes are outdated and require large amounts of fuel
compared to modern processes that have been adopted in more industrialized nations.
Even though a study by China’s Energy Research Institute suggests that China has
potential to cut energy use by thirty to fifty percent by adopting international industrial
standards, the size of China’s population and the sustained high pace of economic
growth, will continue to push energy demand even higher. 69
As the gap between domestic supply and demand in energy sectors continues to
widen, it will have an increasingly significant impact on the nation’s economic security.
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The forecasts are staggering. In 2000, the IEA predicted China would “surpass Japan as
the second largest world oil consumer within the next decade and reach a consumption
level of 10.5 million barrels per day by 2020.70 In 2004, the IEA predicted that eighty
percent of China’s oil demand in 2030 would have to be met by imports.71
2. Regional Variances
One of the problems associated with China’s rapid growth policy has been
widening of the gap in the level of economic development between urban and rural areas
and across geographic regions. Not only has the leadership been faced with finding ways
to equalize regional variances in standards of living, it has also needed to find ways to
balance energy resource supplies and demands between western and eastern China.
While western China is rich in all kinds of energy resources, seventy percent of the
country’s hydropower resources lie in the south-west. Fossil-fuel resources (coal, crude
oil and natural gas) and long-term reserves, located mostly in the northwest, account for
approximately two-thirds of the country’s whole supply.72 The twelve western provinces
contain eighty percent of the country’s total renewable resources, but the eleven eastern
coastal provinces are the largest energy consumers. Consistent with the location of
population centers and the distribution of energy resources, the main energy flows are
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from west to east and from north to south. The main methods for distribution have been
transportation of coal by rail and ship and transmission of electric power through energy
grids.
China’s use of its energy supplies from 1949 to the early twenty-first century is
summarized as follows:
(a) Coal - Historically, China has depended heavily on coal as its primary source
of energy and China has been the world’s largest coal producer.73 The U.S. Department
of Energy, Energy Information Agency (DOE/EIA) reported that China accounted for
twenty-eight percent of world coal production in 2004.74 It is estimated that China holds
126.2 billion short tons of recoverable coal, the third largest in the world behind the U.S.
and Russia.75
In spite of these reserves, in 1993, China’s coal consumption exceeded domestic
coal production and annual coal production peaked at 1.4 billion tons a few years later.76
By 2004, China was consuming 2.1 billion short tons of coal, representing one-third of
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the world total, and a 46 percent increase over 2002.77 Clearly, China could no longer
depend upon coal to sustain high levels of economic growth.
(b) Oil - Compared to coal, China’s oil reserves are comparatively limited, with
85 percent of oil production on shore. At the beginning of 2006, DOE/EIA estimated
proven oil reserves at 18.3 billion barrels.78 China’s largest producing field has been
Daqing which accounted for more than 900,000 billion barrels per day, or one-quarter of
China’s total crude production in 2005.79 However, Daqing is a mature field and, by the
new millennium, production levels had to be reduced to extend the life of the field.80 The
second largest producing field is Shengli which produced over 500,000 billion barrels per
day in 2006. Another 190,000 billion barrels per day is produced from CNOOC’s
offshore fields in Bohai Bay and South China Sea.81
Since the Bohai Bay region is estimated to hold more than 1.5 million barrels of
recoverable oil reserves, it has attracted the attention of major oil corporations. To
encourage exploration and development in the region, CNOOC initiated production
sharing contracts with international companies, such as ConocoPhillips, Kerr-McGee,
Apache, Chevron, and Royal Dutch Shell. “ConocoPhillips holds the largest acreage
with total discovered reserves estimated at 732 million barrels. ConocoPhillips has a
77
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forty-nine percent stake in the Bozhong 11/05 block and has produced 30,000 billion
barrels per day of crude oil from its Peng Lai 19-3 field since 2002.”82 In 2006, the
DOE/EIA reported that it was expected to produce 140,000 billion barrels per day.83
According to the IEA, China consumed 6.6 million barrels per day of oil and
imported 3.0 million barrels per day in 2005.84 Assuming the current rate of growth, the
EIA estimated that consumption in China would increase in 2006 by close to half million
barrels per day, or 7.4 million barrels per day of oil, which the EIA projected to represent
thirty-eight percent of the world total increase in demand.85 Other projections by Chinese
and international energy experts estimated that China’s oil demand in 2020 would range
from 10 to 13.6 million barrels per day, but China’s oil production would only range
from 2.7 to 4 million barrels per day.86 Based upon these predictions, imports of 6 to 11
million barrels per day would be needed to satisfy domestic demand. In weighing the
growth in demand against domestic supplies of oil, the Chinese leadership could not
ignore the potential for natural gas to supplement oil.
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(c) Natural Gas - Traditionally, natural gas has been a minor fuel in China. It has
been secondary to coal, oil and hydro power with the largest known reserves in the
western and north-central regions. The first year the Communists were in power, natural
gas output in China was only 7 million cubic meters the first year, but it had risen to more
than four times the 1949 level by 2000 with approximately 28 billion cubic meters of
output.87
In the 1990s, proven reserves were estimated at 1.5 Tcm.88 Although
more recent estimates by the Oil and Gas Journal place proven reserves at
53.3 Tcm, which is considerably greater than earlier estimates, natural gas
still accounted for only 3 percent of energy consumption by 2004.89
Since most of the earlier discoveries had been found near oil fields, natural gas
was used mostly for oil production which resulted in a highly fragmented transmission
and distribution network. Without a national natural gas pipeline grid, the domestic
market had been limited to local producing regions. As the economy continued to grow
throughout the 1990s, lack of an adequate infrastructure to transport natural gas to high
energy consuming markets in the east and south east became a major obstacle. However,
with foreign financial and technical assistance, gas pipelines increased to 9,112
kilometers in length with transporting capacity of approximately 10.5 billion cubic meters
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in 1996.90 By the beginning of 2006, plans were in place “to establish a more integrated
and complete oil pipeline network to better satisfy growing demand.”91
Along with aggressive development of indigenous natural gas, greater expansion
of the infrastructure for delivery to consumers, and increased importation of liquefied
natural gas in the last decade, the government began looking into alternative energy as a
means of meeting its energy demands.
(d) Alternative Energy Sources - In spite of the developments that had taken place by
2004, the leadership recognized additional diversification would be needed to keep pace
with projected increases in energy demand. The DOE/EIA projects that consumption of
every primary energy source will increase over the twenty-one year forecast horizon,
with the exception of nuclear.92 However, developing alternative energy sources, such as
hydropower, nuclear power, and renewable energy, requires significant investment and
technological development which does not take place over night.
Chinese leaders have encouraged enterprises to seek foreign supplies in an effort
to support continued economic growth in the short-term and to secure supplies for the
long-term. Although there has not been a significant focus on energy conservation as a
means of coping with domestic shortages, Premier Wen Jiabao did suggest in 2005 that
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energy conservation would be needed “to reconcile rapid economic growth with limited
energy resources.”93
C. Restructuring the Energy Industry to Support Economic Growth
China’s transformation from nearly complete reliance on coal to other sources of
energy began with economic reforms in the early 1980s. The leadership recognized a
need to “rejuvenate” the oil and gas industry which had been lagging under the Ministry
of Petroleum Industry.94 The reforms took place in two stages. The first stage involved
transition from inefficient management under the command economy system.

The

transition was initiated by contracting with the Ministry of Petroleum Industry for annual
production targets and allowing producers to sell excess oil in domestic markets. This
provided incentive for further exploration and development and investment funds for
technological improvements.
The second stage involved separating regulatory and commercial functions
(which had been centralized in the Ministry of Petroleum Industry) by abolishing the
Ministry and creating three national corporations to focus on exploration, production, and
marketing. Sinopec was created for refining and petrochemical production, primarily in
the south and east and China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) was created to
operate principally in the north and west. A third corporation, China National Offshore
93
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Oil Corporation was created to control exploration, development, and production of oil
and gas in China’s territorial waters.95 Further restructuring within these corporations
took place throughout the 1990s with the goal of creating vertically integrated oil and gas
companies that would be globally competitive.
After 1993, when China first began to rely on imported oil, the fear that shortages
could threaten growth of the domestic economy and political stability elevated the need
for a comprehensive energy policy. In May 1997, former Premier Li Peng wrote a policy
paper encouraging greater involvement in the exploration and development of
international oil and gas resources, and endorsing diversification of import sources and
transportation routes.96 In support of this policy position, the leadership encouraged
China National Offshore Oil Corporation, Sinopec, and CNPC to establish relationships
in other countries, to engage in production sharing contracts, and to negotiate joint
ventures that would enhance China’s energy supplies.

The government expanded

diplomatic relations with other countries which allowed the corporations to initiate deals
in Angola, Burma, Ecuador, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Libya,
Nigeria, Oman, Peru, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Thailand, Venezuela, and Yemen,
among others.97
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To facilitate foreign investment, the national corporations began to spin off or
eliminate unprofitable ancillary activities; they placed their most profitable, high quality
assets into subsidiaries; and they carried initial public offerings on the Hong Kong and
New York exchanges.98 China National Offshore Oil Corporation created and transferred
all its valuable commercial assets to its subsidiary, CNOOC Ltd. (CNOOC), which listed
on global markets in February 2001. The initial public offering was only for 27.5 percent
and only offered minority shares. Nearly seventy percent of CNOOC’s share capital
remained with its parent company.99
Although China’s entry into the global market was incremental, CNOOC
successfully generated interest from foreign operators anxious to get a foothold in China.
To this end, Kerr McGee, ChevronTexaco, Apache, EDC, Devon, Burlington, Phillips,
Husky, ConocoPhillips, and Devon Energy became involved in offshore areas.100
CNOOC’s foreign partners in Bohai Bay, its largest production area, include
ChevronTexaco, ConocoPhillips, and Devon Energy. Foreign investors have assisted
CNOOC with developing liquefied natural gas operations and China’s liquid natural gas
(LNG) infrastructure in Guangdong, Fujian, Shanghai, and Zhejiang. Other foreign
operators are involved with CNOOC in the South China Sea, Beibu Gulf and East China
Sea.
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In spite of successes, implementation of joint agreements with foreign
corporations has not been a smooth process. For instance, CNOOC and Sinopec entered
into a series of agreements with two multinational corporations, Royal Dutch/Shell Group
and Unocal, to set up what promised to become China’s largest offshore natural gas
project. The project was applauded as a significant step towards satisfying China’s
energy needs by producing gas from the Xihu trough, 250 miles southeast of Shanghai,
and transporting it by pipeline to the eastern coast. Not only would the pipeline provide
low-pollution natural gas to Shanghai, it would help meet the energy needs of other
industrial centers along the way.101 But just one year later, Royal Dutch/Shell and
Unocal announced they would be pulling out of the multibillion-dollar project for
commercial reasons,102 leaving China’s second and third largest domestic oil companies
the only players.103 This was the second large project that Shell abandoned in 2004,
having also pulled out of the west-east natural gas transportation project.104
Despite setbacks, China’s national energy corporations did not relinquish efforts
to engage foreign corporations in exploration and development pursuits. In 2005, CNPC,
the country’s largest player in terms of production and reserves, produced 1.3 trillion
cubic meters of natural gas in 2005 and Sinopec produced a total of 222 billion cubic
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feet.105 Meanwhile, CNOOC, which was in the forefront of natural gas development,
introduced plans to construct LNG import facilities in Guangdong, Fujian and Zhejiang
provinces.106
By 2005, CNPC had acquired interests in overseas exploration and production
which included investments in Sudan, Kazakhstan, Ecuador and Syria.

CNPC also

announced its intent to invest $18 billion in foreign oil and gas assets by 2020. In 2005,
Sinopec was also pursuing overseas opportunities.

Sinopec had already signed a

memorandum of understanding with the Iranian government to acquire a fifty-one
percent stake in the Yadavaran oil field; it was considering a $70 billion deal in which
China would import liquefied natural gas from Iran; and it had acquired a forty percent
stake in Synenco Energy’s oil sands project in Canada.107 Meanwhile, in addition to
bidding to acquire Unocal, CNOOC purchased Repsol-YPF’s oil interests in Indonesia,
making CNOOC the largest operator in the Indonesian offshore oil sector.108 In spite of
this breath of commercial activity, by mid-year, the contribution of China’s three national
energy corporations to oil imports was less than 300,000 billion barrels per day or 8.5
percent of total oil imports at that time.109
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D. Acquiring Foreign Energy Supplies to Support Economic Growth
Ever since 1993, China’s leaders have become more and more concerned that
energy shortages could threaten growth of the domestic economy and political instability.
This concern has been the impetus behind a strategy emphasizing diversification of oil
and gas imports and transport routes, and pursuit of oil deals with Russia and Central
Asian countries. The need for secure transportation routes has served to strengthen
China’s position towards reunification with Taiwan. Since the United States has pledged
its support of Taiwan in the event of a Chinese attack, the fear that U.S. control over
shipping in East China might inhibit Chinese trade is ever present in the leaders’ minds.
In pursuing foreign oil and gas supplies, the Chinese sought lessons from other
nations’ experiences. Learning from Japan’s mistakes, the Chinese modeled their entry
into the global energy system upon the American example. When Japan’s economy took
off in the 1960s and 1970s, the government focused on exploration and financed dozens
of small players. The Japanese companies were unable to compete with larger, wealthier,
and more experienced corporations.

They pursued small projects instead, but these

pursuits led to an inordinate number of dry wells. It is estimated that the Japanese spent
$50 billion for oil-exploration, yet nearly three decades later only 5.7 percent of Japan’s
oil imports come from Japanese-owned fields.110 By contrast, the Chinese government is
financing large corporations which can be competitive in the world energy market. These
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corporations are following the strategies of major international corporations by targeting
proven reserves and working wells.
At first, the Chinese national corporations sought import relationships with
smaller Middle Eastern states, such as Oman and Yemen, because they produced a light,
“sweet” crude oil that was compatible with China’s existing refineries.111 The Chinese
national corporations also established trade relationships with other small nations such as
Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Algeria, Egypt, Libya, and Sudan.
By the second part of the 1990s, the Chinese corporations turned their focus to the
primary producing areas in the Persian Gulf – Iraq, Iran, and Saudi Arabia. In 1997, after
the UN lifted sanctions on Iraq, Chinese national energy companies joined with China
North Industries Corporation to enter into a 22-year production-sharing agreement with
Saddam Hussein to develop Iraq’s second largest oil field. But the Chinese had not
predicted the U.S. war with Iraq and the uncertainty that would follow.112 As such,
according to energy expert Tong Lixia, the Iraq war was the “turning point” in China’s
energy strategy. It was the point at which Chinese “companies and the government
realized that China could not rely on one or two oil production areas.”113
The lesson in geopolitics that came out of the Iraq War did not go unheeded.
According to Shen Dingli, Fudan University international relations expert, China’s
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leadership has become more concerned about a future in which there might not be enough
oil to meet worldwide demand and this concern has led to the perception that the United
States is a major competitor.114 To remain competitive, China has initiated investments
and trade arrangements with foreign energy firms in primary producing areas beyond the
Middle East, particularly in North Africa and the Caspian Sea Basin. This “going out”
(zou chu qu) policy encouraged the three national oil companies to seek supplies by
purchasing equity shares in foreign markets, exploring and drilling in other countries,
building refineries, and building pipelines to connect China with Siberia and Central
Asia.115
Some analysts suggest the Chinese and their energy corporations are undertaking
the same strategies as the United States and the major energy corporations. For example,
a National Petroleum Council study, conducted at the request of Secretary of Energy
Spencer Abraham, recommended a strategy for improving supply diversity, encouraging
conservation and efficiency, improving demand flexibility and efficiency, sustaining and
enhancing natural gas infrastructure, and promoting the efficiency of natural gas
markets.116 Along these lines, the Chinese attempted to minimize their vulnerability to
foreign supply interruptions and trade embargos by diversifying import suppliers,
cultivating diplomatic relations with resource rich countries, establishing a physical
presence in producing regions, negotiating investment and trade deals, acquiring equity
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stakes in foreign exploration and production assets, developing alternate transportation
routes, and developing its own large-scale oil tanker fleet.117
Another mechanism the Chinese have adopted for minimizing vulnerability is
constructing an American-style strategic oil reserve along the Zhejiang province coast.
Beginning in 2005, the first phase included fifty-two tanks with capacity for 25 million
gallons of gasoline. The stated goal was to create a reserve large enough to support the
economy and allow the military to function for three months without imported oil.118 In
short, the basic energy security strategies the Chinese are pursuing include “maximum
development of domestic resources, creation of strategic reserves, seeking foreign
technology and investment, establishing reliable and secure oil trading channels, and
making strategic investments in upstream production facilities abroad.”119

II.

CONCLUSION

Although China and the United States have followed separate and distinct
development models, the two countries have emerged as the world’s largest and strongest
economies in the twenty-first century. While some may see this as an anomaly, it is
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clearly the result of an increasingly global economy and China’s conscious efforts to
become integrated into that economy.
China’s steady economic growth over the past thirty years has been dependent
upon a steady supply of energy. But unlike the United States, which has always relied
upon private entrepreneurs to meet its energy requirements, China has relied upon three
state-owned companies, China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), China
National Petrochemical Corporation (Sinopec), and China National Petroleum
Corporation (CNPC), rather than independent corporations, to engage in energy
transactions. While subject to government controls, these corporations are par t of the
two-stage reorganization program discussed in this chapter and may be viewed as
instruments for transitioning from a command economy to a more market-based
economy.
When China’s energy demand required its energy corporations to extend their
global reach and develop business deals in other countries, the corporations also began to
diversify the energy imports into China.120 The Chinese government provides these
corporations low-cost loans to assist their outreach efforts, and Chinese diplomats often
facilitate negotiation of exploration and drilling rights in foreign countries.121 Similarly,
while the U.S. government may not be directly involved in negotiating business deals, it
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certainly plays a role in the success of those deals by establishing diplomatic relations
and trade agreements with energy surplus countries.
China began establishing relationships with energy surplus countries nearly a
decade before it came to depend on foreign supplies. For example, in the mid-1980s,
China and Saudi Arabia initiated their relationship through military commerce;
established full diplomatic ties in 1990; and in 1999, President Jiang Zemin announced a
strategic oil partnership in which Saudi Arabia quickly became China’ number one
foreign supplier of crude oil.122 Similarly, China established a trade relationship with
Iran by supplying ballistic-missile components, air-, land-, and sea-based cruise missiles,
and by 2004 Iran had become China’s second largest supplier of oil.123
These trading relationships point to a second distinction between the rationale that
leaders in the U.S. and China give for engaging in the global energy system. Historically,
the U.S. government has restricted American firms by imposing trade policies which
reflect political or ideological goals, such as human rights agendas, the pursuit of
democracy, nuclear disarmament, or the war against terrorism.

But the Chinese

government refrains from imposing similar policy limitations on their national energy
corporations. Instead, the Chinese national corporations capitalize on relationships with
oil-rich states by distancing themselves from domestic human rights issues, by providing
foreign aid, by focusing on economic outputs rather than political inputs, and by
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engaging in trade in armaments and dual-use technologies. As a result, China has been
able to cultivate trade relationships with countries such as Iran, Syria, Libya, and Sudan
which have been characterized by the U.S. government as “an increasing threat to U.S.
security interests.”124
Chinese national corporations do not operate according to the same rules as the
major international oil companies. For example, Bader and Downs have observed, that
the national corporations “are not constrained by the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, by
OECD guidelines on export credit competition and tied loans, or by segregation from
other businesses that can be added to a package to make it more attractive, such as nonenergy construction and engineering projects.”125 This suggests that the U.S. and its
allies might have more leverage in preventing China from entering into business deals
which undermine efforts by the international community to influence how countries
spend their oil revenues if they would invite China more often to the decision making
table.126

More recently, as Erica Downs, China Energy Fellow at the Brookings

Institution, has indicated, the Chinese government has used its seat on the United
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National Security Council “to deflect international diplomatic pressure on a country in
which a Chinese oil company has substantial investments.” 127
A more recent feature of the Chinese model is the push to acquire oil and gas
fields. Even before the Iraq War and the CNOOC bid for Unocal, there were signs of
China’s increasing interest in acquiring foreign assets.

By 2005, the volume of

transactions involving a Chinese buyer and an international target rose to nearly $23
billion.128 Erica Downs suggests that this strategy is based on the assumption by some
“that oil obtained through foreign investment is more secure and less expensive than that
purchased on the international market.”129 If China’s national oil companies acquire
equity oil then the companies could send their foreign equity production to China in the
event that China has sufficient funds, but is unable to purchase enough oil on the world
market. But American energy experts contend there is no real advantage to owning oil
fields. While the Chinese may broker a deal to purchase supplies from energy rich
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countries, the deals may be of little consequence if they are not able to obtain secure lines
of supply.130
Chinese leaders share many of the same concerns as their American counterparts
when it comes to energy dependency. But the Chinese have an additional concern about
relying on supplies from politically volatile areas. They worry about relying on energy
supplies from regions where the United States is the preeminent power, and how they
would sustain economic growth and political stability if the United States were to cut
access to those supplies.131 As the Chinese economy has become increasingly dependent
upon maritime trade passing through the waters adjacent to the South China Sea, and
patrolled by the U.S. Navy, the Chinese feel much more vulnerable.132 Nearly eighty
percent of China’s oil imports are shipped through the Strait of Malacca. Gordon Feller
reported in the Pipeline and Gas Journal that approximately 2.45 million barrels per day
of oil moved through the Strait to China in 2004.133
Greater dependency and vulnerability, combined with the desire for peaceful
expansion, provides a strong incentive for diplomacy as a means of maintaining positive
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foreign policy relations with the United States. At the same time, the need for energy
security provides an incentive to look for reserves in areas closer to home, areas within
China’s range of military influence where its leaders might have greater bargaining
power and control over outside influences. The Chinese leadership has made a concerted
effort to build regional relationships which have been based on “a sophisticated blend of
trade, confidence building measures, and even development assistance.”134 But Beijing
has also encouraged global expansion into Africa, South America, and Central Asia as a
means of providing alternative sources of energy to its energy mix.
While some members of the U.S. Congress are encouraged by China’s
increasingly prominent role in the global economy, others are more leery of an increased
global influence that might replace that of the United States. Concerns about China have
been expressed in congressional hearings and debates ever since the Nixon
Administration when the U.S and China renewed diplomatic relations. Although U.S.China relations are complex, members of Congress tend to gravitate toward one extreme
or another based upon their personal values and ideologies. However, when CNOOC
indicated its interest in acquiring an American-owned oil corporation, members of
Congress coalesced to oppose the transaction in an unusually unified manner. This
phenomenon can be explained by the institutional approach to foreign policy analysis.
This chapter described China’s need to import energy and provided the rationale
behind CNOOC’s bid to purchase Unocal. The study now turns to a discussion of the
American political system, the political structures which have been institutionalized, the
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rules and norms which have led to incessant competition between the executive and
legislative branches.

According to the integrated approach to institutionalism,

institutional structures, rules, and values impose constraints on actors within policy
making institutions that make policy change difficult at best. The process is fragmented
and slow. As a consequence, institutional actors will often turn to informal mechanisms
to accomplish policy goals.
Chapter 3 sheds light on how the American Constitution operates to reinforce
democratic principles and ensure that no one branch of government becomes too
powerful, but also provides for a modicum of creativity in which individuals may serve
as instruments of change. Analysis of evolution of the institutions of the presidency and
the legislature lends insight into the state of the conflict between the two branches in
2005 when George W. Bush and the 109th Congress were responding to the issues of
peak energy, growing competition from China in the global economy, and vulnerability
to terrorist attacks. It is the understanding of this inter-institutional conflict that provides
an explanation as to why Congress politicized the CNOOC bid for Unocal.
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CHAPTER THREE:
INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE PRESIDENCY AND CONGRESS

I.

INTRODUCTION

This chapter examines the formation of institutional structures, the historical
processes which have shaped the American presidency and Congress, and the infusion of
values into these institutions.

It also considers how certain values have come to

transcend those of any single individual, and how these values support the basic tenants
of American democracy and the market economy.

Once these characteristically

American institutions and values were in place, they began to shape future political
discourse and policy formation.
The foundation of the American political system and its institutions is the
Constitution. In crafting the Constitution, the Founding Fathers debated what kind of
system would provide stability while reinforcing democratic principles.

The final

solutions was a division of powers among executive, legislative, and judicial branches
and a system of “checks and balances” which defined separate powers for each branch
including the power to question how each of the other branches exercises its authority.
In practice, this American system of governance is dynamic and policy making is
in a constant state of flux characterized by a continuous struggle for power between
Congress and the executive branch. Although powers are defined, there is always room
for interpretation of these powers and the president and Congress are often tempted to
63

push their limits. As one branch asserts its influence over a policy issue, the other reacts
to restrain that influence.135 While this system allows for policy change, change is
incremental and may lead to temporary imbalances in power. The system of “checks and
balances” provides a mechanism for the system to resolve political imbalances and move
back towards a state of equilibrium.
We begin this chapter with an overview of the American Constitution and a
discussion of how it defined the authorities of each branch of government. Congress was
designed as a pluralistic institution intended to “represent the people and enact policies in
response to the popular will through a complex deliberative process.”136 The executive
branch was designed to function under the guidance of a single individual elected to
protect the nation’s stability and security by implementing laws and responding quickly
to crises.

The federal court system was designed to interpret laws and protect

constitutional rights and liberties. The founders hoped this structure would provide for a
long-lasting and effective system of governance.
After discussing the foundation upon which the system is based, we move to a
discussion of the processes by which the executive and legislative branches became
institutionalized; how institutionalization of these two branches ensured that fundamental
values underlying the American democratic system would transcend any changes in
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executive or legislative leadership; and how institutionalization created constraints on
individual actors but left the door open for them to devise informal mechanisms of
change.
This overview is significant in that this study’s analytic approach is based on a
socio-historical perspective which assumes institutions are shaped by history and infused
with values. While values are important in the formation of institutional structures, rules
and standards and tend to persist over time, the conditions that existed during the
formative years may change. The integrated approach to new institutionalism suggests
that institutions which are capable of adapting to change are more likely to survive in an
evolutionary environment.

However, the more the structures and rules are

institutionalized, the more difficult it is to change course. Therefore, institutional actors
responsible for policy making often adopt informal mechanisms for change.

These

mechanisms may become institutionalized or they may merely be tolerated as acceptable.
Familiarity with the historical background in which the American political institutions
were created, and the values underlying these institutional structures, will lead to better
understanding of why certain issues and events (such as CNOOC’s proposed acquisition
of Unocal) are politicized in an effort to accomplish long-term policy goals. Since there
is no express provision in the Constitution concerning regulation of foreign investment in
the United States, we must look to other federal powers mentioned in the Constitution to
understand politicization of foreign investment policies and regulations.
The genius of the American Constitution is that it gave shape to the government
and defined the boundaries and limits of the government at the same time that it provided
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for fundamental rights which would be protected from temporary changes and political
influence.137 It fulfilled the need for a “kind of social compact – a basic agreement
among citizens, and between citizens and state, setting out mutual rights and duties, in
permanent form.”138
The Constitution created a republican form of government in which the people are
the ultimate power, but they transfer that power to representatives elected to govern on
their behalf. While the Founding Fathers conceived of a dominant national government
which would limit the powers of the individual states, concerns over creating a system in
which power might be too centralized led them to include discretionary language in the
Constitution which divided powers among executive, legislative, and judicial branches.139
Each of these branches was granted separate powers, but they were also required to share
powers.
The Constitution vests executive powers in the president and provides for
executive checks on the legislature which include emergency calling into session of one
or both houses of Congress; forced adjournment when both houses cannot agree on
adjournment; presidential veto of legislation; and serving as commander in chief of the
military. Although the president has the power to oversee matters concerning foreign
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nations, the Founding Fathers gave Congress policy making and budgetary powers to
ensure that the president would not be able to assert absolute control over the
government.140 Legislative checks on the executive include the power to provide for the
common defense and general welfare of the United States; the power to declare war;
House impeachment power; Senate trial of impeachments; Senate approval of
departmental and U.S. Supreme Court appointments; Senate approval of treaties and
ambassadors; and legislative override of presidential vetoes.141 Two of the constitutional
bases for legislation concerning foreign investment are the power to regulate interstate
and foreign commerce142 and the power to provide for national defense.143
By institutionalizing the system of “checks and balances,” the founders created a
tension between the executive and legislative branches that is reflected in the policy
making process. While attempting to resolve important and controversial issues the
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president and Congress compete for autonomy and decision making authority.144
Although this struggle is constant, it is tempered by the institutionalization of values that
are biased towards reaching a state of equilibrium. The tendency towards equilibrium in
domestic governance often prevails over efficient, or optimal, policy formulation.145
Nonetheless, greater understanding of the institutional dynamics and how they have
evolved over time will lend insight into how or why the president or Congress may
choose to politicize particular issues while formulating policies.146
The struggle for control over foreign policy had clearly emerged by the beginning
of the twentieth century, but the first major congressional challenge to the president’s
foreign policy prerogative did not occur until the years between World War I and World
War II.147 But after WWII, Congress rarely seemed to oppose the president’s foreign
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policy decisions.148 Scholars have suggested that congressional deference was due in part
to executive leadership in winning the war and in part to recognition that the president
had advantages such as greater access to intelligence, the ability to function outside
public scrutiny, and the ability to take decisive action, especially in times of crisis.149
The semblance of acquiescence began to change after the 91st Congress when
Senator Fulbright, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and a loyal ally
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of President Johnson, began to challenge the president’s foreign policy initiatives.150 In
particular, Fulbright objected to the president’s handling of military intervention in Santo
Domingo which he claimed was a violation of a “treaty which had been solemnly ratified
with the consent of the Senate.”151
Although Senator Fulbright recognized presidential authority for making
decisions and taking actions in emergency situations, he concluded that a series of crises
over the past twenty-five years had led to an “unhinging of traditional constitutional
relationships” in which the Senate’s constitutional powers of advice and consent had
“atrophied into . . . a duty to give prompt consent with a minimum of advice.”152 In
Fulbright’s view, the Senate’s responsibility was
to review the conduct of foreign policy by the President and his advisers,
to render advice whether it is solicited or not, and to grant or withhold its
consent to major acts of foreign policy. In addition the Congress has a
traditional responsibility, in keeping with the spirit if not the precise words
of the Constitution, to serve as a forum of diverse opinions and as a
channel of communication between the American people and their
government. The discharge of these functions is not merely a prerogative
of the Congress; it is a constitutional obligation, for the neglect of which
the Congress can and should be called to public account.153
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At first, Senator Fulbright’s concerns did not seem to be felt to the same extent in
the House. For example, while the House Foreign Affairs Committee favorably reported
a resolution proposed by the president in support of his foreign policy efforts, the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee adopted an alternative resolution requiring “affirmative
action by Congress” to commit armed forces abroad.154 After Johnson announced he
would not run for re-election, the Senate withheld the resolution from the floor, but
Fulbright responded to the power that President Johnson had amassed by forming an ad
hoc Subcommittee on U.S. Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad chaired by
Senator Stuart Symington.

The subcommittee’s stated purpose was to review

international military commitments and the relationship of those commitments to U.S.
foreign policy.155 Its underlying purpose was to facilitate Fulbright in asserting his own
foreign policy initiatives.
The cleavage between the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and President
Johnson set the foreign policy tone for the next decade and beyond. After the Vietnam
War and the Watergate scandal led to a loss of confidence in executive leadership there
were additional challenges to executive powers.156 Beginning in 1973 with the War
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Powers Act,157 the legislature became more assertive in restricting the executive power to
make foreign policy by mandating prior consultation with Congress.158 The following
year, Congress went a step further and imposed human rights issues into U.S.-Soviet
policy with the Jackson-Vanik Amendment (“Jackson-Vanik”) to the Trade Act.159
Although Jackson-Vanik denied the president wholesale authority to grant Most
Favored Nation (“MFN”) status to any “non-market economy” (such as the Soviet Union
and China) that prevented free emigration, it did permit the president to allow MFN
treatment on an annual basis subject to legislative veto by a majority of Congress. After
a 1983 Supreme Court decision made the legislative veto unconstitutional, Congress
amended Jackson-Vanik to allow legislative rejection of the president’s annual extension
of MFN through a joint resolution of disapproval.160 Unlike the previous amendment, the
joint resolution was subject to presidential veto and required two-thirds vote of both the
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House and the Senate to overrule a presidential decision to extend MFN status. As a
consequence, each year as presidents would consider extension of MFN to China,
Congress would engage in debates as to whether that status should be extended or not.
These debates were replete with innuendos concerning communism and China’s foreign
and domestic policies.
Throughout the 1980s Congress struggled with determining where to draw the
line between its foreign policy making authority and the president’s.

Japanese

technology was gaining a stronger foothold in the American market and some legislators
were concerned about the possibility that Japanese corporations might acquire industries
deemed essential to U.S. commerce and national security. Senator Exon (D-NE) and
Representative Florio (D-NJ) sponsored an amendment to the Defense Production Act of
1950 to authorize executive review of all foreign investments that might undermine
national security. The Exon-Florio Amendment passed in 1988 with the expectation that
the president would intervene and block foreign acquisitions of American corporations
that threatened national security.
Ever since its enactment, Congress has reviewed the impact that the Exon-Florio
Amendment has had on foreign acquisitions. Ironically, by drafting legislation with the
intent of protecting national security without compromising free trade and proprietary
rights of private businesses, Congress had created a situation in which they had excluded
themselves from legislative oversight. The secrecy necessitated by executive review of
confidential business transactions led some legislators to suspect that presidents were
being too lenient in interpreting and implementing their authority under Exon-Florio.
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Concerns about implementation of Exon-Florio continued to exist even after
President George W. Bush reorganized his administration to protect the homeland from
national security threats. This study analyzes the tension between Congress and the
White House over foreign policy and the difficulty that both branches face in balancing
free trade values with the national security imperatives.

The analysis leads to the

conclusion that congressional challenges to presidential authority, as demonstrated by the
politicization of CNOOC’s proposed acquisition of Unocal, may become more pervasive
with regards to U.S.-China policy.161

II.

INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND POLICY MAKING

Institutionalization is defined as a process by which an organization “acquires
value and stability” by attaining high levels of autonomy, adaptability, complexity and
coherence.162

In discussing the evolution of the American political system, this

dissertation shows how institutional characteristics have created opportunities as well as
constraints for the president to assert foreign policy making powers. Similarly, it shows
how institutionalization has created opportunities and constraints for Congress to assert
its legislative muscle in the foreign policy arena. Even though there is a constant tension
between the two institutions, accompanied by varying levels of support for the president
161
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among individual legislators, Congress has successfully enacted major legislation to
guide the president in balancing economic goals with national security goals.163 Analysis
of the tension between the two institutions will help explain Congress’ efforts to
politicize CNOOC’s proposed acquisition of Unocal in 2005.
A. Institutionalization of Presidential Powers
1. Characteristics of the Institutionalized Presidency
(a) Autonomy - During much of its history, the office of the president consisted
only of the president and some low-level staff, administrative functions were limited to
national defense, and the presidency demonstrated few institutional qualities.164 Some
scholars have traced the institutionalization of the presidency to 1921 when Congress
enacted the Budget and Accounting Act.165

Previously, Congress had been wholly

responsible for the structure and program responsibilities of the executive branch,
including preparing the national budget. But the Budget and Accounting Act transferred
this congressional power to the presidency by requiring that the president draft the budget
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with the assistance of the newly established Bureau of the Budget (BOB), which was
housed in the Treasury.166
The Economy Act of 1933 gave the president limited authority to reorganize the
executive branch.

Then, in 1939, Congress further strengthened the president’s

managerial responsibilities by statutorily authorizing the president to issue executive
orders proposing reorganization within the executive branch that would reduce
expenditures and increase efficiency. A president’s reorganization order was to become
effective after sixty days unless either the House or Senate adopted a resolution of
disapproval.

President Roosevelt used this statutory authority to propose a

Reorganization Plan to Congress, and some scholars trace the institutionalization of the
presidency to the reorganization that followed. 167 After obtaining congressional consent,
Roosevelt issued Executive Order 8248 to create the Executive Office of the President
(EOP) and the White House Office (WHO) within the EOP. Executive Order 8248 also
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transferred the Bureau of the Budget, later to become the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB), from the Treasury Department to the EOP.168
In establishing the Executive Office, Roosevelt made some significant changes in
presidential staffing. He added six presidential assistants to his staff and differentiated
between secretaries who had substantive responsibilities and administrative assistants
who fulfilled other responsibilities and gathered information at the president’s request.
By moving the Bureau of the Budget into the Executive Office, Roosevelt helped
strengthen presidential control over fiscal planning. Over time, the Executive Office of
the President has expanded to include a number of advisory and policy-making agencies
and task forces. Modern presidents exercise additional powers with their ability to
determine which powers shall be granted to the vice president, which individuals shall be
given cabinet-level status, and which of those individuals shall carry more influence over
the president’s decision making process. The status the president grants to each of his
advisors in the EOP is an indicator of the president’s policy preferences.
Although budget allocations have varied from one Congress to the next, over the
years, the executive budget has grown incrementally along with the staffing.

For

example, before the reorganization in 1939, there were thirty-five employees serving in
the BOB, but in less than ten years the staff had increased to more than 600, and over the
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same time period the bureau’s budget had increased from less than $200,000 to nearly $3
million.169 Today, the exact size of the president’s staff is not exactly clear. According
to Burke, this is because presidents borrow staff from other agencies and departments,
and because presidents have “incentives to limit the officially reported size of the staff”
to avoid “an outcry by Congress and the public.”170
Over time, the expansion of the EOP required more than additional staff, it
required greater managerial expertise.171 Presidents tended to emphasize managerial
expertise until the Nixon Administration when “the impetus for staff institutionalization
shifted significantly toward reducing political uncertainty.”172 As Nixon encouraged
tight control over administrative agencies, the White House staff grew more influential.
Today, the White House Office is even larger, staff functions have become increasingly
specialized with more levels of hierarchy, and presidents have much more autonomy than
in the past.173
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Another measure of executive autonomy is the extent to which the presidency
provides leadership and offers policy directives independent of other branches of the
government. It has been noted that the president’s dual roles of leader and administrative
clerk are often in conflict.174 But the leadership role is instrumental to managing foreign
policy and diplomatic crises.
Although the Founding Fathers had envisioned Congress as the lawmaking body,
executive influence over law-making has expanded over time. President Franklin D.
Roosevelt established precedence for the president’s new policy-making role when he
declared to the nation, “It is the duty of the President to propose and it is the privilege of
Congress to dispose.”175

Since Roosevelt’s presidency, this concept has been

institutionalized to the extent that the public now expects the president to formulate a
legislative package, and the president expects his party to support his legislative package
within Congress.

But, even with this expanded power, presidents continue to have

difficulty getting their proposals through Congress, especially when the presidency and
Congress are controlled by different political parties.
Presidents attempt to increase their influence over Congress by relying upon a
patronage system consisting of personal favors such as inviting individual legislatures to
meetings in the White House or making campaign visits to their home districts.
Presidents also attempt to influence policy through executive orders. Authority to issue
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executive orders is derived from the “take care” clause in the Constitution whereby the
president has the power to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”176 The
Supreme Court has interpreted the “take care” clause to authorize the president to take
such actions as necessary to carry out laws passed by Congress or to enforce existing
laws and the Constitution.177
After Roosevelt carried out the first Reorganization Plan, Congress reviewed the
president’s statutory authority to issue executive orders under the Reorganization Act.
Congressional review was based on a provision in the act that allowed Congress to
disapprove a plan. Then, in 1983, the Supreme Court invalidated congressional reliance
upon a concurrent resolution to disapprove a proposed plan in INS v. Chadha.178 In
response to the Supreme Court decision, Congress enacted the Reorganization Act
Amendments of 1984. The amendments allowed the president to make changes to his
plan any time during the sixty calendar days of continuous session of Congress in which
it was submitted. But the act also provided that both houses must adopt a joint resolution
for approval within ninety days of continuous session. This amendment only continued
until the end of 1984 when it automatically expired.179 No president since Reagan has
sought this reorganization authority.
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In the absence of reorganization plan authority, the president may propose
executive branch reorganization through the normal legislative process. But this process
is often slow, lacks a time frame, and does not mandate a vote. The president can attempt
minor reorganization, such as creating temporary entities, through directives such as
executive orders, but this approach is inadequate for major organizational changes.
Although executive orders are often administrative in nature, they have become
increasingly “policy-specific” over time.180

But there are several constraints upon

presidents who wish to accomplish policy goals through executive orders. First, the
executive order lacks permanency. It has become increasingly common for presidents to
revoke executive orders signed by previous administrations by issuing new executive
orders that accomplish their own policy agendas. A second constraint is the power of
Congress to pass laws which modify or overturn executive orders. This constraint has
not been a significant deterrent to presidents as they know that a slow and tedious
lawmaking process may prevent legislative action. A third constraint is the judicial
power to declare an executive order unconstitutional. However, such rulings are rare
since the courts are reluctant to interfere with the executive’s authority over his staff. In
short, the Constitution provides these types of checks and balances to limit executive
powers; but the fact that they are rarely used in practice has contributed to increased use
of executive orders and the expansion of presidential autonomy.
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Another mechanism contributing to the institutionalization of the presidency
stems directly from the Constitution.

Article 1, section 7 stipulates how bills are

presented to the president and how the president may veto or modify bills presented to
him. If the president approves the bill, “he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with
his Objections to the House in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the
Objections at large on their Journal, and proceed to reconsider it.” If two-thirds of each
house supports the president’s recommendations, the bill will become law.
This signing statement consists of commentary that the president writes to
accompany a bill when he signs it into law. Over the years it has evolved into a
“multipurpose device” with a number of different uses. It can be used to influence
political actors or to challenge the constitutionality of certain provisions of the bill
pursuant to the president’s Article 2 “take care” and “oath of office” powers. Or it can be
used simply as a rhetorical tool to alert the public as to the president’s position
concerning certain aspects of the bill.181
Signing statements have long been used by presidents to assert their authority
after Congress passes major legislation that threatens presidential power and autonomy in
the policy making process.

Kelley and Marshall trace the first use of the signing

statement to President James Monroe, but their research suggests that the signing
statement first attained “strategic importance” with the Reagan presidency and two
significant Supreme Court decisions in which the Court relied in part on President
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Reagan’s signing statements to reach their decisions.182 The signing statement is a
“formidable” tool because it provides the president with a “last-move advantage” after a
long sequence of political bargaining.183
(b) Adaptability – Adaptability is based on an awareness of internal and external
environments and refers to the ability to take action to achieve a balance between the two.
The adaptive function is a means by which an institution may modify its internal
structures to meet the requirements of a constantly changing external environment.184
This second feature of the institutionalized presidency refers to “the flexibility presidents
have to create, modify, and eliminate units and the resilience of key units no matter who
is president.”185 Like autonomy, adaptability increases the potential for the presidency to
act independently of other branches of government. For example, when presidents take
office, their first task is to set up a system for managing the White House activities and
staff. It is not unusual for presidents to add some units that support high presidential
priorities and abolish others that do not, but for the most part, presidents have tended to
follow a fairly consistent model. This model includes a chief of staff who assumes
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responsibility for organizing the White House and a cabinet consisting of the vice
president and heads of administrative agencies.

Because of the complexity of the

institutional structure and the wide variety of policy issues which the president must
address, the role of the chief of staff has become increasingly important to modern
presidents.186 During the George W. Bush presidency, the vice president’s involvement
in executive decision making was elevated to a new level as will be discussed later.
(c)

Complexity – Ragsdale and Theis suggest that the last two features of

institutionalism – complexity and coherence – are indicative of the president’s ability to
make internal changes in response to external forces. Complexity reflects “increased
division of labor and specialization” which enhances institutional stability by making it
more difficult to dissolve administrative units.187 Measures of complexity include the
total administrative units within the organization and the amount of staffing.

As

institutional complexity increases there will be “more discussion points, vetoes,
jurisdictional conflicts, and decisions” which may contribute to an individual president’s
knowledge-base, but may also diminish the efficiency of his decision making powers. 188
There is no question regarding the degree of complexity in the executive branch.
In 2005, there were over 2.7 million federal employees in the executive branch and the
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president was responsible for appointing a small minority of these employees. As a
consequence, presidents have valued the role that political appointees play in advancing
policy agendas.

While expanding policy making authority, the presidency has also

sought to expand its control over White House and administrative agency staff. Political
appointees grew from 1,229 in the Clinton Administration to 2,000 in the Bush
Administration – over thirty-three percent.189 The highest level appointees, such as
cabinet secretaries, are subject to Senate confirmation, and these appointees are
responsible for appointing their assistants.
“Virtually all administrations over the past half century have embraced some
version of a three-tiered layer cake for interagency policy making.”190 The top tier
consists of the cabinet secretaries who are subject to Senate confirmation.

These

appointees are responsible for appointing their assistants, the intermediate tier deputies
who are second or third in charge of the departments and agencies. The bottom tier
consists of assistant secretaries and below. These lower tier employees often retain
employment from one president to the next and tend to identify more closely with the
mission of their agencies than the president’s policy agenda.

The diversity of the

administrative work force may create pressure points for individual presidents who seek
to impose policy agendas on the administrative agencies, but it helps build the fourth
essential characteristic of institutionalization – coherence.
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(d) Coherence – Coherence reflects the ability of an organization to manage its
workload and includes “universalistic rather than particularistic criteria, and automatic
rather than discretionary methods for conducting internal business.”191

Over time, job

criteria are developed and the workload begins to follow predictable patterns; daily tasks
become more automatic and stability increases.192 As coherence in personnel increases it
tends to transcend changes in presidents and changes in party leadership which ultimately
strengthen the office of the presidency.193 At the same time, increased coherence may
make it more difficult for the president to impose his individual preferences in the policy
making process.
One of the most obvious measures of coherence may be found in the civil service
system in which administrative staff is protected from being dismissed once a new
president or a president from a different political party takes office. The magnitude and
extent of the administrative bureaucracy’s influence acts not only to ensure stability, but
also reinforces the tendency towards institutional stasis.
In short, an individual president’s influence over the policy agenda is subject to
the institutional constraints that have been formalized by the Constitution, statutes, and
case law.

The constraints that the president faces vary from one administration to

another. In the domestic arena, the president is challenged by the constraints imposed by
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Congress and the judiciary.

But, in the foreign policy arena, the president is also

challenged by external constraints imposed by other nation-states and demanded by the
need to protect national security. How well the president is able to manage or overcome
these institutional constraints depends upon informal mechanisms, such as his leadership
skills, the organizational structure that he establishes within the White House and
Executive Office, and how that structure facilitates the president’s understanding of the
political dynamics and allows him to utilize his special decision making skills.
2. The President’s Formal and Informal Powers
Institutional theory suggests that American presidents are bestowed with both
formal and informal powers upon taking office. We have stated previously how the
president’s formal powers arise from constitutional authority, statutes, and case law.
Although the Constitution grants the president specific powers, it provides little guidance
on how the president should structure an administration to implement these powers.194
For example, article 2, section 1(2), empowers the president to nominate and appoint, “by
and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate,” ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, judges of the Supreme Court, “and all other Officers of the United States” whose
appointments are not otherwise provided by the Constitution or established by law. The
Constitution also provides that “Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such
inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone.”

How the president

executes his powers of appointment has been shaped by historical precedent, legislative
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acts, and decisions of the Supreme Court.195 In the absence of specific legislation, the
president has considerable autonomy and flexibility in the authority he delegates to his
political appointees and how he interacts with them.
Since informal powers are not specifically delineated by law, they arise from the
historical setting and the political climate existing at the time the president is elected.
Informal powers continue to evolve throughout the president’s term of office. Each
president’s informal powers are shaped by his personality, world view, and leadership
style; the “political capital” that he accumulates prior to taking office; and the set of skills
he possesses for managing the endless number of institutional conflicts and constraints
that he faces during his administration.
There are many definitions of “world view.” This study draws its definition from
cognitive philosophy which provides that a person’s world view originates from his
unique experiences in society, emanates from his socio-economic position, and reflects
his religious background, education, ethics, and basic beliefs. This world view becomes
part of the president’s personality and is manifested in his leadership style.
“Political capital” is often bestowed upon the president by virtue of winning the
election. This power is a function of the president’s electoral margin, party support in
Congress, public approval, and patronage appointments.196 When a president wins by a
landslide, or even a comfortable majority vote, he tends to assume he has been granted a
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popular mandate to implement his political agenda.197 When the president wins in a close
election his political capital is diminished.
The president’s informal powers arise out of the organizational structures and
decision making processes he adopts and the political appointments he makes. The
structural components are subject to the president’s management skills and influence his
ability to collect, analyze, and evaluate the options available for accomplishing political
goals.198 But the compartmentalization of formal organization structures creates barriers
to the decision making process. Informal structures are not found on organization charts,
but create links across the formal lines of authority and communications and are a way of
breaking down structural barriers.199
B. George W. Bush’s Presidency
1. Historical Setting and Political Climate
Historically it is during political campaigns that presidential candidates begin to
disclose their world views, define their political agendas, accumulate political capital, and
set the tone of their leadership styles. The focus in the 2000 presidential campaign was
on values and domestic policy, not foreign policy. George W. Bush used vigorous
language in his campaign speeches, yet carefully avoided engaging in any lengthy
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discourse regarding specific foreign policy issues. No longer faced with Cold War
conflicts fabricated by two contending superpowers, Bush suggested that future threats
would come from “rogue nations and terrorists.” He cited a need to prepare for future
challenges by creating military forces which would be “more agile, harder to find, easier
to move, readily deployable, and lethal in action.”200
In regards to foreign trade, Bush extolled the same benefits that Clinton did – an
open global economy in which American enterprise and values would prevail.201 But
Bush attempted to distinguish himself from Clinton in his occasional remarks concerning
China. Bush described China as a “strategic competitor” as opposed to Clinton’s
characterization of China as a “strategic partner.”202

Beyond these generalizations,

substantive foreign policy discussions were virtually absent from the campaign.203
With foreign policy in the background, George W. Bush was able to focus on
domestic policy and the GOP’s goal of restoring the party to power. The Republican
establishment recognized Bush as a winner – a candidate who was loyal to conservative
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values, but was not divisive. While the Bush name was well respected, George W. Bush
himself had the advantage of not being burdened by Washington politics.204 This was a
welcome relief to the party as well as to the American public which had been outraged by
Clinton’s actions which signaled disrespect for the office.
Although the 2000 election brought victory to the Republican Party, it was
tarnished by controversy over the Florida ballots. After losing the popular vote in a
disputed election and waiting thirty-six days for the Supreme Court to make its narrow 54 decision regarding the Electoral College vote, President Bush was left with very little
political capital to build upon. President Bush faced another disadvantage because his
Republican Party only held a majority in Congress by a slight margin. The Senate was
evenly divided with Vice President Cheney breaking the tie and the House was split 221212.
The lack of political capital and experience in Washington had potential for
inhibiting President Bush’s ability to govern. After the Supreme Court’s decision, Bush
had less than fifty days to hire his staff. To make matters worse, the number of positions
requiring Senate confirmation had increased in recent years which meant it could have
taken much longer to fill key appointments. Yet, Bush was up to the challenge and did
not assume office with the restraint that one might have expected from his narrow and
disputed victory.
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George W. Bush’s leadership style and commitment to strengthen the ranks of the
Republican Party allowed him to solidify his base of support and overcome these
disadvantages. He made structural changes within the EOP that reflected his own goals
and approach to governing, he elevated the status of the Vice President, and he moved
quickly to fill Senate confirmed positions.205 In spite of these obstacles he filled political
appointments on an average of 8.3 months from nomination to confirmation, which was
not much longer than the average of his immediate predecessors, Bill Clinton and George
H.W. Bush.206
In short, President George W. Bush inherited institutional constraints typical to
other presidencies, including prior budget commitments and foreign treaty obligations, as
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well as constraints unique to his own presidency. All of these constraints limited his time
and ability to collect and analyze information, and also restricted the options for
implementing his presidential agenda.

Nonetheless, President Bush followed the

precedent established by previous presidents when he focused on the power of informal
mechanisms to overcome institutional constraints. This study argues that it is the formal
constraints created by the American Constitution, statutes, and case law that has
contributed to the need for actors within the executive and legislative branches to rely
upon informal mechanisms to accomplish policy goals.
2. Developing a Leadership Style
Since our laws grant the president broad discretion in how he organizes the White
House, he is able to set up structures that reinforce his own world view and values, and
these are manifested in his leadership style. George W. Bush’s world view was shaped
by his Harvard Business School experiences, his tenure as a corporate executive, and
observations of his father’s successes and failures as President of the United States.
Bush’s world view, in turn, helped shape the focus of his campaign for the presidency
and his presidential leadership style. According to Daalder and Lindsay, Bush identified
three essential challenges for the president: (1) the challenge of leadership which is to
“outline a clear vision and agenda,” (2) the challenge of building a strong team of
effective people to implement the president’s agenda, and (3) the challenge of sticking to
an opinion even when the polls show the public moving in the opposite direction.207
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Daalder and Lindsay suggest that what made Bush unique among presidents was
his “logic about how America should act in the world.” 208 Bush believed that the key to
securing America’s interests in the world was primacy in a hegemonic world order. This
view was based on five propositions that are consistent with realist theory: (1) the world
is a dangerous place, (2) the key players in world affairs are self-interested nation states,
(3) the key to survival is power, (4) multilateral institutions and agreements are not
necessarily conducive to achieving American interests, and (5) the United States is a
unique power with a focus on personal freedoms and open markets.209
Bush’s strategy for working with Congress was similar to that which he pursued
as governor in Texas where he developed proposals that appealed to both Democrats and
Independents. Upon taking federal office, he deviated little from the agenda that he had
described on the campaign trail.

His agenda was a narrow one intended to limit

competition among issues for public attention and congressional support. His tax cuts
appealed to the Republican base that elected him and his education reforms were a way to
reach across party lines to win over moderates. But one of the more difficult issues on
the presidential agenda was that of energy security, which meant creating energy
independence and economic security.210
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There was increased pressure on both Congress and the presidency to elevate
energy policy on their political agendas after California’s energy crisis had brought about
blackouts. Upon taking office, President Bush acknowledged the energy crisis as the
most important task of his presidency. Shortly afterwards he created a task force of
senior government representatives, called the National Energy Policy Development
Group (NEPDG), with Vice President Cheney as chair to develop a long-range plan to
meet American’s energy requirements.
The NEPDG released a report on May 17, 2001 which called for drilling in the
Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR) at the same time that it blocked an increase in
fuel efficiency standards. The report created strong opposition within the environmental
community and Democratic representatives in Congress. Although it was controversial,
the proposed drilling in ANWR allowed the Bush Administration to claim commitment to
a policy of independence from the Middle East. Actually, as Michael Klare points out,
the report did not offer a real plan for decreasing dependence on imported oil.211 Instead,
it supported the priority of increasing and protecting the flow of petroleum from foreign
sources to U.S. markets.212
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Support from Tom DeLay and other House leaders, was instrumental to forming a
coalition with Democrats from oil and gas states and other interest groups, such as the
Teamsters, to move the energy policy through Congress. The president won a 240-189
victory in the House, but the Senate was more challenging, especially after the
unexpected defection of life-long Republican Senator Jeffords to the Democratic Party.
Losing the majority in the Senate meant losing the advantages that come with majority
status, including control over the timing and substance of the legislative agenda. As a
consequence, Bush’s team of advisors assumed a key role in moving his energy agenda
forward – especially after 9/11 when the focus turned to national security.
Finally, Bush persevered with his commitment to stick to an opinion once it had
been formed. Reflecting on his accomplishments, George W. Bush stated that he would
“like to be remembered as a person who first and foremost, did not sell his soul in order
to accommodate the political process.” He proudly proclaimed, “I came to Washington
with a set of values, and I’m leaving with the same set of values, and I darn sure wasn’t
going to sacrifice those values; that I was a president that had to make tough choices and
was willing to make them.”213 Bush believed that leaders should not succumb to public
opinion, but should adhere to what they believe is the best course of action.
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demonstrated this belief in his commitment to the war on terror and military action in
Iraq. It was also an attitude reflected in diplomacy and U.S. China foreign policy.
3. Creating a Organizational Structure and Decision Making Scheme
(a)

Political Appointments – Political appointments are at the heart of the

executive organizational structure and the president’s decision making scheme. The
tradition of the president’s cabinet may be traced back to the beginning of the presidency
itself. Based on article 2, section 2 of the U.S. Constitution, one of the principal purposes
of the cabinet is to advise the president on any subject he may require relating to the
duties of their respective offices.214 Traditionally, the president’s cabinet has consisted of
the vice president and secretaries of the executive departments.
President Bush took great strides to appoint key individuals within his cabinet (as
well as the White House and administrative bureaucracy) who shared his world view and
ideology. He also focused on honoring political obligations and achieving diversity.
Consistent with his business management background, Bush appointed a cabinet that
symbolized corporate America.215 The key appointees and their influence over Bush’s
foreign policy decisions are discussed below.
First, and foremost, was Vice President Cheney who began a career in public
service when he joined the Nixon Administration in 1969 and then later served on
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Congress representing the State of Wyoming. But Cheney also had a distinguished career
in business and he was CEO of Halliburton Corporation when he joined Bush’s campaign
ticket. Although business experience was prevalent in Bush’s political appointments,
Kenneth Walsh notes that when Bush asked the head of his vice presidential search team,
Dick Cheney, “to actually become his running mate, it was clear that he valued Cheney’s
Washington experience above all.”216 He told Cheney that he would need his advice in
good times and bad, but Cheney’s advice was actually most valued during times of crisis.
President Bush came to rely on his vice president more than any other advisor and
confidant.

He immediately gave Cheney responsibility for developing the national

energy policy and welcomed him to attend any executive meeting of his choice.217
Unlike previous administrations, Bush made Cheney chair of the president’s
Budget Review Board which rules on appeals of OMB decisions regarding proposed
funding for executive branch departments. Bush also named two of Cheney’s top aides –
Lewis Libby and Mary Matalin – assistants to the president.218 This was quite unusual,
but served to bring the White House and vice presidential staff closer together.
Bush also gave Cheney an office in the White House in addition to the one
traditionally reserved for the vice president in the Senate. In Cheney’s words, his close
216
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relationship with the president created a “seamless operation” in which he and everyone
else was there “to serve the president.”219 In an interview with Cokey Roberts, Vice
President Cheney gave insight into the administration’s perspective concerning the
historical struggle for power between the presidency and Congress. Cheney explained
that the president’s powers had been so compromised by Watergate that it diminished the
“ability of the president of the United States to do his job.”220
Cheney’s commitment to taking back presidential powers was demonstrated on a
number of occasions. One particularly notable case concerned Vice President Cheney’s
role as chairman of the NEPDG, which was charged with developing a national energy
policy. In April 2001, Representative John Dingell (D-MI), ranking member of the
House Committee on Energy and Commerce, and Henry Waxman (D-CA), ranking
member of the House Committee on Government Reform, wrote to the GAO Comptroller
General Walker to request investigation of the conduct and composition of the NEPDG.
Initially the GAO requested information concerning the composition of the task
force, the persons with whom Cheney, in his capacity as chair of NEGDC, and the task
force met, the meeting notes and minutes, and the costs incurred in developing policy
recommendations. The congressional members claimed they wanted this information to
aid with considering proposed legislation, assessing the need and merit of legislative
changes and conducting oversight of executive branch administration of existing law.
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Even though Title 31, section 712 broadly authorizes the GAO to investigate all matters
relating to the use of public funds, Cheney refused.221 Even after the GAO voluntarily
narrowed its request by eliminating the minutes and notes and information presented to
the task force, Cheney still refused to comply. The vice president was resolute in his
belief that the presidency had been weakened by “unwise compromises” that were made
over the previous thirty to thirty-five years and he refused to release any substantive
information.222 It was his position that the GAO lawsuit was an intrusion into “the inner
sanctum of executive-branch deliberations” which threatened to undermine the
constitutional powers of the executive branch.223
Although the issue was not resolved, the GAO postponed its pursuit of the
requested information out of deference to the administration’s need to respond to the
events of September 11th. Then, early in 2002, after several senators joined the previous
request by the House of Representatives, the comptroller general wrote a letter to the
chairmen and ranking members of the Senate and House Committees stating that the
GAO had exhausted all statutorily required processes for resolving access requests out of
court. Cheney’s refusal was an affront to the GAO which is a nonpartisan group that is
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widely respected in Washington. Although the GAO was sensitive to the vice president’s
“need to protect executive deliberations,” it was concerned that Cheney had denied
access to information that the GAO had “a statutory right to obtain.”224 The GAO
proceeded to file suit against Vice President Cheney in Walker v. Cheney reasoning that
“if the Vice President’s arguments were to prevail, any administration seeking to insulate
its activities from oversight and public scrutiny could do so by assigning those activities
to the Vice President or a body under the White House’s direct control.”225
Walker v. Cheney was a landmark case because the GAO had never before filed
suit against the executive branch for failing to cooperate with an inquiry.226 It was also
distinguished by the fact that the suit was brought by a member of the Republican Party
to raise important constitutional questions involving the actions of a Republican vice
president exercising executive privilege independent of the president. But the case did
not prevent Cheney from continuing with his efforts to bolster executive privilege and
elevate his vice presidential authorities to new heights. The more Cheney pushed, the
more he gained influence over the president’s leadership style – which became
increasingly inflexible, insular, and aggressive.

As we will see later, the more the

president relied on Cheney, the less the president relied on his other advisors for input
into the decision making process.
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Besides Cheney, other appointees brought valuable corporate experience to the
Bush Cabinet, including Samuel W. Bodman and Donald Rumsfield. Bodman joined the
Bush Administration in the Department of Commerce after a career in venture capital,
serving as chairman, CEO, and director of a number of publicly owned corporations.
Then he served a year as deputy secretary of Treasury before being sworn in as the
eleventh secretary of Energy on February 1, 2005. Rumsfield had a distinguished career
in the military and politics, as well as the corporate world. He served seven years in
Congress, followed by nearly a decade of political appointments, before serving as chief
executive officer, president and chairman of G.D. Searle & Company, chairman of
General Instrument Corporation, and chairman of the board for Gilead Sciences, Inc. As
secretary of Defense, Rumsfield was characterized as a conservative hawk; he was an
advocate for a strong defense policy with a particular emphasis on missile defense
systems. 227
Consistent with campaign promises and the need to strengthen political capital,
Bush strategically diversified his cabinet. He appointed two African-Americans (General
Colin Powell at the State Department and Roderick Page at the Department of
Education), two East Asians, one Hispanic, and three women to highly visible
positions.228 But even these appointments were a reflection of corporate America. For
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example, Carlos Gutierrez joined Kellogg as a sales representative, but rose to executive
office, and was named to chairman of the board before he was nominated as secretary of
Commerce in February 2005.
Secretary of State Colin Powell had a distinguished military career, having served
as a captain in Viet Nam before his promotion to full general under former President
George H.W. Bush’s administration and service as chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff
during the Gulf War. Powell was perceived as a moderate with regards to military
matters. For instance, in his confirmation hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, Powell stated that the key to dealing with the Chinese was to expose them “to
the powerful forces of a free enterprise system in democracy, so they can see that this is
the proper direction in which to move.”229 This moderate approach and the respect that
Powell had earned from both Democrats and Republicans led to the Senate’s unanimous
approval of his appointment.
As a moderate, Powell also preferred a policy of containment regarding Iraq, but
this made him the “odd man” among Bush’s other hawkish advisors. Even though
Powell succumbed to Bush’s strategy for overthrowing Saddam Hussein after 9/11,
political infighting among the Department of State, the Department of Defense, and the
Vice President’s Office led to his resignation on November 15, 2004.230
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President Bush relied on a number of other appointments to high ranking
positions to compensate for his lack of experience in Washington. The National Journal
reports that forty-three percent of Bush appointees had worked in his father’s
administration, eighty-six percent had worked for the government previously, and twenty
percent had worked for Washington lobbying firms.231 One of these experienced and
trusted appointments was National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice who later
replaced Colin Powell as secretary of state in 2005.
Interestingly, there is no provision in law establishing an assistant to the president
for national security affairs, but the position of national security advisor has roots in the
National Security Council (NSC) established by President Harry Truman in 1947 with
four statutory members – the president, vice-president, secretary of state, and secretary of
defense. At first, the assistants that managed the NSC simply reported to the president.
Then President Dwight Eisenhower created the position of special assistant for national
security to assist with long term planning. President Kennedy, who wanted to be more
directly involved with foreign policy, modified the position into one that managed the
president’s policy affairs and worked to integrate the national security bureaucracy with
the president’s foreign policy agenda.

Daalder notes that the “position gained

prominence after President John F. Kennedy’s election . . . and has become central to
presidential conduct of foreign policy.”232 National security advisors must balance their

231

James A. Barnes, “Bush’s Insiders,” National Journal, June 23, 2001,
http://nationaljournal.com, 2
232
Ivo H. Daalder, “In the Shadow of the Oval Office: The Next National Security
Advisor,” Foreign Affairs 88, no. 1 (January/February 2009): 114.
104

allegiance to the president with their commitment to manage a policy process that
engages various senior officials and their agencies.
Historically, the national security advisor has influenced the president’s foreign
policy initiatives and decisions concerning overseas business transactions. Analysts have
explained this phenomenon by noting the national security advisor’s proximity to the
Oval Office and the frequency with which he or she interacts with the president.233 As
foreign policy became more complex, presidents came to rely on their national security
advisors to work with various departments to integrate diverse policy dimensions,
including defense and diplomacy, finance and trade, the environment and homeland
security, and science and technology. By the time George W. Bush took office there was
a “general consensus” as to the appropriate role of the national security advisor.234
The position requires someone who can balance the need to make decisions with
sensitivity to the roles of the other secretaries and advisors. A key ingredient to the
national security advisor’s success is maintaining the trust of the president and the other
senior advisors, all of which must have confidence that he or she will convey their views
and advice to the president.
Condoleeza Rice joined George W. Bush’s Administration as assistant to the
president for national security after a career in academia, and several stints of service in
the previous Bush Administration, including service on the National Security Council.
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Prior to joining the current administration, she gained experience as a member of several
boards and commissions, including the board of directors for the Chevron Corporation.
She was an expert on Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, and as a “realist,”
believed that the U.S. must maintain a position of military strength in its relations with
communist countries.235

She also believed that the administration should focus on

strengthening relations with Japan and other East Asian allies while downplaying
relations with China.236
Ultimately, the national security advisor is responsible for helping the president
make the best decisions as expeditiously as possible. Some analysts argue that Rice
followed the president’s orders without examining alternative actions or examining the
consequences.237 But given Bush’s managerial style, it is unlikely that he would have
been receptive to any attempts to engage him in analysis. He viewed himself as “the
Decider” whose primary responsibility was making tough decisions in difficult times.
A distinguishing characteristic of Bush’s presidency was that he did not appoint
China experts to his cabinet or to key foreign policy advisory positions. Believing the
Clinton Administration had over emphasized China’s importance, Bush did not rush into
developing his own China policy. It was only after a U.S. Navy EP-3 surveillance
aircraft and a Chinese jet fighter collided in the South China Sea in April 2001 that Bush
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was forced to turn his attention to China. Even though U.S.-China relations were tense,
Bush pledged to do “whatever it takes” to protect Taiwan,238 which included military
measures as well as downgrading China’s stature in foreign policy by working through
State Department and Defense Department channels.239
Although China experts did not define Bush’s cabinet, two senior policymakers
had significant experience in Asia – Deputy Secretary of State Richard L. Armitage and
Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul D. Wolfowitz. Armitage served three tours of duty in
Vietnam and was in Saigon with it fell to the North Vietnamese. During the Reagan
Administration, he served as deputy assistant secretary of defense for East Asia and
Pacific Affairs and also assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs.
Like Rumsfield, Armitage saw the relationship with Japan as fundamental to U.S.
national security supported a missile defense policy.

Wolfowitz had served as

ambassador to Indonesia and assistant secretary of state for East Asia and pacific affairs.
He, too, advocated for stronger ties with Japan, at the expense of ties with China, and a
policy of increased missile defense.
Another political appointment relevant to the development of foreign policy under
the Bush Administration was U.S. Trade Representative Robert B. Zoellick. Zoellick
gave a preview of the Bush Administration’s trade agenda when he testified before the
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House Ways and Means Committee. Emphasizing that “[t]rade policy is the bridge
between the President’s international and domestic agendas,” Zoellick pushed for trade
liberalization and the free exchange of goods and services to boost domestic economic
growth. Assuring the Committee he would consult with them often, he asked Congress to
give him “the strong hand of presidential trade promotion authority.”240
(b) Bush’s Hierarchical Approach to Decision Making
The president’s decision making scheme consists of how recommendations are
made to the president – whether he is presented with one perspective of each policy issue
or whether he was alerted to disagreements across policy issues; whether he looks at just
one dimension or multiple dimensions of the information presented; whether he receives
single or multiple recommendations for action; and how he communicates policy issues
and decisions to the public.241 Ultimately, the president’s decision making scheme has an
impact on whether he is able to build coalitions, coalesce congressional support, and win
public endorsement. But just as the separation of powers has created issues of control
and responsibility among the various branches of government, it has also created
conflicts within each branch as the cabinet members, advisors, and executive staff, often
have overlapping responsibilities.
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Initially, President Bush took a restrained approach to his executive
responsibilities which seemed to reflect his limited background in public policy.
Although the organizational structure that existed when he took office mirrored the
structure of presidents before him, he drew upon his business school education and the
successes he had as Governor of the State of Texas, to form a structure and managerial
style that relied upon a hierarchical approach to decision making.
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For example, in

organizing the White House staff, President Bush appointed Andrew Card as his chief of
staff, but did not make Card the only senior advisor who reported directly to him. He
also appointed Karl Rove as his political strategist and Karen Hughes as his public
relations advisor. Karl Rove was put in charge of the newly created Office of Strategic
Initiative (OSI) which was designed to “think ahead and devise long term political
strategies.”243
According to Hult, forming the triad of Andrew Card, Karl Rove, and Karen
Hughes was “consistent with reports of [the president’s] desire for multiple sources of
information” and was also a mechanism for maintaining control and keeping any one of
his advisors from becoming too powerful.244 But after Karen Hughes left the president’s
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staff early in 2002 Karl Rove’s influence over the president increased substantially.245
Evidence of Rove’s influence is abundant, but one example is the impact he had
regarding the president’s political appointments which extended from the executive
branch to the federal judiciary.

The evaluation criterion for political appointments

included partisan as well as ideological standards. This criterion came to play when the
White House Personnel Office sought advice concerning nominees.

The Personnel

Office would not just consult the staff in the Office of Political Affairs, as had been done
in previous administrations, but would go to Senior Advisor Karl Rove as well.246
President Bush often chose to achieve policy goals through his cabinet (to which
he had delegated some “untraditional” functions),247 political appointees, and
bureaucratic channels rather than through Congress or the party apparatus.248

For

example, when Bush came to office, he admitted that he was weak in foreign relations
experience and assembled a team of experts to counterbalance that weakness. This group
of eight Republican experts, nicknamed the “Vulcans,” was led by National Security
Advisor Condoleezza Rice and Paul Wolfowitz, dean of Johns Hopkins School of
Advanced International Studies. Both Rice and Wolfowitz had served under the elder
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Bush – Rice as the president’s advisor on Soviet affairs and Wolfowitz as undersecretary
for defense policy. Other Vulcans who served in the previous Bush Administration, and
their previous titles, included: Robert Blackwill, White House advisor on European and
Soviet affairs; Stephen J. Hadley, assistant secretary of defense for international security
policy; Robert Zoellick, undersecretary of state for economic affairs and White House
deputy chief of staff. Vulcans who served under President Reagan, and their titles,
included Richard Armitage, assistant secretary of defense for international security
affairs; Richard Perle, assistant secretary of defense for international security policy; Dov
Zakheim, deputy undersecretary of defense for planning and resources.
These appointments were significant because they indicated Bush’s “own foreign
policy predispositions.”

249

In contrast to Republican “sovereignists” who served in

Congress in the mid-1990s and favored isolationism, the Vulcans supported engagement
and free trade. It was this preference for letting the free market reign that caused some
legislators in Congress to question whether the Bush Administration was taking the
Exon-Florio Amendment seriously, or whether the presidency was more inclined to let
corporate profits prevail over all other national interests.
In laying the foundation for understanding Bush’s decision making scheme, we
have examined his leadership style, his key political appointments, and how he interacted
with his advisors and cabinet members. Now we turn to the strategies he used to build
coalitions, congressional support, and public endorsement.

249

Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay, “Bush’s Foreign Policy Revolution,” 102-03.
111

4. Building Coalitions and Congressional Support
Under institutional theory one might expect a strong tendency towards
cooperation when the president and the majority in Congress represent the same party.
This is because members of the same party are more likely to adhere to similar ideologies
and political views. There is also strength that can be garnered from party cohesiveness
when it comes to a candidate’s ability to finance political campaigns and secure electoral
votes. Once a candidate is elected, the public tends to judge the elected official based
upon his or her ability to fulfill campaign promises. Given the division of power in the
American system, individual politicians are more likely to be successful if they can build
a coalition of support, and the party is fundamental to building coalitions.
By contrast, when members of Congress and the president are from opposing
parties they tend to adhere to different ideologies and view one another as a threat to
attaining personal and political goals. In spite of the expectation of cooperation along
party lines, there are occasions in which the president and legislators from the same party
may disagree. This may be because legislators want to be re-elected and are motivated
by a desire to serve their constituents, but not all of their constituents support all of the
president’s policies. Or, as in the Unocal Case, it may be because individual legislators
become concerned about the president diminishing the importance of respecting
congressional oversight.
While it is in the president’s best interest to cooperate with members of his party
in Congress, the diversity of interests represented in Congress means that it is not always
112

possible. The president must constantly lobby legislators and form coalitions of support.
But the coalitions of support will vary depending upon the issue, the particular
circumstances surrounding that issue, and the cohesiveness of the party as a whole.
Sometimes the president will need to reach across the aisle and cultivate support from the
opposite party, but this type of coalition building becomes much more difficult when one
or both chambers of Congress are controlled by the opposition party.
In his campaign, Bush had run as a “compassionate conservative,” suggesting that
he would work to overcome the strong partisanship that had characterized the 1990s, as
well as the Texas statehouse when he was governor. But President Bush quickly learned
that the political game in Washington was much more challenging than Texas politics.
Even though Bush had begun to reach out to individual Democrats before he was
declared the winner in the Florida election, he still failed to convince Democrats and
Republicans to work together to push legislation through Congress.
Given the circumstances, President Bush enjoyed exceptional legislative success
in the early years of his administration. Some attribute this phenomenon to Bush’s
ideological and partisan compatibility with Republicans in Congress and the majorities
that his party held in the House for the first six years and the Senate for the first four
years.250 Some attribute it to the strategy of focusing on just a few issues and playing to
interests held by both Democrats and Republicans, such as education reforms and lower
taxes. And some attribute it to 9/11 and the unique situation in which Americans rallied
250
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around the president and the firm stance he took in preventing America from being the
target of future terrorist acts.
Certainly, President Bush had the advantage of a Republican-controlled Congress
when he took office, but the lack of political capital made him dependent upon his the
cabinet, the White House staff, and administrative agencies for promoting his political
agenda. Fortunately, he had the advantage of the Republican majority in the House of
Representatives, and even though it was by a narrow margin, the House is biased towards
the majority and a cohesive majority has substantial power. This meant Bush was wellpositioned to take advantage of the procedural and organization tools in the hands of the
Speaker of the House.
By contrast, the Senate operates by more permissive rules and the 50-50 split
between the parties in the Senate presented a challenge to the president. The divided
Senate “forced Republicans to enter into a power sharing agreement with Democrats
specifying equal numbers of members on every committee” even though Republicans
would chair committees.251 Tension between President Bush and his party in Congress
began to emerge shortly after Senator Jeffords’ defection from the Republican Party on
May 24, 2001.252 Noting that many Republicans in Congress had never served with a
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president of their own party and none had served in the majority with a Republican
president, Sinclair suggests that “congressional Republicans were accustomed to setting
their own course.” They may have had unrealistic expectations from the president, but
they were disappointed when President Bush asked them to “make tough votes that
conflicted with their ideology.” After losing the majority, Republican senators became
much more outspoken when they did not agree with the president, that is, until September
11, 2001.253
Throughout his administration, whenever President Bush found that he could not
win Congress over, he turned to his veto power to object to specific provisions of a bill
without vetoing the entire bill.

Although the Constitution grants this power to the

president, it does not provide any formal rules mandating how the president may or may
not use the signing statement to accomplish his own goals. According to a study by
David Birdsell, the Reagan, George H.W. Bush, and Clinton administrations used signing
statements to argue “on behalf of a president’s right not to enforce ‘constitutionally
unsound’ provisions and all three presidents made much more frequent use of signing
statements than their predecessors.”254 But Birdsell suggests that President George W.
Bush went far beyond previous presidents in expanding his executive prerogative beyond
congressional will.
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What made President Bush’s approach unique was not just the number of signing
statements accompanying the bills he signed, but the character of the statements. Rather
than following the precedent of framing statements in the first person, Birdsell points out
that President Bush framed his statements in the third person.

He asserted the

constitutional authority “of the President” rather than his own authority as it related to the
particular bill. His signing statements also lacked specificity regarding his objections,
which made it virtually impossible for Congress to respond. Finally, the language he
used was “formulaic and broad, asserting power without a detailed rationale for the
power.”255
A successful president does not just limit himself to winning over Congress he
also works to win over the public. Public opinion is instrumental in bolstering the
president’s position vis à vis Congress because legislators votes are influenced by vocal
interest groups and supportive constituents. This means that presidents must be astute in
managing their communications with the public.

How President Bush handled

communications is discussed below.
5. President Bush’s Communications Network and Public Endorsement
The White House communications network is complex and multifaceted, and
focused on briefings, press releases, and advance copies of speeches as tools for
managing the media.

The modern communications network may be attributed to

President Wilson who expanded relations with the press, centralized control in the White
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House, reinstituted the tradition of orally delivering the State of the Union address to
Congress, and initiated national campaigns. White House ties to the media expanded
under President Franklin D. Roosevelt after he gave the press secretary greater authority
to coordinate the media and its contacts with the administration and to discipline
executive departmental staff to project a public message designed by the president.256
The role of the media has continued to grow ever since.
In today’s world, the communications operations are needed to promote the
president’s brand of leadership and advocate for the policies, laws, and programs that he
wants to accomplish. Communications are a serious matter and are handled by the
Offices of Communications, Media Affairs, Speechwriting, and Global Communications.
By Bush’s second term, communications staff exceeded 300, ranging from senior
officials down to personnel who record presidential speeches, press conferences, and
briefings, and transcribe the sessions.257

One reason behind the growth of the

communications staff is that modern technology has increased the channels of
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communication and the president can no longer make “off the record” remarks to a
unique audience.258 Everything is open to public scrutiny.
President Bush’s communications and advocacy were shaped by a White House
structure organized around the management principles that he followed in private
business and as governor of Texas. Martha Kumar suggests that his management style
was based on Peter Drucker’s principles which call for setting goals, developing plans for
getting to the desired goal, assigning operational responsibilities, and allowing staff to
implement the plans.259

By appointing loyalists to the White House staff and top

administrative positions, he was able to accomplish the mandate that the administration
“talk about what we want to talk about, not what the press want to talk about”

260

The

communications system was also influenced by Chief of Staff Andrew Card’s
“compartmentalized” operating system based on a “need to know”, and Karl Rove’s
attempts to integrate policy, politics and publicity.261
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James Wilkinson has described President Bush’s goal as a communicator as
wanting “to make news on his own terms.”262

Because Bush wanted to avoid

communications mistakes that might make him more vulnerable, he rarely allowed staff,
who might not be sophisticated in dealing with the press, to appear in the news or the
briefing room to provide background policy information. While this was a change from
previous administrations in which policy specialists and cabinet secretaries often
explained policy initiatives, the approach was relaxed a bit by Bush’s second term when
his ratings began to fall. As Martha Joynt Kumar has observed, Card’s system was
efficient in avoiding overlap of duties, but often resulted in situations where the staff was
“caught by surprise on some major issues.”263 This may have been the case when the
CNOOC bid for Unocal became an explosive issue in the American press.

When

confronted by the media, the administration’s spokespersons gave vague responses,
dodging any official response, other than a statement that executive review of the
proposed acquisition was premature.
Like other modern presidents, President Bush tracked public opinion, although his
administration sought to convey the impression that it was not as “obsessed” as the
previous Clinton Administration.264

Edwards suggests that public relations are

fundamental to the modern presidency and there are three premises about the relationship
between public opinion and presidential leadership: (1) public support is a “crucial
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political resource” for the president because it makes it difficult for Congress to deny the
demands of a president with popular support, (2) the president earns public support
through his performance and by actively taking his case to the people, (3) the president
can persuade and mobilize the public through a “permanent campaign.”265 Typically,
there is a honeymoon period in which presidents have a high degree of public support.
Americans tend to want the president to succeed, and even if they did not support the
president during the campaign, they are likely to give him some time to get acclimated.
From the very beginning of his term, President George W. Bush took his case to
the people with a public relations campaign that surpassed that of any new president. But
this was not a surprising tactic given that he took office after losing the popular vote by
less than one percent. The election had become even more controversial as it hinged on
the outcome of controversies which emerged concerning the voting mechanics in the
State of Florida where his brother was governor. After thirty-six days, the Supreme
Court declared Bush the winner and he took office with an air of confidence that belied
his thin victory.
Although Bush went to the public to promote his proposals, he did so in a
controlled environment. With little national speaking experience, he relied heavily on
prepared scripts. But even the most eloquently written speeches – such as the 2001
inaugural address – lost some of their dramatic impact from poor delivery. The press
began to question his absence from the public view just three months into his
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presidency266 and, later on, others noted that prior to the night of the September 11, 2001
tragedy he had not addressed the nation once from the Oval Office.267
Bush worked diligently to achieve the promises he had made to the Republicans
who had played a key role in bringing him to office. While it is common for presidents
to campaign for the party’s congressional candidates in the mid-term elections, Fortier
and Ornstein describe President Bush’s effort as “unprecedented.”
He made a record ninety campaign appearances, including campaign stops
for twenty-three congressional candidates, sixteen Senate hopefuls, and
candidates in a number of hotly contested gubernatorial races. Along the
way he attended nearly seventy-five fund-raisers and raised a record of
more than $144 million. His campaign trips had him on the road nearly
nonstop in the weeks leading up to the November 5 election, including a
whirlwind tour of fifteen states in the last five days before the election.”268
In spite of an ambitious travel schedule, he also sent proposals to Congress to support his
campaign issues of income tax cuts, education reform, and overhauling the military.
Then, even when Congress changed key elements of his proposed policies, he
emphasized his success in getting the legislation through Congress rather than bringing
attention to how Congress had modified his proposals.269
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This discussion of George W. Bush’s presidency illustrates how a president may
take advantage of informal mechanisms to upset the institutional balance of power so as
to dominate foreign policy decision making. Although taking office as a Washington
outsider with little experience and even less political capital, President Bush built upon
on his political connections to assemble an impressive team of advisors with expansive
corporate experience. The president and his advisors were inclined to support free trade
policies with minimal oversight and regulation.
After 9/11, Bush took a strong and decisive position against global terrorism
which gave him the political capital needed to push his policy agendas through Congress.
At the same time, members of Congress were also concerned about protecting national
security. When CNOOC made its offer to buy Unocal in 2005, it created a perfect storm
in Washington and Congress demanded that the president take immediate action. This
next section will discuss the institutionalization of legislative powers and the tensions
between Congress and the presidency that encourages individual members to resort to
informal mechanisms to achieve their policy goals.
C. Institutionalization of Legislative Powers
1. Characteristics of the Institutionalized Legislature
(a)

Autonomy – By the end of World War II, Congress’s policy making role

had diminished to such an extent that some congressmen were beginning to question the
institution’s survival.270 With the burgeoning growth of the federal economy and
increasing budget deficits, Congress delegated more and more legislative authority to
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administrative agencies, but often failed to provide meaningful oversight.

In 1946,

Congress responded to its loss of power by initiating several reforms, including the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), the Legislative Reorganization Act (LRA), and the
Employment Act.271 Each of these acts demonstrated Congress’s ability to adapt to a
more complex society. The Administrative Procedure Act was designed as a means of
relying on administrative agencies to perform legislative functions.272 At the same time
that Congress alleviated its work load when it delegated rule-making procedures to the
agencies, it improved transparency by requiring that agencies hold public hearings and
obtain citizen input in the rule-making process.
The LRA was particularly significant because it radically restructured the
organization of Congress.

It provided rules of the Senate and the House of

Representatives and recognized the constitutional right of either chamber to change its
own rules. It reduced the number of standing committees, gave parallel jurisdiction to the
House and Senate committees, and designed the overall committee structure to coincide
with the structure of the federal administration.273 For the first time, the LRA defined
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and assigned to standing committees an implicit responsibility for “legislative
oversight.”274 This improved supervision of administrative agencies contributed to the
institutionalization of Congress.
(b)

Adaptability – In our discussion of the presidency, we defined adaptability

as awareness of internal and external environments the ability to take action to achieve a
balance between the two. While both the president and Congress are constrained by the
Constitution and statutory law, Congress faces additional challenges. It is a democratic
body whose interests and positions are defined by the states and the constituents they
represent. As such, this study assumes that the legislature is more restricted in its ability
to adapt to changes in the external environment. It is much more difficult to achieve a
consensus when members of Congress are accountable to their states rather than one
ultimate authority. History has taught legislators that they must form coalitions and
support groups to accomplish their policy goals.

For this reason, they have taken

advantage of their powers under the Constitution to develop their own committees, with
rules and operating procedures to guide the committee’s work.
Throughout the evolution of standing committee structure, two principles have
remained constant: (1) the principle that the majority controls the committees, and (2)
the principle that the minority is entitled to an equitable voice in proportion to its
274
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representation in the house of Congress as a whole.275 The ability of Congress to adapt to
internal and external conditions is demonstrated by the changes in the seniority system
which accompanied changes in the standing committees.

Initially, committee

chairmanship was awarded to those delegates with the greatest length of service in
Congress. However, as the number of issues increased and as the issues become more
complex, Congress recognized the need for more equitable committee assignments and
the dispersal of power beyond just a few legislators. Seniority still plays a role, but it is
now seniority on the committee, rather than in Congress as a whole, that positions a
member for leadership.
A committee’s power is also preserved by the convention in which members of
the standing committee are assigned as conferees when a bill is considered by both
chambers. This practice was institutionalized in the House during the 109th Congress by
Rule I, clause 11 which specifies the members of the House appointed to conference
committees “shall to the fullest extent feasible, include the principal proponents of the
major provisions of the bill or resolution passed or adopted by the House.”276 But the
House can adapt to the particular circumstances in which a bill is passed. If a bill is
modified on the floor, the Speaker can appoint conferees who supported the floor position
rather than the committee position. Although this study focuses on the House, the Senate
showed a similar ability to adapt with the changes in its own rules.
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(c)

Complexity – Complexity involves an increased division of labor and

specialization. In the earlier section on the presidency we discussed the Legislative
Reorganization Act. The LRA provided greater coherence to both the presidency and
Congress by delineating organizational structures and responsibilities; it also contributed
to institutional independence and flexibility.
outcomes for Congress.

But the LRA had some unexpected

First, by authorizing the standing committees to hire

professional staff, the LRA led to explosive growth in the number of congressional staff
and enlarged support services for research and policy analysis. Not only did the number
of individual legislative aides increase277 but, in 1970, the Congressional Research
Service replaced the outdated Legislative Reference Service as Congress’s primary
source for research and policy analysis.278 Since then, a variety of improvements to the
General Accounting Office has increased its capacity to evaluate administrative
performance; and the Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990 has also contributed to
legislative oversight.279

Today, the General Accounting Office, the Congressional

Research Service, the Congressional Budget Office, and the Office of Technology
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Assessment all include foreign specialists. With its own staff, Congress was no longer
dependent upon the executive branch for information resources.
A second unexpected outcome of the 1946 LRA was the uncontrolled growth of
subcommittees. The consolidation of committees resulted in larger jurisdictions, which
led to the need for more and more subcommittees to divide the work load.

The

proliferation of subcommittees led to the creation of more chair positions, which resulted
in the distribution of influence among more members of Congress.

Concern over

increasing subcommittee autonomy led to revision of the Legislative Reorganization Act
in 1970. Specifically, section 110 reinforces the principle that Senate committees control
the funds of their subcommittees280 and section 129(a) reinforces the rule that
subcommittees are part of House committees and subject to its authority and direction.281
Congress has a number of mechanisms for influencing administrative agencies
without having to amend authorizing statutes. In addition to the regularity of decision
making promoted by the APA, the Senate has the constitutional power of “advice and
consent” to the President’s nominations of agency heads. Although some believe this
power has devolved into nothing more than a formality, others believe it is still a
powerful tool in shaping public opinion.282

Congress also has the power of
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appropriations, which may be even more influential today. Annual budget hearings in
both houses provide an opportunity for Congress to review agencies’ performance, to
hear and express opinions, and to further influence agency actions by approving or
denying specific expenditures.283

With the evolution of statutory laws Congress

contributed to the institutionalization of a “legislative-centered” federal administration
where agencies assist with legislative functions, where Congress plays a role in
overseeing agency work, and where Congress may intervene in agency decision making
“through casework and other forms of constituency service.”284
(d)

Coherence – As stated previously, coherence reflects the ability of an

institution to manage its workload based upon universal criteria. Each individual
legislator has benefited from increased staff support, but Congress as a whole manages its
workload through its organizational structure and rules.
While the presidency has benefited from the coherence provided by the civil
service system, Congress has benefited from the coherence provided by the system of
incumbency and social networks. Few incumbents are defeated and, as a result, some
members of the House of Representatives have served for more than thirty years.
Members with greater length of service are more likely to have cultivated relationships
and built supportive networks among other legislators, within the federal agencies, and
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with experts who populate think tanks and advisory boards and commissions that
influence policy making in Washington. Senior legislators are also more knowledgeable
of the rules and procedures and how to manipulate them to accomplish policy goals. For
example, since Congress operates on the basis of standing committees, those with the
most seniority in the majority party chair the most important committees.285

This

committee structure creates a formidable challenge to presidents and will be discussed in
the next section.
2. The Legislature’s Formal and Informal Powers
Institutional theory suggests that Congress is bestowed with formal and informal
powers. Just as the Constitution grants the president specific powers, article 1, section 1
provides that all legislative powers shall be vested in Congress. As the fundamental
source of lawmaking, Congress plays a primary role in controlling and overseeing
administrative agencies.

Article I, section 8 (18) of the Constitution provides that

Congress has the power to
. . . make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into
Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this
Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department
or Officer thereof.
These laws include statutes that create agencies and define their substantive and
procedural limits, as well as statutes that define foreign policy criteria and restrictions.
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(a)

Constitution and Congressional Rules

The Constitution provides that each house may determine the rules of its
proceedings and must keep and publish a journal of its proceedings.286 Legislators are
required to follow these rules when introducing legislation. But the rules have become
extensive and are often cumbersome. Because the rules have slowed down the policy
making process or created inefficiencies, over time Congress has devised a system of
informal mechanisms that legislators may utilize to accomplish their goals.
These informal mechanisms for policy making take place throughout the formal
process. Although there are specific formal procedures for introducing bills and violation
of the procedures can kill a bill, the formal procedures do not necessarily give insight into
why legislators introduce certain bills. Nor do the formal procedures help us understand
the political strategy that an individual legislator chooses to adopt.

However,

institutionalism suggests that the informal mechanisms underlying Congressional actions
may provide insight into legislative outcomes.
Why legislators introduce bills depends upon a variety of factors. They may
introduce legislation in response to pressure by interest groups; they may want to
publicize issues that they are personally concerned about; they may want to convey a
message to the president or an executive agency; or they may simply want to go on the
record as doing something about an issue for the benefit of their constituents and to gain
constituent support.

This study suggests that examination of public records and

statements to the media regarding the particular legislation will give insight into why
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individual legislators introduced the legislation. The theoretical approach also suggests
that insight may be gained from examining precedent established in the legislative
history. Some of the questions raised by the institutional approach are as follows: Does
the legislator have a history regarding the particular issue? What positions has he taken
in the past? Has he been able to generate support for the issue in the past, or has he faced
opposition?
Legislators adopt informal tools at each stage of the legislative process. During
the first stage of introducing legislation, the experienced legislator may consider the
following factors: (1) how to title the bill so that it has the broadest appeal to the public
or attracts the media’s attention; (2) whether to include co-sponsors and how to determine
who has the greatest potential to influence others over the issue; (3) whether to introduce
the bill early in the legislative session so as to compensate for Senate filibuster, or late in
the session to take advantage of public pressure for Congress to act quickly before recess;
(4) whether to introduce companion bills concurrently in the other chamber; and (5) how
to draft the language of the bill so that it falls within the jurisdiction of a committee that
might be more sympathetic to the issue and more capable of pushing the bill through the
legislative process.287
Although both chambers are guided by rules of procedure, the rules in the House
are much more formal because of its size. In addition, the House has developed different
procedures for handling minor legislation and uncontroversial issues compared to major
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bills or more controversial issues. There are four legislative calendars for scheduling
legislative actions in the House. These are as follows:
(1)

Calendar of the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union

which handles actions concerned with raising, authorizing, or spending funds;
(2)

Private Calendar which handles actions concerned with matters of concern

to individual persons or entities;
(3)

Discharge Calendar which handles bills that have been removed from

committees through special procedures; and
(4)

Corrections

Calendar

which

is

concerned

with

unnecessary or

cumbersome rules and regulations. This last calendar was removed from the House
rulebook at the beginning of the 109th Congress.288
One tool that the Speaker uses to control the agenda is the suspension of the rules.
Prior to the 109th Congress, the suspension procedure was in effect on Mondays,
Tuesdays, and the last six days of the session. At the beginning of the 109th Congress,
Rules Chairman David Dreier (R-CA) added Wednesdays to the suspension calendar.289
There are three rules that govern suspension procedures: (1) debate is limited to forty
minutes and is divided between proponents and opponents, (2) amendments to a bill may
be included if the amendments are included in the motion to suspend the rules, and (3)
the only vote on the measure is a vote to suspend the rules and pass the bill. A quorum
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must be present for the vote and it must pass by a two-thirds vote. Typically, the Speaker
will not schedule bills under the suspension rule unless he or she is confident of the twothirds vote. But, if the bill fails to pass under the suspension rule, it may be considered
again under the regular House procedures.290
The suspension procedure helps expedite legislation that appeals to a majority of
the House. Committee chairs tend to support the suspension rules because they protect a
bill from amendments on the floor and points of order. Majority party leaders like to use
the suspension procedure to move their legislative agenda forward, but minority party
leaders may oppose the suspension rule procedure on bills which they believe require
more lengthy debate or wish to amend.291 In recent years, suspension procedures have
been used more often. Oleszek suggests that this is because it “gives lawmakers who are
frustrated by their inability to modify major bills a chance to offer additional suspension
measures that serve their constituents, make policy, and enhance their influence in the
chamber.”292
House rules allow five standing committees direct access to the floor for certain
bills. They initiate legislation measures as follows: Appropriations Committee may
report general appropriations bills; Budget Committee may report budget resolutions;
House Administration Committee may report matters relating to enrolled bills, House
expenditures and committee funding; Rules Committee determines rules and the order of
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business; and Standards of Official Conduct Committee may recommend action
regarding conduct of a member or employee of the House.
Other standing committees do not have the same privilege and act only on
legislation referred to them. Most legislation does not go directly from the committee to
a calendar and to the House floor. A bill must have privilege, that is, precedence over the
regular order of business.293 Major bills get to the floor through the Rules Committee.
The First Congress appointed an eleven-member body in April 1789 to draft its
procedures. For nearly a century afterwards, each Congress would appoint a panel to
prepare its rules. The Rules Committee became a permanent committee in 1880 and soon
developed the practices followed today, such as reporting rules agreed to by the majority
that control the time allowed for debate and the extent to which bills could be amended
from the floor. Traditionally, the Rules Committee is an agent of the leadership and
functions to implement the majority party’s agenda. The Speaker has the power of
appointment and the disproportionate partisan ratio guarantees majority control.
The power of the Rules Committee is in its scheduling responsibilities. As bills
are reported out of committee, they are entered in chronological order on the Union or
House Calendar. Major legislation is granted precedence for consideration on the floor
through a special order obtained from the Rules Committee. The chair of the committee
reporting the bill submits a written request for the special order to the chair of the Rules
Committee. The Rules Committee holds a hearing in which witnesses are limited to

293

William Holmes Brown and Charles W. Johnson, House Practice: A Guide to the
Rules, Precedents, and Procedures of the House (Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 2003), 657.
134

lawmakers who debate the proposal. This has been described as a “dress rehearsal” in
which the committee serves as the first audience for the legislation outside of the
committee or subcommittee reporting it.294 After the hearing, the Rules members write
their rule and vote on it. Then the rule is considered on the House floor as privileged
matter which means no more than one hour of debate and no amendments before a vote.
Rules serve several purposes: (1) the order of precedence on the Calendars, (2) the
length of general debate, (3) dispensing with the first reading of the bill and amendments
that are preprinted in the Congressional Record, (4) limiting the number of amendments,
and (5) moving the bill to an immediate vote. The Rules Committee has the power to
block or delay legislation from reaching the floor. The committee serves as an informal
mediator of disputes among House members and over legislation with overlapping
jurisdiction.
The Rules Committee grants three basic kinds of rules: open, closed, and
modified. The distinction pertains to the amendment process. Under an open rule,
amendments may be offered from the floor as long as they comply with House rules and
precedents, such as the writing requirement. During the Bush Administration there was a
decline in the number of open rules. Rules Committee member James P. McGovern (D-
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MA) observed that only one non-appropriations bill out of 190 was considered under an
open rule in the 109th Congress.295
Closed rules prohibit floor amendments except those offered by the reporting
committees. In recent years there has been an increase in the number of closed rules that
require a bill be considered in the House and not the Committee as a Whole under
procedures that limit debate to one hour and restrict or prohibit amendments.296 Some
critics, like Representative McGovern (D-MA), believe closed rules hamper legislative
process and violate democratic values; while supporters such as Representative Capito
(R-WV) say they are needed for complex measures subject to intense lobbying.297
Modified rules may be open or closed. A modified open rule may indicate all
parts of a bill are open to amendment except a few sections. A modified closed rule may
state that an entire bill is closed to amendment except for certain sections. During the
109th Congress Republicans began to characterize modified closed rules as “structured”
rules, thereby suggesting that they were not restrictive, but fair and systematic.298
In addition to these three forms, the House rules allow for waivers, or temporarily
setting aside certain procedures or points of order. The primary purpose is to waive
points of order against consideration of legislation that is privileged but has violated
295
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House rules. It is typically used at the end of the session when legislators want to wrap
up business quickly.
(b)

Legislative Seniority System

Although modern legislators are much more individualistic than in the past, they
are conscious of their position in the legislative hierarchy. This is reflected in a variety of
situations, ranging from their committee assignments to voting patterns and electoral
vulnerability.299
Committees can be divided into different types – policy committees are those that
attract members who want to make good public policy; power committees are those that
expand the member’s legislative jurisdiction.

For example, the House Energy and

Commerce Committee is a powerful committee because it combines strong legislative
jurisdiction with effective oversight responsibilities.
To overcome opposition to policy initiatives presidents have developed strategies
to push legislation through Congress. One such strategy involves appointment of liaison
staff to establish and maintain relations with Congress. These staff members target key
legislators in both houses, keep the president informed of “power clusters,” keep
congressional members informed of presidential initiatives, and recommend tactics to the
president for developing support of his initiatives.”300
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Although the committee structure is essential to how Congress functions, the
internal power system is not totally dependent upon the committees. The power of
Congressional leadership positions, such as the Speaker of the House and majority and
minority leaders in both houses, often trump the powers of the committee chairs. As a
consequence, power in Congress is fragmented and derived from a variety of sources,
such as leadership status, personal relationships, and the “power of the purse,” all of
which may be utilized to act as a check on the president’s authority over foreign and
national security policies.
(c)

Delegation of Powers and Legislative Oversight

In the early years, as Congress began enacting legislation to delegate powers to
administrative agencies, it also began conferring some decision making discretion on the
administrators of those agencies.301

Perhaps unexpectedly, while creating broad

administrative powers, Congress also provided the presidency with increased autonomy
and budgetary control. This transfer of powers was gradual at first.302 Following the
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Great Depression, President Hoover sought authority to reorganize the executive and
administrative agencies, but was cautious about overstepping his constitutional powers.303
Assured by such prudence, Congress granted the president authority to consolidate the
agencies and “to segregate regulatory agencies and functions from those of an
administrative and executive character.”304

To increase efficiency, Congress also

authorized the president to make changes by Executive Order but restricted this executive
authority by stipulating that Executive Orders could not abolish the statutory functions of
agencies. To ensure executive compliance with this restriction Congress required that the
president transmit Executive Orders to Congress while in session and provided that the
orders would not become effective for 60 days unless Congress approved them earlier.305
President Franklin D. Roosevelt continued the quest to update the administrative
machinery so as to give the chief executive greater managerial control. He appointed a
Committee on Administrative Management to examine inefficiencies and to make
recommendations for change. President Roosevelt passed the committee’s “five-point”
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program on to Congress for legislative action. The recommendations included expanding
the White House staff to help the president keep in touch with administrative affairs and
to obtain the knowledge required for decision making.306
After adopting the Reorganization Act of 1939, Congress applied the legislative
veto to resolve delegation problems related to national security and foreign affairs issues.
Congress continued to include the legislative veto in statutes delegating legislative power,
and presidents continued to accept the legislative veto as the price to pay for obtaining
exceptional authority, but the constitutionality of the veto was uncertain.307
D. 109th Congress
1. Historical Setting and Political Climate
Historically, Congress has focused primarily on domestic matters.

But as

influence within the executive branch has continued to move away from the State
Department toward the White House and functional departments with international
responsibilities, congressional access to foreign policy decision making has been
increasing. This change is the result of increased complexity of foreign policy issues and
greater crossing of domestic and international considerations on many non-security
issues. By 2005, congressional members were more likely to take the initiative to join
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with like-minded colleagues in asserting independent positions on foreign policy matters,
whereas earlier in our nation’s history they might have simply accepted guidance from
the White House or other executive departments.308
Although Congress asserts its policy making muscle from time to time, the
president still has an advantage in the national security arena because intelligence,
operational instruments, and the power bases are still located in his office. Even though
Congress has increased its staff and has greater research capabilities, the departments of
Defense, State, and Homeland Security, and the National Security Council, the Central
Intelligence Agency, and the Chiefs of Staff continue to dominate national security
policy.309
2. Legislative Decision-Making
There is a significant body of research with a diversity of opinion as to who
influences U.S. foreign policy and the policy preferences of public officials. The most
prevalent external influences may be categorized into three groups: organized interest
groups, knowledge-based experts, and voters or public opinion.310 Business corporations
and associations are particularly influential because of their effects on the economy, their
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powerful lobbying efforts, and the link between lobbying and campaign contributions.311
Knowledge-based experts have become more and more important to legislators as our
society has become more complicated.

The range and variety of issues in which

legislators much be conversant has expanded exponentially, while the number of
legislators representing the population has grown incrementally. Even with the growth of
support staff, it is impossible for any one legislator to be fully informed on every issue
considered in Congress. Although it is commonly accepted that legislators must be
responsive to public opinion, it is more likely that members of the House of
Representatives will be more sensitive to public opinion because of the frequency of their
elections in small, decentralized districts, whereas Senators are more insulated from
public opinion because of their longer terms.312

But these differences may have

diminished in an information society dominated by C-Span and the internet. Legislators
will tend to weigh the merits of a proposed policy against their assessment of its
acceptability.313 But it is generally agreed that there is a hierarchy of values when
legislators consider foreign policy, with domestic political factors taking precedent over
foreign policy decisions.314
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The preceding discussion of legislative institutionalization identifies informal
mechanisms that the 109th Congress had at its disposal to shift the balance of foreign
policy making power back in its direction. For instance, increases in legislative staff and
support services have bolstered Congress’ research and policy analysis capabilities and
its capacity to evaluate administrative performance. Changes in subcommittee structures
have redistributed control over legislative priorities and disbursed the ability to amass
votes among more members.

The power of appropriations has resulted in greater

administrative accountability to Congress. And, while the procedural rules may create
constraints, more experienced members of Congress have learned how to manipulate
rules to move bills through the process. The following chapters will discuss in more
detail how the 109th Congress took advantage of these types of informal tools to politicize
the CNOOC bid for Unocal.
Before moving to the analysis of official records showing that politicization of
CNOOC’s business proposal was a mechanism for asserting congressional power, the
next section will discuss the post 9/11 sense of vulnerability that created a sense of
urgency for reexamining executive review of foreign mergers and acquisitions for
national security implications.

U.S. Foreign Policy,” in Change in the International System, ed. O.R. Holsti, R.
Siverson, and A.L. George (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1980).
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III. INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES TRIGGERED BY SEPTEMBER 11, 2001
A. Changes in the Relationship Between the President and Congress
Early in his presidency, Bush had followed a minimalist approach to foreign
policy which was intended to contrast with Clinton’s interventionist approach. Upon
entering the White House, Bush knew he would have to balance the foreign policy
interests of both the conservatives and neoconservatives that had supported his
election.315 One way of achieving this balance was with his political appointments. For
example, one appointee, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, believed in the
use of force to promote American ideals in foreign nations, while another appointee,
Secretary of State Colin Powell, believed in a cautious approach which stressed the
importance of cultivating allies.
In the aftermath of the Cold War, President Bush acknowledged that neither
China nor Russia presented a global threat and this allowed him to turn his attention to
other areas of the world. By way of example, he received President Vicente Fox as the
first visiting foreign head of state. Not only did this stress the role that Bush saw Mexico
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playing in the American economy, but it could also be seen as an attempt to shift public
debate away from the Middle East.
Before President Bush had an opportunity to define any specific or controversial
foreign policy initiatives, the events of September 11, 2001 marked a turning point in the
presidency and for the nation as a whole. American citizens were unified in their demand
for an immediate response to this act of aggression. National security was elevated to the
top of the policy agenda and elected officials in both the executive and legislative
branches of government were forced to refocus their priorities. Partisanship took a
backseat while the president and Congress joined forces to manage the crisis. Both
houses of Congress acted quickly to approve a resolution authorizing the president to use
all necessary and appropriate force” against nations, organizations, and persons who had
aided in the terrorist attacks.316 This meant that President Bush could no longer tolerate
different foreign policy perspectives in his administration.
It was critical that the president regain control over the nation’s security. One of
the first steps he took was to assemble a “domestic consequences group” with Deputy
Chief of Staff Joshua Bolten serving as chair.317 The Office for Strategic Initiatives
(OSI) shifted its focus from long-term planning to research how previous presidents had
responded to crises. Karl Rove began to work with the domestic consequences task force
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and helped manage congressional relations. The National Security Council began to
meet daily with the president’s war cabinet which included Vice President Cheney, Chief
of Staff Card, National Security Advisor Rice, Secretary of State Powell, and CIA Chief
George Tenet.318
Based on the organization of other administrations one might expect that National
Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice would have been instrumental in setting the
president’s foreign policy priorities and reassigning those priorities to reorder the
president’s post 9/11 policy agenda.

But Rice’s role in national security was

overshadowed by Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld,
and to a lesser degree, Secretary of State Colin Powell.

Cheney was known to

circumvent Rice and attempt to take over her major responsibilities while Rumsfeld often
refused to share information with her. Even though many of Bush’s top advisors had
worked together in previous administrations, and had appeared to be unified in their
support of the President, internal disagreements among them began to emerge after the
terrorist attacks and the pressures of an impending war.
Some analysts argue that Rice followed the president’s orders without examining
alternative actions or examining the consequences.319 But given Bush’s managerial style,
it is unlikely that he would have been receptive to any attempts to engage him in analysis.
He viewed himself as “the Decider” whose primary responsibility was making tough
318
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decisions in difficult times and he often cut Rice and other advisors off before they could
provide their complete assessment of the situation.
A second step that Bush took after 9/11 was to evaluate his ability to make
immediate and unilateral decisions to secure the homeland against repeated terrorist
attacks within the existing organizational structure. Many of the administrative functions
related to national security were dispersed among a variety of administrative agencies and
coordination of these agencies would be an unwieldy task. The September 11 attack on
the United States made it clear to the president that he would have to undertake the most
massive reorganization of the Executive Office since Congress approved Roosevelt’s
Administrative Plan in 1932.320
In October 2001 President Bush used his executive authority to create the Office
of Homeland Security (OHS) and the Homeland Security Advisory Council (HSAC) to
coordinate the executive branch’s efforts to “detect, prepare for, prevent, respond to, and
recover from, terrorist acts within the United States.”321 Initially, the OHS and the HSAC
were to function much like cabinet councils established by previous presidents.322 Bush
320
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Even though OHS and HSAC were to perform much like president’s councils had in
the past, clearly, in the aftermath of 9/11, there were differences. See The 9/11
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proposed that the HSAC have a membership consisting of “not more than 21 members
appointed by the President” who would be “selected from the private sector, academia,
professional service associations, federally funded research and development centers,
nongovernmental organizations, State and local governments, and other appropriate
professions and communities.”323 The council included secretaries of Treasury, Defense,
Health and Human Services, and Transportation; the attorney general; the directors of the
OMB, CIA, FBI, and Federal Emergency Management Administration; and chiefs of
staff to Bush and Cheney.324 The HSAC was to meet periodically upon the request of the
Assistant to the President for Homeland Security to advise the president on strategy to
secure the U.S. against terrorist attacks.
The president distinguished the Homeland Security Advisory Council from the
existing National Security Council under Rice’s leadership. The HSAC was delegated
responsibility for protecting the homeland from terrorist attacks while the NSC was still
responsible for advising the President regarding foreign policy. In spite of efforts by
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Cheney to undermine Rice’s credibility, she still maintained her status with the president
who relied upon her to get things done.
President Bush appointed Thomas Ridge the first assistant to the president for
homeland security, but shortly after being sworn in, the administration ran into a conflict.
Even though widespread support for the president was undeniable, it did not mean that
every member in Congress was willing to grant the president carte blanche. Even in a
crisis situation, legislators were vigilant in protecting their oversight authority.

For

example, Senators Robert Byrd (D-WV) and Ted Stevens (R-AK) wrote a letter to Ridge
requesting that he testify before the Senate Appropriations Committee.

The

administration refused stating that advisors to the president did not have to testify before
Congress.325 This response was reminiscent of Cheney’s refusal to disclose information
to the GAO earlier in the year and illustrated once again that Congress and the
administration did not see eye to eye regarding executive privilege and legislative
oversight.

In spite of this conflict, the administration benefited from the nation’s

solidarity in the immediacy of the crisis as both Democrats and Republicans alike rallied
to support the president.
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It is not uncommon for executive power to expand during times of war when
presidents are granted a full array of administrative tools (including national security
directives, executive orders and proclamations) to design and implement policy
objectives. Clearly, Bush took advantage of the situation to assert unilateral powers
during his second term. This power play was backed by the White House counsel’s claim
that “[T]he framers of the Constitution, I think, intended there to be a strong presidency
in order to carry out certain functions, and [President Bush] feels an obligation to leave
the office in better shape than when he came in.”326
The president’s forceful response to 9/11 bolstered his approval ratings and his
surge in popularity gave him leverage over the 107th Congress which passed the Patriot
Act in spite of concerns about constitutional issues.327 The 107th Congress also showed
overwhelming support for a bill creating a new Transportation Security Administration
within the Department of Transportation.328 From this point on, Bush wholeheartedly
pursued the War on Terror and exuded new confidence in declaring to the world that our
allies were either with us or against us.
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At the beginning of 2002, President Bush laid out the American response to 9/11
and won over American citizens, in spite of concerns that his “axis of evil”
characterization might alienate some U.S. allies. While Vice President Cheney focused
on making the administration’s case for invading Iraq, President Bush focused on
defusing underlying congressional discontent by initiating one of the most ambitious
midterm campaigns of any president.

At the expense of domestic issues that have

typically favored Democrats, President Bush shifted the public’s attention to national
security issues that favored Republicans and helped the GOP gain more congressional
seats.
Another example of the president’s popularity, and perhaps his most enduring
success in expanding executive powers, was when the 108th Congress gave in to the
White House version of the Department of Homeland Security Act. In October 2002,
Congress passed legislation to merge the Office of Homeland Security with the
Homeland Security Advisory Council to form the Department of Homeland Security, but
retained the assistant to the president for homeland security in the Executive Office.329
This organizational change resulted in four centers of power with influence over the
formation of national security policy: (1) the policy triad comprised of the secretary of
state, secretary of defense, and the national security advisor; (2) the director of national
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intelligence and the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff; (3) the president’s closest White
House advisers; and (4) the secretary of Homeland Security.330
The Homeland Security Act allowed Bush to turn his back on the antiinterventionist foreign policy rhetoric of his 2000 campaign which pledged to work with
U.S. allies for peacekeeping and nation-building. President Bush and Vice President
Cheney advocated for a tough policy against terrorists, and Americans supported military
intervention to make their homeland safe again.
Although 9/11 unified Congress, the consensus over the need to protect and
defend national security began to crumble when the Iraq invasion failed to disclose
weapons of mass destruction. At first, Bush held fast to his original strategy for the War
on Terror, but after Stephen Hadley succeeded Rice as national security advisor, Bush
became more open to considering alternative recommendations. This is not to say that
Rice had been ineffective, but that Hadley had benefited from a different environment,
one in which the president had come to realize that his policies were not working as
expected.331 The National Security Council went through several changes early in 2005,
including: (1) simplification of internal organization with communications and legislative
affairs functions returning to the White House; (2) a thirty percent reduction in staffing,
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and (3) adding a second deputy to coordinate economic strategy, national security, and
foreign policy.332
Even though few legislators had challenged President Bush publically, conflicting
political views continued to churn beneath the façade of a unified position towards the
administration’s approach to protecting national security.333 Democrats and Republicans
had concerns about constitutional separation of powers, about maintaining the
prerogatives of the legislative branch, and about threats to civil liberties.334 But they had
not felt empowered to voice their concerns until the failure to find weapons of mass
destruction, combined with administrative bungling of Hurricane Katrina caused Bush’s
ratings to plunge. Even though Bush attempted to modify his foreign policy tone at the
beginning of his second term, it was too late to stave the backlash that was brewing in
Congress.
B. Changes in U.S.-China Foreign Policy
1.

Pre-9/11 Institutional Tensions Over U.S.-China Policy

To set the stage for understanding how institutional tensions have affected post9/11 China policy we briefly review the executive-legislative relationship that has
evolved since the Nixon Administration first pursued normalization of relations. Even
though the joint communiqué signed by Nixon and Chou Enlai in February 1972 was a
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major breakthrough in U.S.-China diplomatic relations, Sino-American talks stalled
under the Ford Administration.
When President Carter took office, one of his stated foreign policy goals was
normalization of relations with China.335 The Policy Review Committee headed by
Secretary of State Vance cautioned that diplomatic relations with China might harm arms
control negotiations, but still recommended that the president pursue negotiations and
accept the Chinese demand to end diplomatic relations with Taiwan.

336

Meanwhile,

knowing this demand would create opposition from the hawks in Congress, National
Security Advisor Zbigniew Brezinski convinced the president to enter into secret
negotiations to avoid publicity.337 While the president argued publicly that China
intended to resolve the Taiwan issue peacefully and the Chinese cooperated by not
challenging his pledge to protect Taiwan.
Carter argued for normalization, claiming it would “contribute to the welfare of
the American people, to the stability of Asia where the United States has major security
and economic interest, and to the peace of the entire world.”338 But his failure to consult
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prominent congressional leaders in the decision process led to an immediate political
reaction. Nonetheless, the response was mixed. For instance, Senate Majority Leader
Robert Byrd said it was “an important step that would help secure world peace;” Senator
Gerald Ford voiced “terse” approval; and Senator Goldwater called it a “cowardly act.”
It was the criticism from angry conservatives that suggested President Carter would face
a fight in Congress.339 The political struggle continued until Congress deleted language
about a specific U.S. commitment to Taiwan in the Taiwan Relations Act. Afterwards,
the act passed 90-6 in the Senate, 345-55 in the House, and the president approved it
April 10, 1979.340
By midsummer 1979, President Carter indicated a willingness to consider Most
Favored Nation (MFN) status for China.341

Unlike the previous debates over
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normalization of trade relations, congressional opposition to an expanded relationship did
not materialize. In fact, MFN status drew support from Senator Henry M. Jackson (DWA) who was the author of the earlier Jackson-Vanik trade restrictions that affected both
China and Russia.
According to Richard Bush, three explanations for cooperation between the
president and Congress in 1979 regarding China’s MFN status have dominated the
literature.342
1. China’s policies toward Asia and bilateral issues either paralleled or
reinforced U.S. objectives,
2. China was seen as an adversary of the Soviet Union and could
cooperate with the U.S. on that front,
3. The reforms in China appeared to be improving the political and
economic well-being of the people.343
For most of the 1980s, consensus prevailed in U.S.-China policy and Congress
generally supported the president’s initiatives.344
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the bi-polar nature of international politics
changed and communist aggression was no longer a primary concern. As traditional
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security issues diminished in significance, the door opened for non-traditional issues with
a moral undertone. Congress, and the public, turned their attention to concerns about the
global economy, human rights, and the environment.

A wide spectrum of private

businesses, special interest groups, and non-government organizations sought to
influence these foreign policy debates.
After the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident, religious and human rights groups,
labor unions, and students lobbied to elevate moral issues on the foreign policy agenda.
Many legislators, believing President George H.W. Bush was too lenient towards China,
relied on Tiananmen to interpret Jackson-Vanik as authorizing Congress to withhold
China’s MFN status as an economic sanction against human rights violations.345 Policy
differences expressed in the ensuing MFN debates ushered in the end of a China
consensus.346
In 1990 the House of Representatives passed the “conditionality bill” that
proposed to place restrictions on China’s future eligibility for MFN status. But the bill
died when the Senate failed to act. The next year, differences between the president and
Congress intensified and the House of Representatives passed legislation to suspend
China’s MFN status with a nearly unanimous vote. With the president threatening a veto,
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the Senate deferred once again and China was granted MFN status for another year.347
This set the stage for MFN to become an annual vehicle for debating U.S. policy towards
China, and U.S.-China policy became hostage to domestic politics.348
During the final weeks of the second session of the 102nd Congress, Senators Byrd
(D-WV) and Bingaman (D-NM) sponsored legislation concerning the Exon-Florio
Amendment.349 This bill, called the Byrd Amendment, was designed to strengthen ExonFlorio by limiting presidential discretion to avoid investigation of proposed takeovers and
increase scrutiny of foreign governments and foreign government-owned companies.350
More importantly, the Byrd Amendment increased opportunities for legislators to apply
political pressure to the president to conduct a review of proposed acquisitions.
Meanwhile, during the 1992 election year, Bill Clinton’s campaign criticized
President Bush for “coddling tyrants” in Beijing and pledged to be more assertive
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towards human rights violations.351 Newly elected in 1993, President Clinton announced
he would link MFN status to human rights in the future.352
Prior to 1993, the business community had relied on the presidential veto to
protect its business interests, but seeing this would no longer a guarantee under the
Clinton Administration, and facing the possibility that China’s MFN status could be
terminated, “the business community organized one of the most aggressive and effective
lobbying efforts ever made in the foreign policy sphere” to push for renewal of China’s
MFN status.353 Clinton then proposed a compromise in which the Chinese would have to
attain bench marks to ensure continued MFN status and he imposed these benchmarks by
executive order.354

Clinton effectively removed China policy from the grasp of

politically motivated legislators but economic agencies within the executive branch
asserted that the executive order had not given adequate emphasis to economic
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considerations.355 Ultimately, Clinton was persuaded to move away from the concept of
conditionality towards delinking international human rights issues from economic issues.
Following this flurry of activity over China’s MFN status, the Clinton
Administration became preoccupied mostly with domestic issues and the state of the
American economy. While some analysts argue this domestic focus emerged because
Clinton did not have a map to guide the foreign policy agenda during this initial postCold War period, others argue that it emerged because the Republican-led Congress
made such a strong effort to micromanage foreign policy.356 Yet, in spite of Clinton’s
domestic focus, he did have some foreign policy successes. Over the course of his
presidency, institutions with foreign policy agendas multiplied and more and more of
these institutions began to utilize Congress as their point of entry into the policy making
process.
By the time President Bush took office, most legislators had an opinion regarding
U.S.-China policy, even if foreign policy was not their area of expertise. China has long
held a place in the hearts and minds of Americans, and many continue to struggle with
the concept of granting privileges, such as MFN, to a country that is governed by the
Communist Party, even if those privileges benefit the American economy.

This

ideological struggle is intensified when one considers that benefits may accrue to one
sector of the economy, but may be detrimental to other sectors. This tension is played out
every day in Congress.
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2.

Post-9/11 Tensions Regarding U.S.-China Policy

After September 11, 2001, the Bush Administration advocated for a global
antiterrorist campaign with cooperation from similarly-minded nations and American
defense policy changed from deterrence to preemption. In East Asia, this effort began
with a conference between senior officials from Washington and ten member-states of the
Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). During the conference, American
officials discussed the strategic importance of Southeast Asia and convinced the ten
ASEAN member-states to sign a counterterrorism pact.357
President Bush also announced he would travel to Shanghai in October 2001 to
attend the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) council heads-of-state meeting, to
be followed by an official visit to China.358

The administration pursued several

diplomatic exchanges with China with President Bush making two trips to China and
China’s Vice President Hu Jintao and President Jiang Zemin visiting the United States.
Although Bush did not relent in his support of Taiwan during these exchanges, a “new
cordiality” began to emerge.359
The Bush Administration’s shift in priorities from Clinton-era economics to
military and security priorities was evident in the Pentagon’s 2001 Quadrennial Defense
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Review Report which classified Asia as a “critical region.”360 A year later, in September
2002, the Bush Administration released the National Security Strategy of the United
States of America which solidified a policy of military predominance in which the United
States committed to take whatever actions are necessary to protect its security and the
security of its allies. This preemptive approach recognizes governments are responsible
for what happens within their territory, but assumes an American right of intervention if
another government fails to act against terrorist activity.

Fearing legitimization of

intervention in domestic affairs, many Asian nations, including China, began to question
the increased U.S. military presence in East Asia,361 but the Bush Administration held
fast to its policy of swift military responsiveness to future military challenges in the
region.362
Some analysts suggest Bush’s interest in high level exchanges had as much to do
with U.S. military strategy in Asia as with U.S. policy towards China because once the
administration began to consider foreign policy, it stated that it wanted to strengthen ties
with traditional allies in the Asia-Pacific region, which excluded China.363 For example,
in his testimony to Congress prior to Bush’s February 2002 visit to China, Assistant
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Secretary James Kelly praised U.S.-Japan relations and U.S.-South Korea relations, but
pointed out the negative as well as the positive when commenting on China.364 In
another example, when Bush and his secretary of defense, Donald Rumsfeld, committed
to the buildup of national and theater missile defense systems, they looked to Japan, not
China, for potential support.365 This approach did not escape attention in Beijing and
raised concern over a more aggressive United States, perhaps encouraging Chinese
leaders to engage in their own military buildup.
In the following years, the Bush Administration continually warned against any
power challenging U.S. interests with military force; and even though the Chinese had
toned down their anti-American hegemony rhetoric, the administration continued to view
China as a potential threat. President Bush issued the strongest statements supporting
Taiwan’s defense since the normalization of relations with China; he increased the
Taiwan arms sale package; and he imposed more sanctions on China over reported
proliferation of military weapons than any other president.

In addition to his firm

position regarding military affairs, President Bush took a strong stand against China’s
domestic policies, focusing on human rights abuses and repressed religious freedoms.366
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The president’s hard line stance seemed to be in line with mainstream thought at the time
and there was little opposition in Congress or the media.367
Some speculate that China supported the U.S. anti-terrorist policies to avoid
interrupting the domestic economy and commercial relations that were so important to
China’s economic growth.368 While the U.S. focused on fighting terrorism, tensions over
U.S.-China trade issues continued to ferment in Congress.

Following China’s

membership in the WTO, an increase in the U.S.-China trade imbalance led to more and
more complaints from U.S. manufacturing firms. Several manufacturers charged China
with unfair trade practices that threatened their ability to compete and resulted in the loss
of American jobs. Even though businesses were concerned about trade issues, they were
also concerned about avoiding a disruption in trade with China.

The Bush

Administration seemed to respect the need to maintain advantageous economic relations
with China despite ideological differences, but members of Congress began calling on the
administration “to take a more aggressive stance” against Chinese “unfair” trade
policies.369
On several occasions, President Bush criticized China’s currency valuation
policies, and he even raised the issue in a meeting with Chinese President Hu Jintao on
October 19, 2003. But on October 30, 2003, when the Treasury Department released its
367
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semiannual report on exchange rate policies, it fell short of stating that China
manipulated its currency. Therefore, by U.S. law, Treasury was not required to negotiate
an end to China’s currency practices.370
In January, 2005, Secretary of Commerce Donald Evans traveled to Beijing to
engage in a dialogue concerning China’s commitments to its WTO membership. In
meetings with Vice Premier Wu Yi and Minister of Commerce Bo Xilai, Secretary Evans
focused on reducing intellectual property counterfeiting and piracy by strengthening the
enforcement structure; eliminating non-tariff barriers to open up markets; moving to a
flexible exchange rate; and creating a level playing field for all trading partners.371
A few months later, when the Unocal issue arose in Congress, it appeared to the
administration that Beijing was ready to change its position regarding China’s currency
valuation. At a G-7 meeting in April, U.S. Treasury Secretary John Snow indicated that
China was ready to adopt a more flexible exchange rate. Snow’s reading of China’s
willingness to change may have been based on his belief that the Bush Administration
was strengthening its position, as illustrated in the Treasury’s International Economic and
Exchange Rate Policies report to Congress, and not on any firm commitment by the
Chinese.372 Less than one month later, in Treasury’s May 17, 2005 report, Snow changed
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his tune and stated that the valuation issue is a “substantial distortion to world markets,”
and he warned that Treasury planned to monitor China’s progress closely.373
But at the same time that the Treasury Department was monitoring currency
related issues, the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) was facing intellectual property
rights issues. Under the terms of China’s WTO accession, China had agreed to bring its
intellectual property rights law in compliance with the WTO agreement on Trade Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights. Although the Bush Administration had stated
repeatedly that China was making progress by passing new laws, training judges and law
enforcement officials, closing illegal production lines, seizing illegal products, and
preventing exports of pirated products, the USTR held fast to the conviction that much
more needed to be done to improve China’s intellectual property rights protection.374
Complaints from the business community continued and the USTR responded by
announcing, on April 29th that it had placed China on the Special 301 Priority Watch List
due to “serious concerns” over compliance with WTO obligations and failure to
implement pledges to reduce IPR infringements.375 On July 11, 2005, the U.S.-China
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Joint Committee on Commerce and Trade (JCCT) met and discussed intellectual property
rights related issues.
In July 2005, Secretary of State Condolezza Rice visited Beijing to discuss North
Korea, counter terrorism, human rights and religions rights. When asked about economic
and trade issues, she deferred to Secretary of Commerce Gutierrez and the JCCT who
were also in China. Although recused from addressing the Unocal bid due to her ten
years of service on the Chevron board, Secretary Rice stated that the relationship with
China has
improved dramatically over the last several years. Our trade relations,
while they are not uncomplicated and while the Chinese economy is
transitioning in ways that are sometimes problematic for the American
economy, it’s still a very healthy, robust and active economic
relationship.376
When asked about the Bush Administration’s characterization of China as a
threat, Rice responded that the administration did not perceive China as a threat; it was
simply taking note of the size and pace of China’s military buildup. In her view, the
pressing issues for Washington were keeping up with China’s military; safeguarding
intellectual property rights; and honoring the long-held One-China policy, the three joint
communiqués, and obligations under the Taiwan Relations Act.377 Later, in an interview
with Time Magazine, Rice emphasized that the Chinese relationship is complex.
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Although China cannot be characterized as “all positive or negative,” it is the
administration’s job is “to make China a positive influence on international politics.” 378
Clearly, Secretary Rice was downplaying Congress’s negative reaction to the Unocal bid.
Similarly, other State Department officials refrained from commenting on the
CNOOC bid and the congressional reaction it precipitated. Deputy Secretary Robert
Zoellick flatly refused to offer any thoughts on whether Congress was overreacting.379
When asked if the administration had no formal position, National Security Advisor
Steve Hadley responded, “The position is going to come out of the CFIUS process.”
Elaborating further, he stated:
There are a series of administrative and legal processes that get triggered .
. . a standard process in law and regulation that we would have to pursue .
. . if it becomes a formal proposal, then those procedures will have to be
invoked, and we’ll have to take a look at it.380
Hadley also refused to take a political stand, making no comment on congressional
outrage over the issue. The administration’s position, as stated by Hadley was indicative
of the classical “time-buying” strategy identified by Farnham. When faced with tradeoffs that reduce acceptability (such as making a choice between promoting free trade and
protecting national security), political decision makers will “often bide their time, relying
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on the logic of events. If there is nothing to be done at the moment, they are content to
wait for change in a more favorable direction” so as to “alienate fewer people” while
evaluating opportunities to increase the public’s receptivity to the policy issue.381

IV.

CONCLUSION

According to the theoretical framework of new institutionalism, policy making in
the United States is in a constant state of flux in which the institutions of the presidency
and Congress continually act (either formally or informally) to assert powers granted
under the Constitution to influence foreign policy decisions. Formal rules set parameters
for introducing legislation, and delineate the steps that a bill must go through to become
law.

But policy making is much more complex than the rules set forth under the

Constitution and in statutes and procedural rules. This study hypothesizes that what takes
place informally is what really matters when trying to explain why some issues become
politicized when they are formally introduced as legislation, and why some bills become
law and others do not.
When presidents rely upon informal powers to increase their authority it threatens
to destabilize the formal balance of power between the executive and legislative
institutions.

To overcome this tendency, members of Congress will use formal

constitutional powers to propose new laws and policies to bring the system back into
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equilibrium.382 However, because institutional constraints also inhibit Congress from
acting quickly and decisively, individual legislators will turn to informal powers as a
means of increasing their political influence and ability to get legislation passed.
While a natural ebb and flow is expected in a political system based on “checks
and balances,” by the end of the twentieth century, the president’s formal authority had
expanded while legislative oversight authority had diminished. Some of the drift towards
presidential dominance may be explained by specific measures modern presidents have
taken to gain more decision making autonomy; and some of this trend may be explained
by the Congress’s failure to foresee the full spectrum of outcomes that could result from
executive implementation of legislative mandates. What distinguished President Bush
from other presidents was the combination of his hierarchical approach to managing his
staff and delegation of responsibilities with an almost absolute insistence upon loyalty
and discipline. By Bush’s second term, policy weaknesses created by a limited flow of
information and advice became more evident. These weaknesses heightened concerns
regarding executive powers and some members of Congress saw the controversy
surrounding CNOOC’s proposed acquisition of Unocal as an opportunity to assert
congressional oversight authorities.
Institutional tensions between the president and Congress have created a policy
making process that is fragmented, inefficient, and often difficult to predict.

This

phenomenon is illustrated by the Unocal Case discussed in this dissertation. When
Chinese-owned CNOOC contemplated its bid to acquire Unocal, CNOOC did not foresee
382
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that it would become entangled in the institutional struggle between Congress and the
presidency – a struggle in which each institution was vying for greater authority and
autonomy in foreign policy decision making.
Research shows that a variety of factors contributed to a legislative desire to shift
the balance of power in foreign policy decision making during President Bush’s second
term. Immediately after September 11, 2001, Congress deferred to Bush and Cheney in
the war on terror and the public supported the president’s decisive actions. By 2005,
foreign policy decision making had become decidedly weighted towards the presidency.
But this shift in the balance of power did not go unnoticed by members of Congress –
even legislators in the president’s own party who supported his political agenda were
becoming concerned about the loss of legislative authority.
Even though Congress had done very little to rein in the President Bush prior to
2005, during that summer, the proposed Unocal takeover provided an opportunity for
Congress to take on administrative shortcomings and transgressions. Congress held
hearings, issued proclamations, and modified legislation to make the president more
accountable for the review of foreign acquisitions under the Exon-Florio Amendment.
The Bush Administration seemed to just sit back while the issue played out in the
legislature. Was this because the Unocal bid caught President Bush off guard, like it did
the Chinese, and he was confident that the Republican majority in Congress would shape
policy to his liking? Or was it because the president determined it was not a battle worth
fighting? The answer to this question lies in the institutions themselves and the historical
context in which the institutions found themselves reacting to the CNOOC proposal.
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One of the issues that had been brewing in Congress concerned presidential
implementation of the Exon-Florio Amendment. Some legislators had begun questioning
whether the Bush Administration’s singular focus on the War on Terror had left the
nation’s security vulnerable in other respects – such as foreign acquisition of corporations
with access to essential resources, technology, and know how. Others had become
concerned that they had abdicated congressional oversight responsibilities when giving
the president such liberty to respond to terrorist attacks.

By the time CNOOC

contemplated its bid to acquire Unocal a movement was already underway in Congress to
strengthen legislative oversight of presidential authority over foreign acquisitions of U.S.
corporations under the Exon-Florio provision.
From the president’s perspective, other policy issues may have been deemed more
important at the time. He may also have felt he could afford to let his Republican
colleagues handle the issue. However adept President Bush was at measuring the level of
opposition in Congress and adapting his position to obtain his goals, he may have
overlooked the more subtle, yet tangible, tools that Congress has available to impact
executive powers. A president’s unilateral powers are not absolute and Congress and the
courts are always standing ready to reverse any executive actions should the president
overextend his powers. Such was the case with the Unocal acquisition.
The next chapter reviews the primary statutes governing foreign acquisitions with
a focus on the Exon-Florio Amendment enacted to provide the president statutory
authority to block foreign acquisitions impacting national security. The chapter begins
with a discussion of the history of Exon-Florio – how presidents have used their statutory
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authority to promote or discourage foreign business transactions and how Congress has
responded to the exercise of this authority. Then, within the context of the CNOOC bid
for Unocal, the chapter examines the struggle between the institutions of the presidency
and Congress over the implementation of Exon-Florio. Examining the Unocal Case from
the analytical perspective of institutionalism provides insight into why Congress
politicized the Chinese company’s offer to purchase the American-owned oil and gas
corporation.
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CHAPTER FOUR:
EFFECTUATING CHANGE IN STATUTORY LAW THROUGH
POLITICIZATION OF CNOOC’S BID TO ACQUIRE UNOCAL

I.

INTRODUCTION

Foreign capital has played a role in the American economy and has contributed to
the country’s development ever since colonial times. Even though it is generally believed
that there are mutual benefits to foreign investments, most countries impose restrictions
of one sort or another. In the United States, there are no express provisions in the
Constitution for the federal government to regulate foreign investment, so we look to
other constitutional powers for justification of these powers. Most commonly, regulation
of foreign investment is interpreted as falling under Congress’s authority to “regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States”383 and to provide for
national defense.384 In spite of this constitutional basis, not every legislator perceives the
impact of foreign investment in the same way. Some may encourage it as a means of
offsetting the loss of jobs from U.S. companies investing abroad while others may see it
as a threat to American industry. But if foreign investment threatens to impair the
nation’s security, legislators are faced with the challenge of weighing national security
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needs against open trade principles. Finding the balance between these two important
national interests is dependent upon access to relevant and timely information.385
After World War I the United States became a creditor nation with exports
exceeding foreign imports. By the 1970s foreign investment in American businesses had
begun to rise, and Congress began to debate the merits and disadvantages of foreign
investments. Realizing the importance of access to data in the policy making process,
Congress passed a number of statutes focused on how information is gathered and
disclosed. For example, the International Investment and Trade in Services Survey Act
of 1976 states that the president shall collect information regarding international
investment and U.S. foreign trade in services.386 In 1990, Congress amended the act to
require that the president publish periodic information regarding foreign investment,
including ownership by foreign governments,387 and to allow the president to request
reports on the best available information from the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of
Economic Analysis (BEA) regarding the extent of foreign direct investment in any given
industry.388

Another example is the Foreign Direct Investment and International
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U.S. Congressional Research Service, Foreign Investment in the United States: Major
Federal Statutory Restrictions, (Report No. RL33103, March 27, 2008), by Michael V.
Seitzinger (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, 2009), 3-4.
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U.S. Code 22, § 3103(h). Foreign direct investment is defined by statute as the
ownership or control, directly or indirectly, by one foreign person (individual, branch,
partnership, association, government, etc.) of 10% or more of the voting securities of an
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Financial Data Improvements Act of 1990 which allows the BEA to access data from the
Census Bureau. 389 The purpose of the statute is to provide the BEA with additional data
so that it can improve the accuracy and analysis in the reports that it provides to the
Congress and the public regarding foreign direct investment.
In spite of the statutes directed at collecting and disclosing data regarding foreign
investment in the United States, members of Congress have grown increasingly
concerned about loss of control over resources and industries that are essential to our
economy and our national security. This has been less of a concern for the economy
when foreign investment is made by persons or governments from nations that provide
reciprocal investment opportunities.

But concerns have been heightened when

investments are made by citizens or governments from nations that do not follow
reciprocal trade policies, or when foreign investments are made in industries and
resources deemed vital to national defense. Whenever concerns are heightened, Congress
considers specific legislation to regulate mergers, acquisitions, and takeovers of
American corporations.
Globerman and Shapiro suggest that even though there has “always been political
opposition” to foreign direct investment, particularly when it involves acquisitions of
large host country corporations, legal barriers to inward foreign direct investment have
been “substantially weakened” in both developed and emerging economies in recent
decades. This seems to suggest that host economies recognize net benefits to the host
incorporated U.S. business or an equivalent interest in an unincorporated U.S. business
enterprise. Code of Federal Regulations, title 15, §806.15(a)(1).
389

U.S. Code 22, § 3141.
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country.390 Given this trend, one would expect the 109th Congress to have viewed
CNOOC’s proposed acquisition more favorably. But the history of this case shows that
the pendulum may be swinging in the other direction as members in Congress push for
more rigorous delineation of the executive’s statutory authority over foreign acquisitions
and greater scrutiny of executive decisions.

II. LAWS GOVERNING MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS, AND TAKEOVERS
Over the years, Congress has enacted specific laws to govern mergers,
acquisitions, and takeovers of American corporations.391 Which laws apply, and how
they apply, depend upon the origins of the entities proposing the corporate acquisitions
and the particular details of each offer. Acquisitions proposed by domestic entities are
governed by the Premerger Notification Act (PNA) and are subject to review by the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) or the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice
(DOJ).392

Acquisitions proposed by foreign entities are governed primarily by the

International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA)393 and the Defense Production
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Steven Globerman and Daniel Shapiro, “Economic and Strategic Considerations
Surrounding Chinese FDI in the United States,” Asia Pacific Journal of Management 26
(2009), 164-165.
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For simplicity, we will use the terms “mergers,” “acquisitions,” or “takeovers”
interchangeably to discuss the offers that ChevronTexaco and CNOOC proposed for the
purchase of Unocal.
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Premerger Notification Act, U.S. Code 15, §18a.
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International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977, Public Law 95-223, codified
at U.S. Code 50, §1701 et. seq.
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Act of 1950 (DPA) and its subsequent amendments,394 and may be subject to review by
the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS).395 Because the two
corporations that proposed to takeover Unocal and its wholly owned subsidiary Union Oil
of California in 2005 had different origins they were subject to different laws. As a
domestic entity, ChevronTexaco’s offer was subject to review by the FTC. As a foreign
entity, CNOOC’s offer was subject to review by the CFIUS.
A. Domestic Mergers, Acquisitions, and Takeovers
Although the PNA does not indicate which agency is to review which domestic
transaction, traditionally, those in the petroleum industry have when been reviewed by
the FTC.396 In 2005, when ChevronTexaco announced its plan to acquire Unocal, the
PNA required the reporting of all transactions resulting in the acquiring party’s holding
assets or voting securities: (1) in excess of $200 million, or (2) between $50 million and
$200 million plus the assets or voting securities of the acquired party.397 A 30-day
waiting period begins on the day the reviewing agency receives the materials specified in
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Defense Production Act of 1950, Public Law 81-744, codified at U.S. Code (1950).
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Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, § 5021, Public Law 100-418, U.S.
Statutes at Large 102 (1988): 1107, 1425-26, amending Title VII of the Defense
Production Act of 1950, codified at U.S. Code 50 (1989), § 2170 et seq.).
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U.S. Code 15, § 18a. See also, U.S. Congressional Research Service, “Unocal: Legal
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Corporation,” (Report No. RS22192, August 5, 2005), by Janice E. Rubin and Michael V.
Seitzinger, (Washington D.C.: Library of Congress, 2005).
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section 18a.398 If the reviewing agency requests “additional material or documentary
material relevant to the proposed acquisition” prior to the expiration of the initial 30 days,
the waiting period may be extended an additional 20 days.399 Alternatively, the original
waiting period may be terminated prior to the end of 30 days if the reviewing agency
provides notice in the Federal Register that it intends no further action.400 But if the
merger partner or the acquiring party is a non-U.S. entity, national security may be an
issue and other legislation is controlling.
The primary purpose of FTC review is to ensure competition in the American
domestic markets. When investigating acquisitions, the FTC is committed to gathering
extensive information; obtaining input from a wide variety of sources; and emphasizing
scientific methodology in its analyses. For example, in July 2004, William E. Kovacic,
General Counsel of the FTC, appeared before a subcommittee of the House Committee
on Government Reform to present testimony on factors that contributed to recent gasoline
price increases and steps that might decrease gasoline prices in the short and long term.401
A week later he appeared before a subcommittee of the House Committee on Energy and
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U.S. Code 15, § 18a(b)(1)(A), (B).
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William E. Kovacic presenting prepared statement of the Federal Trade Commission,
“Market Forces, Anticompetitive Activity, and Gasoline Prices: FTC Initiatives to Protect
Competitive Markets,” on July 7, 2004, to the Subcommittee on Energy Policy, Natural
Resources and Regulatory Affairs, Committee on Government Reform, U.S. House of
Representatives, 108th Cong., 2nd sess. Available at www.ftc.gov/speeches/Kovacic.shtm
(accessed December 12, 2007).
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Commerce to present testimony on initiatives to protect competitive markets in the
production, distribution and sale of gasoline.402 In his testimony, he identified the basic
tools the FTC uses to promote competition in the petroleum industry as “challenges to
potentially anticompetitive mergers, prosecution of non-merger antitrust violations,
monitoring industry behavior to detect anticompetitive conduct, and research to
understand petroleum sector developments.”403 Kovacic emphasized the premium that
the FTC places on “careful research, industry monitoring, and investigations” to
understand the industry and to identify obstacles to competition.404
The FTC plays an important role in protecting competition in the petroleum
industry. From 1981 to 2004, the FTC had taken enforcement action against 15 major
petroleum mergers, four of which were either abandoned or blocked as a result of FTC or
court action; in the remaining 11 cases, the FTC required the merging companies to
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divest substantial assets.405

The openness of the FTC process is illustrated by the

availability and depth of its reports.406
B. Foreign Mergers, Acquisitions, and Takeovers
Foreign mergers, acquisitions, and takeovers are distinguished from domestic
acquisitions in that they are subject to different laws, both within the United States and
the home country. Although U.S. citizens value free markets, both the president and
Congress have long been aware of how difficult is it to balance free trade principles with
national security concerns, especially during times of war. Early in the twentieth century,
Congress found it necessary to pass the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917 to give the
federal government authority to prohibit financial transactions in time of war.407
Similarly, the Defense Production Act of 1950 (DPA), which broadened the
government’s power to channel domestic production capacity to meet national defense
needs, also served to limit foreign investment in sectors of the economy that were
particularly sensitive during wartime.408
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While a foreign acquisition may not give rise to an actual national emergency, it
may have implications regarding future national security concerns. In 1975, President
Ford established the interagency Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States
to address this issue.409 President Ford granted the CFIUS broad responsibilities for
monitoring and evaluating the impact of foreign investment, but in reality, the committee
had little authority. President Ford’s successors issued subsequent executive orders to
expand these powers, but they too had varying and debatable degrees of success.410
In 1977, the 95th Congress amended the Trading with the Enemies Act by passing
the International Emergency Economic Powers Act.411 The IEEPA grants the president
broad powers to deal with any “unusual and extraordinary threat” to the national security,
foreign policy, or economy of the United States.412 However, to invoke these powers, the
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President Ford formed the CFIUS in response to the Arab Oil Embargo in 1973 and
fears that the influx of Arab “petrodollars” would allow the foreign countries to control
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20263.
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(1977), §§ 1701-1707.
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threat must be imminent enough for the president to declare a national emergency.413
According to former Commerce Secretary Baldridge, taking such an action would be “the
equivalent of a declaration of hostilities against the government of the acquirer
company.”414

Therefore, in many instances, presidents (who are respectful of the

innuendos of diplomacy) were powerless to take action against foreign mergers,
acquisitions, and takeovers for political reasons and because the business transactions fell
short of an “imminent threat.”
By the 1980s, growing concern over Japan’s rise as an economic power and
competitor in the technology industry, led Congress to amend section 721 of the Defense
Production Act of 1950 with the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988.415
Since then, exclusive of a national emergency, foreign acquisitions have been governed
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Commerce Secretary Baldridge, speaking about “Acquisitions by Foreign
Companies,” on at hearing before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation, 100th Cong., 1st sess.,1987, 15
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Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, § 5021 enacted H.R. 4848, Public
Law 100-418, U.S. Statutes at Large 102 (1988):1107, amending Title VII of the Defense
Production Act of 1950, codified at U.S. Code 50 (1989), app. § 2170. It was signed into
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scheduled to expire in 1991, but was made permanent by Section 8 of the Defense
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Exon-Florio a permanent provision of the Defense Production Act, Public Law 102-99,
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by the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act.416 This act has come to be known as the
“Exon-Florio Amendment” after its sponsors Senator J. James Exon (D-NE) and
Representative James J. Florio (D-NJ).417
C. Legislative History of Exon-Florio Amendment
The congressional hearings regarding the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness
Act are instructive as to foreign trade concerns as well as the institutional tensions
between the president and Congress. The act was first introduced in the House as an
amendment to H.R. 3 by Rep. Dick Gebhardt (D-MO) to order the executive branch to
examine trade with countries that had a large trade surplus with the U.S. In the hearing
on April 28, 1987, debate was limited and time was divided and controlled by the chair
and ranking minority members of eleven committees.418
Banking Committee Chair Mary Rose Oakar (D-OH) objected to section 905 of
the bill, which would require the secretary of Commerce to immediately investigate, upon
the request of the head of any agency, any foreign takeover of a U.S. corporation to
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Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Public Law 100-418, 5021, 102
U.S. Statutes at Large 1107, (codified at U.S. Code 50 (1989), app. § 2170 reprinted in
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Hearing on Trade and International Economic Policy Reform Act of 1987, Cong.
Rec., 100th Cong. 1st sess., April 28, 1987, 133, no. 66: H2548. One hour was provided to
the following committees: Ways and Means; Foreign Affairs; Energy and Commerce;
Agriculture; Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs. One-half hour was provided to
Education and Labor; Government Operations; Public Works and Transportation;
Judiciary; Merchant Marine and Fisheries; and Small Business.
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determine the effect on national security. She reminded the House that the Banking
Committee had sole jurisdiction over defense production and the Defense Production Act
of 1950. She objected to “usurping” the committee’s jurisdiction under the guise of an
omnibus trade bill. However, Mr. LaFalce (D-NY), chairman of the House Banking
Subcommittee on Economic Stabilization, reminded the delegates that President
Reagan’s trade policies had caused the trade deficits that were the root of the problem.
As a consequence, U.S. competitiveness had reached “crisis proportions” and the trade
bill was necessary to address a multitude of trade policy problems.
Meanwhile, Democrats in the Senate had been working on their own version of a
bill ever since the 1986 elections had made trade an “urgent legislative priority.”419 The
cosponsors of S. 1420 introduced the bill on February 5, 1987. After 19 days of hearings,
the bill was favorably reported to the Senate upon a 19-1 vote. When the clerk reported S.
1420 on June 23, 1987, Majority Leader Robert Byrd (D-WV) emphasized the bipartisan
nature of the bill and the effort to include the administration in its formation. He noted
that the Finance Committee had held 60 days of hearings and heard over 650 witnesses
during the 99th and 100th Congresses.420
Senate Finance Committee Chair Lloyd Bentsen (D-TX) stressed the bipartisan
consensus that trade should be the “number one legislative priority” of the 100th Congress
419

Senator Lloyd Bentsen of Texas, speaking for the Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act, on June 25, 1987, 100th Cong. 1st sess., Cong. Rec. 133: 177450. In
2005, then Minority Leader Byrd had asked Bentsen to head a study group. After issuing
a report in April, Bentsen then recommended trade legislation which was the impetus for
S. 1420.
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Senator Robert Byrd of West Virginia, speaking for the Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act, on June 25, 1987, 100th Cong. 1st sess., Cong. Rec. 133: 177448-9.
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which he said was demonstrated by fact that he was able to introduce S. 1420 with the
support of 56 cosponsors, 25 of which were Republicans.421 Bentsen also stated that the
committee had tried to bring the president on board, but hinted at the tension between the
administration and Congress when he declared: “No president can be a strong and
effective negotiator unless he has the support of the American people. And no President
can be certain of that support unless he works with Congress.” In this spirit, Bentsen
believed the provisions of the bill would “make Congress a partner, and not a puppet, in
our trade policy.”422
Senator Byrd addressed the media’s criticism of the Democratic Congress and
denied the suggestion that Democrats were inclined towards protectionist legislation.423
Senator Phil Gramm (R-TX) commented that the Senate bill was “less protectionist” than
the House bill, and Ranking Finance Committee Member Bob Packwood (R-OR),
warned Congress against being “panicked into protectionism by grim statistics.”
Packwood said he was persuaded by Chairman Bentsen’s arguments that “by tolerating
unfair practices in some special cases, we encourage them in all cases.” As such,
Packwood emphasized that there is a “powerful national interest . . . in making clear that
the United States will not tolerate trade agreement violations.”424
421
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Clearly, the hearing was focused on U.S. competitiveness in relation to the growth
of other economies, particularly Japan and to a lesser degree, Germany. There were only
a few passing comments concerning China in the lengthy hearing with the most
substantive comment being made by Senator Heinz (R-PA). He warned that there may
be an amendment to the trade bill to provide favored treatment for the People's Republic
of China – not for economic reasons but for the political purpose of advancing U.S.China foreign relations.
The Chinese are very skillful; they are very bright, and they have quickly
figured out that their price for such improvement should be improved
economic relations, which to them means selling more here, regardless of
whether it is dumped, subsidized, or fraudulently entered in violation of
our bilateral textile agreement. The amendment that we might face would
throw trade policy to the winds when the Chinese have their eyes firmly
fixed on the proper objective -- the economic bottom line.425
Senator Danforth (R-MO) reminded the Senate that Congress, not the executive branch
has responsibility for foreign commerce under the Constitution. As a practical matter,
Congress delegated the day-to-day operation of trade policy to the president because the
legislative branch is not equipped to conduct the administrative details.

Danforth

summarized the debate as follows:
[T]he overall responsibility for international trade is in the hands of the
Congress and, therefore, we do have a strong role to play and if the current
system is not operating effectively, if it has broken down, then Congress
should step in and make sure that we have a trading system that does
work.
Now, I say that the existing system has obvious problems. I would say that
it has obvious problems because it is not really a system. We have so
425

Senator Heinz of Pennsylvania, speaking for the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness
Act, on June 25, 1987, 100th Cong. 1st sess., Cong. Rec. 133: 17485.
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delegated responsibility to the President that the President almost on the
basis of whim can determine when to act and when not to act in
enforcement of the laws that have been enacted.
One of the ongoing debates that has occurred both in committee and in the
press and will occur on the floor of the Senate in the next week or so has
to do with the issue of Presidential discretion. It is a tough question,
Presidential discretion.
On one hand, we recognize that we do not want to tie the President's hands
completely. The President has overall responsibility for foreign policy, for
the faithful execution of the law. We do not want to be in a situation where
the President has absolutely no room to maneuver.
But, on the other hand, we have so delegated authority to the President of
the United States, we have so granted him discretion in the past, that the
laws that have been enacted by the Congress have often been dead-letter
laws. . . .426
This legislative history is particularly instructive for analysis of the politicization
of CNOOC’s bid for Unocal. The Exon-Florio Amendment was formally introduced in
1988 when President Reagan’s open investment policy and growing U.S. foreign debt
reinforced the perception in Congress that U.S. firms were becoming particularly
vulnerable to foreign takeovers.

President Reagan had delegated the executive’s

regulatory and investigative authority under Exon-Florio to the CFIUS, an inter-agency
committee which had been created by President Ford to include members from executive
branch departments and the Executive Office of the President, and was chaired by
secretary of Treasury.427 [See Table 4] But the potential takeover of two U.S. companies
raised Senator Exon’s concern about how the White House was handling its authority
426
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Act, on June 25, 1987, 100th Cong. 1st sess., Cong. Rec.133: 17465.
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Executive Order no. 12,661, Federal Register 54 (December 27, 1988): 779.
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under the legislation.

Fujitsu, Ltd. of Japan proposed the purchase of Fairchild

Semiconductor Corporation and Sir James Goldsmith of Great Britain attempted a hostile
takeover of Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company. Goodyear Tire & Rubber had a large
facility in Nebraska and had appealed to Senator Exon to help prevent the offer.428
Several government agencies agreed with Senator Exon that the two companies
were important to national security – Fairchild produced a microchip with military
applications and Goodyear had several Pentagon contracts – but the White House said
that it could not prevent the takeovers unless there were a national emergency.429 The
Pentagon objected to Fujitsu purchasing Fairchild because it had no confidence that
Fujitsu would protect classified technology.

The Commerce Department objected

because U.S. companies had been denied the right to compete with Fujitsu in Japan when
they had proposed to sell supercomputers there.430 On the other hand, the Office of
Management and Budget, the State Department, and the Treasury Department leaned
towards supporting foreign investment in the U.S. and they were more inclined to
approve the transaction.431
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In the end, neither the Fujitsu nor the Goldsmith transactions were consummated.
The Japanese firm responded to the increasing support for protectionist legislation in the
U.S. by backing down from their proposal. Goldsmith’s bid did not receive the same
degree of opposition at the Federal level, but it did lead the Ohio legislature to strengthen
the ability of state corporations to resist hostile takeovers from foreign interests.432 This
was accomplished by allowing corporate directors to consider not just the impact of a
proposed takeover on the shareholders, but also the impact upon employees, suppliers,
creditors, and customers.
The stated purpose of the 1988 Exon-Florio Amendment was to strengthen the
process by which proposed foreign transactions are analyzed by “the President or the
President’s designees” and to give the president authority to prevent or restructure foreign
acquisitions that threatened to undermine national security. According to Christopher A.
McLean, Senator Exon’s legal counsel and staff co-author of the law, the senator “had to
fight every step of the way for this Presidential authority.”433 The proposed bill had
stated that prohibition or suspension of a transaction was authorized when a transaction
threatened to impair “national security and essential commerce.”

But the Reagan

Administration objected to the phrase “essential commerce.”434 Secretary of Commerce
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Baldridge contended that the language was too broad and the Exon proposal would
“mean a diversion away from the principles” that the administration had been trying to
espouse – that is, “national treatment for investment, open investment policy, and
everything that goes with it.”435 Former Treasury Deputy Secretary Richard Darman
argued that the language potentially represented a “radical reversal of U.S. policy
favoring increasingly open investment regimes” and, as written, would have “a chilling
effect on foreign investment in the United States.”436

In the end, the “essential

commerce” phrase was removed.
There was also considerable debate in Congress over the definition of the
“national security.” In hearings before the House, Representative Florio argued for
expansion of the term “so as to be able to go beyond very militaristic interpretations.”437
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Later, Representative Fish (R-NY) attempted to define “national security” with a warning
that national security “is not limited to those industries which develop and produce rifles,
and fighter bombers. It includes the ability to provide a broad range of human services,
materials, products and technological innovations.”438

Ultimately the definition was

omitted purposefully from the final bill to the give the president broad discretion in
invoking the statute.439 Afterwards, during the administrative rulemaking process, the
Department of Treasury received over 500 pages of comments from more than seventy
parties.

The comments focused primarily on clarifying the meaning of “national

security,” but Treasury rejected the comments based on the rationale that it needed to
maintain the congressional intent expressed in the Conference Report.440
As enacted in 1988, Exon-Florio gave the president broad discretionary authority
to take “appropriate” action to suspend or prohibit proposed or pending foreign mergers,
438
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acquisitions, or takeovers of U.S. businesses by persons engaged in interstate commerce
which “threaten[s] to impair the national security.”

The president “may” make an

investigation, but “only if” he determines that other laws are inadequate or inappropriate
to protect national security and there is “credible evidence” that the transaction would
impair national security.441 The president’s determination as to whether Exon-Florio
kicks in was not subject to judicial review.442
Although members of Congress could not agree on certain definitions, and
decided to exclude them, they did agree on several factors that the president could
consider when deciding whether to block a foreign merger, acquisition or takeover.
These were:
(1) domestic production
requirements;

needed

for

projected

national

defense

(2) the capability and capacity of domestic industries to meet national
defense requirements, including the availability of human resources,
products, technology, materials, and other supplies and services;
(3) the control of domestic industries and commercial activity by foreign
citizens as it affects the capability and capacity of the U.S. to meet the
requirements of national security.443
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The 1988 Exon-Florio Amendment established the following process:

(1)

investigation of the acquisition must commence within 30 days after receipt of written
notification of the proposed or pending acquisition of a U.S. company to determine
whether there are any national security concerns, (2) 45 days to complete the
investigation to determine whether those concerns require a recommendation to the
president for possible action, and (3) a presidential decision to permit, suspend, or
prohibit the acquisition.444

Then the president may seek judicial remedy, including

divestiture, in federal courts if necessary to enforce his decision.
As a means of protecting corporate interests, the information provided in the
Exon-Florio investigation was made exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of
Information Act, except for the purpose of an administrative proceeding or judicial
action.445

In addition, the statute provided that Congress or any of its authorized

committees could access information provided during the investigation.446
D. Presidential Implementation of Exon-Florio
Not only is Exon-Florio’s legislative history important for understanding the
politicization of China’s bid for Unocal in 2005, but how presidents have interpreted and
implemented their statutory authority under the amendment is also important. In this
section, we analyze congressional hearings and debates, and subsequent efforts to amend
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the statute, in order to understand the statute’s flaws and the difficulties presidents have
encountered in implementing the statute as enacted.
On February 2, 1990, during the Senate’s recess, former President George H.W.
Bush reported that he had invoked his Exon-Florio authority for the first time. The
president’s report informed the Senate of his decision to order the China National AeroTechnology Import and Export Corporation (CATIC) to divest all its interest in MAMCO
Manufacturing, Inc., a company incorporated under the laws of the State of Washington,
which manufactured aircraft components that had potential commercial or military use.
Former President Bush based his decision on finding “credible evidence” that the
“foreign interest exercising control might take action that threatens to impair the national
security” and that no other law provides adequate and appropriate authority for him to
protect national security.447
CATIC was an export-import company of the Chinese Ministry of Aerospace
Industry which engaged in research and development, design, and manufacturer of
military and commercial aircraft, missiles, and aircraft engines, and had business dealings
with various U.S. companies. MAMCO voluntarily notified the CFIUS of CATIC’s
intention to acquire MAMCO, and the acquisition was consummated in November 1989
while the CFIUS review was in process. On December 4, 1989, the CFIUS made a
determination to conduct a formal investigation and informed the parties to the
transaction. During the investigation, officials from the Departments of Commerce and
Defense visited MAMCO on behalf of CFIUS and gathered data regarding MAMCO’s
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production and technological capabilities. President Bush made his decision to order
divestment based on the results of this investigation. However, because of the “sensitive
nature of the evidence,” the report did not specify details. Instead, the President informed
the Senate that CFIUS would “be available, on request, to provide the appropriate
committees, meeting in closed sessions, with a classified briefing.”448
Although the publically stated reason was that by acquiring MAMCO, the
Chinese could have access to U.S. aerospace companies and products which were
restricted by export controls, some have suggested that the president’s determination was
politically motivated.449 This hypothesis is supported by the fact that the case was
reviewed just one year after the political riots in Tiananmen Square when there was
considerable anti-China sentiment and many legislators were seeking human rights
sanctions. During the initial 45-day review of the MAMCO acquisition, the Bush
Administration did not impose any restrictions to protect against the transfer of sensitive
information and technology and there was no immediate action taken to protect national
security. Furthermore, even though the statute provided that mediation occur within three
months of the president’s order, the president did not ensure that CATIC surrender its
interest in MAMCO until one year later. If national security had been an imminent
concern, one would have expected more immediate action.

448
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President George H.W. Bush’s handling of the MAMCO case was questioned by
certain members of Congress and a number of foreign investment related bills began to
appear in both chambers. For example, on April 25, 1990, Senator James Exon (D-NE)
introduced S. 2516, cosponsored by Senators Orrin Hatch (R-UT), Arlen Specter (R-PN),
and David Boren (D-OK), to allow the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Economic
Analysis (BEA) access to information collected by the Bureau of the Census. It was
determined that this access would improve the accuracy and analysis of BEA reports to
the public and to Congress on foreign direct investment in the United States, and would
enable CFIUS to conduct more thorough and informed analysis regarding the impact of
foreign takeovers of American companies.
The Committee on Commerce, Science, and Technology held a hearing in which
the Departments of Commerce and Treasury testified in support of the bill. On July 31,
1990, the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Technology ordered S. 2516 favorably
reported by voice vote with an amendment offered by Senator Ted Stevens (R-AK) and
Senator Exon providing for a BEA foreign investment report to CFIUS. The report
would be made, upon request, and would outline the level and extent of foreign direct
investment in an industry, including foreign government investment, by country, without
disclosing individual investment information.450

Now, under P.L. 101-533, when a

request for a report is made to BEA in connection with a CFIUS investigation under
Section 721, the report must be provided within 14 days.
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Meanwhile, during House proceedings and debates, Representative Helen Bentley
(R-MD) expressed disappointment in the1988 Exon-Florio Amendment. Although the
CFIUS was comprised of “heads of eight federal agencies, and chaired by the Secretary
of the Treasury,” Representative Bentley lamented,
There is absolutely no requirement for foreign investors to notify anyone
in the Government of their intent to purchase anything . . . . Foreign
investors can purchase U.S. companies and do purchase them at will. Any
attempt Congress has made, as in the Bryant bill of last year, to get some
kind of registration of foreign ownership, has been knocked down every
time.451
Representative Bentley identified other signs of weakness in the 1988 legislation,
including: (1) Exon-Florio only offered the option of CFIUS review if someone
challenges the foreign acquisition; (2) Even though eight agencies were represented on
CFIUS, only three needed to agree to a sale; (3) In two years, CFIUS had made only
three recommendations to the president, and of those, only one was to stop a sale; (4) In
just three months during 1990, 209 U.S. companies had passed into foreign ownership.452
From the context of her testimony, it appeared that Representative Bentley was more
concerned with the amendment’s ineffectiveness in protecting U.S. assets than protecting
national security interests.
In spite of the conflict in the Gulf area, and congressional concern about foreign
direct investment in the U.S., the 101st Congress failed to enact the DPA authorization
bill in 1990, and the DPA expired for the first time since it was first enacted.
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Representative Thomas Carper (D-DE) responded in the House by introducing H.R. 991
to extend the expiration of the DPA until September 30, 1991, and to make it retroactive
to October 20, 1990.453

In testifying as the new chairman of the House Economic

Stabilization Subcommittee of the Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs Committee,
which

had

jurisdiction

over

noncontroversial” amendments.454

the

DPA,

Carper

discussed

three

“relatively

The first was to provide antitrust protection to

voluntary agreements as part of petroleum-related international agreements. The second
was to clarify defense contract priority and allocation provisions, and the third was to
make permanent the 1988 Exon-Florio provisions which require executive review of
foreign mergers, acquisitions, and takeovers of domestic firms that might affect U.S.
security interests adversely.455
Representative Tom Ridge (R-PA), the ranking member of the subcommittee,
emphasized the importance of the DPA, and danger of forcing the president to operate
without the benefit of the DPA during critical stages of the Gulf crisis. He also stressed
how the 1988 Exon-Florio provisions give the president necessary authority to review
proposed mergers that might adversely affect U.S. national security. Representative
Mary Rose Oakar (D-OH), past chairwoman of the Economic Stabilization Committee,
453
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spoke of extensive efforts to “modernize the act,” consultations with “an advisory group
composed of high former military and civilian executives and industrialists,” and strong
bipartisan support. Representative Chalmers Wylie (R-OH), ranking member of the
Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, echoed the others’ comments and
reiterated the need to make the Exon-Florio provisions permanent with an illustration of
“a takeover involving the transfer of nuclear technology [that] could have potentially
gone through because DPA had expired.”456
Representative Cardis Collins (D-IL) noted a diversity of views as to how the
administration had handled implementation of Exon-Florio. While some criticized the
administration for not being aggressive enough and others felt the administration’s
“reluctance to intervene” was appropriate, the overwhelming consensus was that ExonFlorio should be exempt from the sunset terminations of the DPA. Again, citing the
example of the proposed Japanese takeover of Moore Special Tool Company, the sole
U.S.-owned supplier of ultra-high-precision grinding equipment to the U.S. nuclear
program, Representative Collins pointed to the significance of providing CFIUS with the
statutory authority to act.

In this case, she said, it was only after the Economic

Stabilization Subcommittee announced it would consider the takeover at a hearing that
the Japanese firm, Fanuc Machine Tool, withdrew its offer.457
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Aside from the national security issue, Representative Philip Sharp (D-IN) noted
two other benefits from making Exon-Florio permanent.

First, it would strengthen

Congress’s institutional leverage over how the administration implements its Section 721
authority. Second, it would create greater confidence on the part of the international
business community, rather than the ambiguity of an unpredictable statute.458 Within this
context, it is not surprising that the House voted 416 in favor of H.R. 991 with no
opposition, and 17 not voting, and the bill was sent to the Senate.459 On August 2, 1991,
the Senate agreed to the conference report on H.R. 991 to extend the expiration date of
the Defense Production Act of 1950.460
Representative Sharp emphasized his concern about Congress’s ability to monitor
and regulate transnational mergers, joint ventures, and takeovers by introducing the
International Mergers and Acquisitions Review Act to the Commerce, Consumer
Protection and Competitiveness Subcommittee of the House Energy and Commerce
Committee on June 12, 1991.461 He noted that some transnational mergers may not fall
into the commonly accepted definition of national security, but may raise other concerns,
such as antitrust or competitiveness issues. The bill was an attempt to provide a linkage
between the regulatory domains of the Hart-Scott-Rodino premerger notification
458
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regulation of the Clayton Antitrust Act and the national security review under the ExonFlorio Amendment.
At the House Energy and Commerce Subcommittee hearing, Theodore Moran,
international business professor at Georgetown University, testified that there are
“genuine national security threats associated with foreign investment” and these national
security threats arise when foreign companies attempt to acquire U.S. companies in
“industries where external suppliers are extremely concentrated.”462 Furthermore, he
noted, global “proliferation of restrictions on flows of technology and capital” also
threatens U.S. national security and welfare.463 Mr. Moran proposed a “concentration
test” where the largest four firms (or countries) should control no more than fifty percent
of the market, so that they would lack the ability to collude to manipulate the market. He
concluded that this approach, based on “principles that have always guided the American
preference for free markets” would allow the market, rather than government bureaucrats
to pick winners and losers.464
In addition to antitrust protection, Representative Sharp expressed a need to
oversee businesses engaged in commerce related to the United States’ defense industrial
base.

Sharp’s bill proposed making the Hart-Scott-Rodino mandatory premerger

requirement of the Clayton Antitrust Act the starting point for review of foreign direct
462
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investment. But, in addition to the normal antitrust thresholds set by Hart-Scott-Rodino,
H.R. 2631 would “establish clear and precise national security triggers.” 465 While the
bill would give the president additional authority under Exon-Florio to precondition a
merger or acquisition so that national security concerns are met, it also addressed
Congress’ institutional concern that presidential implementation of Exon-Florio lacked
transparency and accountability. So that Congress and the public could better understand
how CFIUS operates, the bill required an annual public report on CFIUS
investigations.466 In 1991, after extensive comment, the Treasury Department issued
final regulations implementing the Exon-Florio provision.467 These regulations created a
voluntary system of notification by the parties to an acquisition, but allowed for notice by
agencies that are members of CFIUS.468 It was assumed that large firms would have an
incentive towards voluntary notification because the regulations stipulate that when
companies do not notify CFIUS of foreign acquisitions which are governed by ExonFlorio, the acquisitions remain subject indefinitely to divestment or other appropriate
actions by the President.
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In 1992, Congress again expressed concern about the review process after a
French state-owned company, Thomson-CSF, Inc., proposed to acquire LTV
Corporation’s missile division. Originally, Senator Byrd drafted a bill that would have
prohibited the sale of LTV Corporation to any non-U.S. company,469 but this bill stalled
as the president indicated he was inclined to block the transaction. The results of the
CFIUS investigation, strong congressional scrutiny, and broad public awareness made the
acquisition much too risky and controversial. Then, towards the end of the legislative
session, Senator Byrd introduced Amendment 3077 to the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993. The cosponsors were Senators Exon, Riegle,
Sarbanes, Bingaman and Dixon.
Although debate was limited, it was passionate due to the fact that it was
introduced subsequent to an attempt to block the Thomson-CSF transaction. One of the
main concerns about the Thomson-CSF proposal was the issue of French government
control over Thomson-CSF’s parent company and sensitive LTV technology.

This

concern was consistent with Congress’s long history of disapproval over France’s thirdparty transactions involving the transfer of military equipment. Ultimately, ThomsonCSF withdrew its proposal in response to the politicization of the transaction and
anticipation of the outcome. After restructuring its proposal to include joint acquisition
with U.S.-based defense contractor, Loral Group, which agreed to purchase the LTV
469

See S. 2704, 102nd Cong., 2nd sess., 1992 stating that “no foreign person may purchase
or otherwise acquire the LTV Aerospace and Defense Company.” Foreign person is
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foreign country, or any domestic or foreign organization, corporation, or individual, that
is owned or controlled by the foreign organization, corporation, or individual.”
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Missile Division and thereby reduce Thomson-CSF’s interest to less than ten percent,
Thomson-CSF was able to get the acquisition approved.470
Regardless of the outcome of the LTV case, Senator Byrd had successfully
introduced Amendment 3077 (“Byrd Amendment”) which inserted a new subsection
721(a) to the DPA requiring mandatory investigations of foreign mergers, acquisitions, or
takeovers when the acquirer is “controlled by or acting on behalf of a foreign
government” and the merger, acquisition, or take over “could affect the national security
of the United States.” The amendment provided that such investigation “shall commence
not later than 30 days after receipt by the President or the President’s designee of written
notification,” and the investigation “shall be completed not later than 45 days after its
commencement.”471
The redesignated subsection 721(f) was amended to add two additional factors for
the president to consider when making a decision to block a foreign merger, acquisition,
or takeover:
(1)
the potential effects of the transactions on the sales of military
goods, equipment, or technology to a country that supports terrorism or
proliferates missile technology or chemical and biological weapons; and
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(2)
the potential effects of the transaction on U.S. technological
leadership in areas affecting U.S. national security.472
The amendment also added the requirement that the “President shall immediately
transmit to the secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House of Representatives a
written report of the President’s determination of whether or not to take action” to include
a “detailed explanation of the findings and factors considered in making the
determination.473 Finally, the amendment added the “sense of the Congress” that the
president should include the director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy and
the assistant to the president for National Security in the membership of the CFIUS.
The comments of the Byrd Amendment sponsors are particularly instructive for
understanding Congress’s concerns about CNOOC’s bid for Unocal.

“We face the

dilemma of how to prevent foreign companies, particularly those controlled by their
governments, from raiding the U.S. economy and snatching up the prized jewels of
America’s industrial base without discouraging legitimate foreign investment in our
economy,” said Senator Byrd.474 Even though global defense spending was dramatically
reduced since the end of the Cold War, there were negative side effects on the industry;
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one of which was the failure of weaker defense firms making them ripe for acquisition.
In Senator Byrd’s opinion, although the Exon-Florio Amendment provides the executive
branch with “all the tools” it needs “to ensure the stability and safety of our industrial
base,” presidents have not chosen to use these tools. Senator Byrd feared that “we have
established a pattern where only the most blatantly risky cases receive scrutiny and even
then they are likely to get the go-ahead.”475
Senator Exon echoed Senator Byrd’s concerns, emphasizing that President
George H.W. Bush had used his powers under Exon-Florio Amendment “rather
conservatively.” He did not fault the president, but suggested that changes in “what can
be expected in the post cold war era” required updating the law. Of course, it is not
surprising that Senator Exon would shy away from criticizing the statute that he had
authored.476

By way of contrast, Senator Riegle (D-MI) emphasized that the

Reagan/Bush Administration was “blinded by its free trade and open investment
ideology.” Reigle suggested that the presidents’ narrow interpretation of the authority
Congress gave them kept them from seeing the “cumulative impact” of foreign
takeovers.477
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Senator Sarbanes (D-MA) emphasized that cases involving foreign-owned
companies fall into a different category “by definition … because they are not dictated
strictly by market forces.” He also expressed concern about the “generic issue of foreign
government ownership of U.S. defense contractors.”478 Emphasizing that even the U.S.
government did not own its own defense contractors, he questioned whether it would be a
good idea to let foreign governments own them.

Mr. Sarbanes concluded that the

changes proposed by the amendment would allow the president to consider additional
factors in considering whether to block a transaction. In addition, the new reporting
requirements would increase transparency. In the past, presidents were not required to
provide an explanation as to why they made the decisions they did. As a result, it has
been “virtually impossible for Congress and the public to know what policy had been
developed by the administration in applying the Exon-Florio provision or to hold the
administration accountable.”479
In short, the Byrd Amendment made three significant changes to the original 1988
Exon-Florio Amendment. First, it shifted the focus from the intended use of the acquired
assets to national origin of the entity acquiring the assets. Review was mandatory if an
acquiring entity was controlled by or acting on behalf of a foreign entity. Second, it
lowered the threshold for determining when review should occur. No longer did the
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CFIUS need to find that the transaction “threatens to impair national security,” instead
the CFIUS only needed to find that the transaction “could affect national security.”480
Finally, it expanded the scope of factors that the president was to consider and
emphasized technological leadership in maintaining national security.
Even though the Byrd Amendment improved the statute, it was not the panacea
for handling foreign mergers; rather, it was a compromise. The first compromise was
that reporting of a merger was still voluntary. Voluntary filing by foreign entities was
included in the original Exon-Florio Amendment to demonstrate the U.S. government’s
support of open trade. The reporting option was based on the “safe harbor” principle,
that is, if parties to a merger were to notify CFIUS of a proposed or completed merger,
and the CFIUS were to determine that a transaction did not pose a threat to national
security, then the foreign entity could rest assured that the president would not order
divestiture at a later time. But if the parties failed to notify the CFIUS of the transaction,
it would leave the door open for future investigation and remedies.

The risk of

nondisclosure was heightened by the fact that any remedies imposed by the president
were not subject to judicial review, leaving the foreign entity with no legal recourse once
the president makes a decision. In spite of the incentive for voluntary notification, some
members of Congress continued to believe voluntary notification was a flaw in the statute
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because sensitive information could exchange hands before any CFIUS review or
presidential decision.
A second improvement in the statute was to require mandatory investigations in
certain circumstances.

The compromise language stipulates that CFIUS had

responsibility for making the determination that national security “could” be affected by
the transaction, that the subject U.S. company would be under foreign "control," and
possibly, that a foreign company was "acting on behalf of" a foreign government.
Without clear definitions of terms, the Byrd Amendment still left a lot of room for
interpretation and, consequently, a lot of room for disagreement as to that interpretation.
Third, even though the Byrd Amendment specified additional factors for CFIUS
to consider regarding sales of military goods and technology to countries supporting
terrorist activities, some analysts have noted that the CFIUS already considered these
factors as part of the review.481 But even if the changes were minor, or redundant, by
identifying specific factors in the statute, Congress was attempting to ensure that those
factors would be given greater political weight during the review process.482

This

research into the CNOOC case and other bids proposed by Chinese corporations confirms
that the CFIUS did give these statutorily defined factors more careful consideration in
subsequent reviews.
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Fourth, the Byrd Amendment addressed Congress’s concern about the lack of
transparency in how presidents had been implementing Exon-Florio in the CFIUS
investigative process. The amendment required specific guidelines for initiation of the
process and milestones for each stage of the review, that is, the review must begin within
30 days of written notice, the review must be completed and a recommendation made to
the president within 45 days, and the president must make a decision within 15 days. In
addition, the president was required to report to Congress immediately regarding any
decisions after undertaking an investigation, and a Quadrennial Report was required to
provide details as to any credible evidence concerning industrial espionage or attempted
control over leading technology.483 Even though some have argued that the Byrd
Amendment had little legal consequence, the message that Congress sent to the president
and the CFIUS had political consequences. That is, it was clear that Congress would
review CFIUS consideration of investments proposed by foreign government-owned
entities more assiduously.
On February 16, 1994, pursuant to amendments to the Defense Production Act,
the Treasury Department issued proposed implementing regulations. Treasury defined
"foreign government" broadly to include any government body exercising governmental
functions, such as state and local authorities.484 The regulations also specified that a
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mandatory investigation would not be required where the foreign government entity was
merely a "passive participant in an acquisition by a foreign person."485 The inclusion of
this language demonstrates how administrative agencies are able to assume control over
how laws and statutes are implemented, especially when Congress does not provide clear
definitions or statutory guidance.
In short, the Byrd Amendment to Exon-Florio was “designed to serve as a
surgical instrument to prevent control of critical defense-related industries by hostile
governments or transfer of sensitive technologies to strategic competitors” by focusing on
the origin of capital in determining whether a transaction threatened national security.486
But in 2000, the GAO published its report and concluded that the process for identifying
foreign acquisitions which affect national security still could be improved.487 Some of
the weaknesses identified by the report are as follows: First, the reporting process still
did not ensure that all national security-related acquisitions were reviewed. The CFIUS
continued to rely upon voluntary reporting and Congress assumed that companies would
report contemplated foreign acquisition to the CFIUS early in the process because the
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president retained authority to force divestiture for acquisitions that were not reported.488
Second, the CFIUS still did not know the extent to which foreign acquisitions of U.S.
companies might have an effect on national security. This was because no records were
kept of acquisitions identified by member agencies or contacts made with parties to the
acquisitions to encourage voluntary reporting.489 Third, even though other laws and
regulations required the reporting of some security-related acquisitions to individual
agencies, the agencies were not required to report this information to the CFIUS.490
Instead, Treasury officials reported that the CFIUS member agencies continued to obtain
information about acquisitions of potential concern by reviewing business media
sources.491 This resulted in inconsistent reporting from one agency to the next. Fourth,
since agency referrals to the CFIUS were informal, agencies did not maintain formal
records of contacts and agency actions pertaining to the contracts, resulting in little to no
follow-up regarding the referrals.492
Over the years, foreign countries, and their investors, have expressed concerns
that American presidents would interpret the Exon-Florio provisions too broadly and
there would be a trend towards more protectionist policies. In fact, presidents have been
reluctant to apply the statute too broadly for fear of interfering with foreign trade and
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investment opportunities.

This reluctance is documented in the 2000 GAO Report

indicating that only seventeen percent of 7,371 foreign acquisitions reported to the
Commerce Department Bureau of Economic Analysis from 1988 to 1999 were reported
to the CFIUS.493 [See Table 5] Of those reported, only seventeen were investigated,
seven were withdrawn, and only one was blocked by the president.
In spite of these weaknesses, according to McLean, the Exon-Florio Amendment
has not failed. “Before the law was enacted, presidents had very few tools to protect the
national security when a foreign entity took control of an important security asset of the
United States,” he said. “The test of the law is not how many transactions that have been
stopped, but that transactions involving foreign purchasers are scrutinized to ensure that
the national security is protected.”
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TABLE 5: Foreign Acquisitions, Voluntary Reports, and Dispositions 495
Year
1988

Foreign
Acquisitions
869

Reports to
CFIUS
14a

Reports
Investigated
1

Offers
Withdrawn
0

President
Decision
1

President
Blocked
0

1989

837

204

5

2

3

1

1990

839

295

6

2

4

0

1991

561

152

1

0

1

0

1992

463

106

2

1

1

0

1993

554

82

0

0

0

0

1994

605

69

0

0

0

0

1995

644

81

0

0

0

0

1996

686

55

0

0

0

0

1997

640

62

0

0

0

0

1998

673b

65

2

2

0

0

1999

c

79

0

0

0

0

2000

c

72

1

0

1

1

2001

c

55

1

1

0

0

2002

c

43

0

0

0

0

2003

c

41

2

1

1

1

2004

c

53

2

2

0

0

2005

c

65

2

2

0

0

a

Filings began in September 1988
Data not complete
c
Data not available
b
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III.

POST 9/11 IMPLEMENTATION OF EXON-FLORIO

September 11, 2001 marked a major shift in the international world order.
Previously, national security threats were state-based and foreign trade policies reflected
that world order. After the terrorist attacks on American soil in 2001, the focus of
national security was no longer on nation-states, but on non-state actors, and their
relationships to different nation-states. Along these lines, President Bush added the
Department of Homeland Security to the CFIUS which had the effect of shifting the
balance of power on the committee from agencies that focused on the economic benefits
of foreign direct investment to agencies that focused on the complexities of providing
national security.496
Consistent with the heightened concerned about national security and the
authorities provided to the president under the Homeland Security Act, many in Congress
believed that President Bush’s post 9/11 interpretation of the Exon-Florio Amendment
would change.497 This would have been consistent with the popular belief that a more
expansive view of national security is required when threats by non-state actors are
considered. Analysts such as Christopher Fenton suggested that the changed global
environment required an expansion of new relationships
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to preclude terrorist access to the international financial system and mainly
include: the protection of industries required for the execution of the
global anti-terror campaign, security threats posed by foreign control of
particular domestic industries, and potential third-party transactions
between foreign entities that acquire these industries.498
In spite of past efforts to increase congressional oversight of CFIUS
investigations, foreign transactions continued to be reviewed in a “highly secretive”
manner.499

Although intended to protect sensitive proprietary information, Senator

Richard Shelby (R-AL) emphasized that this secretive process made congressional
oversight difficult. For example, some of the CFIUS-reviewed cases that continued to
raise congressional concerns were: (1) the proposed acquisition of Silicon Valley Group,
Inc. (SVG), a manufacturer of computer semiconductor lithography with military
applications, by ASM Lithography (ASML), a Netherlands company; (2) the 2003
proposed acquisition of a majority stake in the bankrupt Global Crossing Ltd, a fiber
optic network provider, by Singapore Technologies Telemedia and Hutchison Whampoa
Ltd. of Hong Kong;500 and (3) the purchase of Magnequench, Inc., a high-precision
magnet manufacturer by a Chinese consortium.
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The proposed acquisition of the SVG had been set for review under President
Clinton, but SVG withdrew its proposal after intervention by the Department of Defense
and some members of Congress. When ASML reapplied under the George W. Bush
Administration, the CFIUS was deadlocked at the end of the 45-day review and had to
work overtime to reach a consensus.

Finally, the CFIUS issued a formal

recommendation in which it conditioned approval on restructuring which included ASML
agreeing to sell SVG’s Tinsley Laboratories, a manufacturer of optical components for
spy satellites.501
The Bush Administration was criticized for how it handled the ASML-SVG deal.
Fenton suggests the “most legitimate and relevant” reasons for the criticism were that :
(1) the CFIUS was overstepping its bounds by evaluating both direct and indirect effects
of an acquisition; (2) the Department of Defense was seeking to expand its influence by
insisting upon “performance requirements” rather than agreeing to informal guarantees
which had been acceptable in the past; (3) the Bush Administration preferred to require
restructuring of foreign acquisitions rather than deny business opportunities; and (4) the
committee’s decision making stalemate was caused by irreconcilable ideological
differences.502
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Accordingly, on February 20, 2004, Senator Richard Shelby (R-AL), chairman of
the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, and Senator Sarbanes (D-MD),
ranking member of the committee, requested another Government Accountability Office
(GAO) study of the implementation of Exon-Florio.503 While the GAO was conducting
its study, and prior to the release of its findings, the Chinese-controlled CNOOC was
secretly contemplating a proposal to acquire Unocal.
Early in 2005, when rumors surfaced that CNOOC was preparing a bid, executive
investigation of a proposed merger still was not mandatory. Specifically, the statute
stated,
The President or the President’s designee may make an investigation to
determine the effects on national security of mergers, acquisitions, and
takeovers proposed or pending . . . by or with foreign persons which could
result in foreign control of persons engaged in interstate commerce in the
United States.504
A few months later, when CNOOC formally announced its interest in Unocal,
members of Congress were still awaiting the results of the GAO report.

General

questions about administrative review of foreign acquisitions, uncertainty stemming from
the secret review process, and heightened concern about national security following
September 11 contributed to the elevation of the CNOOC proposal on the congressional
policy agenda.
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IV: THE UNOCAL ACQUISITION CASE
A. FTC Review of ChevronTexaco’s Proposed Merger
ChevronTexaco submitted its plan for the proposed merger to the FTC on April 4,
2005 while the FTC was involved in an administrative hearing with Unocal over a
previous charge that Unocal unlawfully monopolized the market for reformulated
gasoline meeting the specifications of the California Air Resources Board (CARB).505
According to the FTC, the alleged monopolization resulted from Unocal misrepresenting
its research regarding the reformulated gasoline as nonproprietary while also pursuing a
patent on the technology.506
In reviewing the proposed Chevron-Unocal merger, the FTC acknowledged that
ChevronTexaco and Unocal both had extensive oil and gas operations. But since Unocal
did not have any refineries or gasoline stations, and few other downstream operations, the
FTC determined “virtually all of the competitive overlaps between the two firms are in
unconcentrated upstream markets, and the merger thus creates no competitive risk.”507
However, the FTC warned, if ChevronTexaco acquired Unocal, and Union Oil’s
questionably obtained patents, then ChevronTexaco would be in a position to “obtain
505
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sensitive information and to claim royalties from its own horizontal downstream
competitors.” This, the FTC believed, would “have an adverse effect on competition”
and “would inevitably have required an extensive inquiry and possible litigation.”508
This concern was resolved by executing an Agreement Containing Consent Order
(Consent Agreement) which became final after a 30-day public comment period.509 The
Consent Agreement mandated that upon merging, neither ChevronTexaco nor Unocal
take any action to enforce the patents or collect royalties, including pending litigation; the
order also required that Unocal would disclaim its reformulated-gasoline patents and
release the patent information to the public.510

Because resolution of the

patent/monopolization matter was predicated upon the ChevronTexaco-Unocal merger, a
successful bid from another entity would require FTC to reopen the administrative
hearing on the issue. Since reopening the hearing would involve additional legal costs,
many assumed it was in Unocal’s best interest to complete the merger with
ChevronTexaco.
The next section turns to discussion of the legal obligations ChevronTexaco had
as a corporate entity to its shareholders, and how these obligations imposed another
formal constraint upon the congressional reaction to the CNOOC proposed takeover.
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B. ChevronTexaco Corporate Obligations to Shareholders
The operations of business associations and corporations are largely governed by
statutory law.511

The Uniform Partnership Act of 1914 received almost unanimous

acceptance and has been adopted in forty-nine states, with the exception of Louisiana.
Since then, very few amendments have been made. This consistency, along with decades
of litigation, has given corporations a good sense of the kinds of legal issues that may
arise and how the courts may interpret those issues.

A second statute, the Model

Business Corporation Act, was very influential in the development of state corporation
statutes. The difference between “uniform” statutes and “model statutes is that uniform
statutes are designed to create nationwide uniformity of provisions applicable to the
corporations, whereas model statutes suggest that jurisdictions may pick and choose from
a template and make amendments or changes as desired.

As a result, there is

considerable variation in the state corporation statutes.
Unocal’s board of directors was obligated to comply with the corporation law of
Delaware where Unocal was legally incorporated.512 Unocal was also subject to the
Federal laws, such as the Securities Act of 1933, U.S. Code 15, § 77a et seq. which
imposes specific requirements on corporations engaged in the public sale of securities.
While discussion of the specific details of these statutes goes beyond the scope of this
dissertation, it is important to understand that Unocal’s directors were bound by the duty
of care and the business judgment rule adopted in Delaware.
511
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In general, the standard of due care is met under corporate law if two tests are
met: (1) due care must be used in “ascertaining relevant facts and law before making the
decision,” and (2) the decision must be made after reasonable deliberation.513

The

American Law Institute has defined the duty of care and business judgment rule as
follows:
A director or officer has a duty to the corporation to perform the director’s
or officer’s functions in good faith, in a manner that he or she reasonably
believes to be in the best interests of the corporation, and with the care that
an ordinarily prudent person would reasonably be expected to exercise in a
like position and under similar circumstances. . . . 514
A director fulfills the duty of making a business judgment in good faith if he is “informed
with respect to the subject of the business judgment to the extent the director reasonably
believes to be appropriate under the circumstances” and the director “rationally believes
that the business judgment is in the best interests of the corporation.”515
Under Delaware law, directors are charged with an “unyielding fiduciary duty to
the corporation and its shareholders.”516 The rule itself is “a presumption that in making
a business decision, the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good
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faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the
company.”517 In regards to acquisitions, whether directors make an informed decision, in
good faith, includes how they timed the acquisition, how it was initiated, structured,
negotiated, disclosed to directors, and how approvals were obtained from directors and
shareholders.

An informed decision also includes financial considerations of the

proposed acquisition, including assets, market value, earnings, future prospects, and any
other factors that affect the intrinsic or inherent value of the company’s stock.518
Directors may be held liable for taking actions that are so improvident, or risky, as
to be contrary to fundamental conceptions of prudent business practices. However,
courts are reluctant to interfere with corporate affairs, “except in the egregious case of
bad judgment or when there is evidence of bad faith.”519
Although deliberations concerning the CNOOC proposed acquisition were not
made public, the directors had a duty to give the CNOOC offer detailed and judicious
consideration before bringing the ChevronTexaco proposal to the stockholders for a vote.
Because the directors were obligated to bargain for a fair price, and to make an informed
decision based upon the information that was available to them, they would have to
weigh the pros and cons, the costs and benefits, of both the ChevronTexaco and CNOOC
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proposals. This duty of care played into the unfolding of events surrounding the Unocal
case.
C. CNOOC’s Proposed Acquisition of Unocal
There has been a great deal of speculation as to why CNOOC would choose to
enter the U.S. market through a takeover rather than by building a new subsidiary.
Assuming that CNOOC was interested in profits, like most investors, it would be
attracted to the most profitable option. The advantage of an acquisition is that it would
allow “relatively quick entry into a foreign market.”520 By being the first to enter a
foreign market, investors may avoid barriers that are created by prior entry of other
investors. In addition, when markets are growing slowly, there is an advantage to being
able to enter a market rapidly through an acquisition instead of forming a subsidiary.521
Globerman and Shapiro note that corporations are motivated to invest abroad
because of the opportunity for “enhance[ing] the efficiency and competitiveness of the
investor.”522

Foreign investment provides “complementary assets” which “include

marketing and distribution networks in the host country and technological and managerial
knowledge resident in the host country.”523 Another motive is “to exploit the investing
firm’s competitive advantages in the host market. Where those advantages are rooted in
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firm-specific knowledge or other intangible assets, they are typically best exploited by
internalizing their utilization within a wholly owned affiliate.”

524

But this usually

requires knowledge of the host market conditions and the host country environment.
Considering the net advantages of acquisitions, Globerman and Shapiro conclude
that the Chinese companies are more likely to find acquisitions to be the most
advantageous way to enter the U.S. market.525 Early in 2005, prior to the FTC hearing
discussed above, CNOOC had commissioned a review of Unocal’s assets, and rumors
had begun to surface that CNOOC was interested in purchasing Unocal.526 Although
neither CNOOC nor Unocal would comment on the reports, Unocal’s stock jumped and
analysts began to speculate as to whether CNOOC had the financial ability or managerial
expertise to pull off such an ambitious deal.527 The possibility of a petroleum company in
a developing country purchasing a western petroleum company with a hundred year
history was “hot news” in the energy industry.528
In the meantime, a number of bills which were working their way through
Congress helped set the stage for politicizing any offer made by CNOOC. For example,
eleven bills had been introduced in the 108th Congress to address China’s currency peg,
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and these bills reappeared in the 109th Congress: S. 14 (Stabenow, D-MI), S. 295
(Schumer, D-NY), and H.R. 1575 proposed to raise U.S. tariffs on Chinese goods by an
additional 27.5% unless China appreciated its currency; S. 277 (Lieberman, D-CT)
directed the president to negotiate with countries that manipulate their currency; and HR
1216 (English, R-PN) and S. 593 (Collins, R-ME) would apply U.S. countervailing laws
dealing with government subsidies to nonmarket economies such as China. Early in
April, the Senate approved Amendment 309 to S. 600, the Foreign Affairs Authorization
Act, which would impose an additional 27.5 percent tariff on Chinese goods if China did
not appreciate its currency to market levels. In response to this amendment, the Senate
leadership moved to allow a vote on S. 295, with the same language, no later than July
27, 2005 on the condition that the sponsors of the amendment would not sponsor similar
amendments for the rest of the 109th congressional session.529
Later in the month, the U.S. Trade Representative announced that he had placed
China on the Special 301 Priority Watch List due to failure to increase protection of U.S.
intellectual property rights. The Trade Representative urged China to prosecute criminal
piracy cases and to improve market access to products with intellectual property rights
protection; and it warned China that it may bring a case against it to the World Trade
Organization for failure to enforce the intellectual property right laws.

529

Later on June 30, 2005 Senator Schumer and other sponsors of S. 295 agreed to delay
consideration of the bill until they received a briefing from the Bush administration
which would provide assurances that China would make progress on currency reform in
the next few months.
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The political environment surrounding U.S.-China trade issues was made worse
for the CNOOC bid when the Treasury Department released its International Economic
and Exchange Rate Report on May 17, 2005. The report reinforced legislators’ fears
regarding China’s currency by concluding that China was substantially distorting world
markets by pegging its currency to the U.S. dollar. The report stressed that China should
move towards a more flexible exchange rate and that Treasury would closely monitor
progress in this area over the next six months.
While Congress was debating China’s trade policies, CNOOC Executive
Chairman Fu Chengyu’s plans to submit a bid were delayed when CNOOC’s nonexecutive directors decided to hire independent advisors to review his proposal.530 Then,
while the review was taking place, ChevronTexaco finally announced its own offer for
Unocal on May 27, 2005.531 At that time, the possibility of a CNOOC bid was still not
off the table. Congressional reaction to this possibility seemed unnecessary to many
observers given that the offer had not yet been made and CFIUS review had not yet been
triggered under the Exon-Florio Amendment.

But by the time that the CNOOC board

voted on June 22, 2005 to counter-offer an $18.5 billion cash offer for Unocal,532
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lawmakers in Washington had already begun questioning whether the Bush
Administration should intervene and the issue was heating up.533
On the day following the announced bid, the Bush Administration held to the
position that the question of a national security review was “hypothetical” because the
transaction had not yet occurred.534 While the administration did not appear unduly
concerned, the question permeated the media which certainly played a role in stirring up
the controversy. Perceiving the upcoming rivalry with CNOOC, ChevronTexaco may
have added fuel to the debate by focusing on the fact that CNOOC is controlled and
financed by the Chinese government and playing on fears that China would divert oil to
China on a non-commercial basis.535
Meanwhile, the idea that CNOOC’s bid was politically motivated, or would have
an effect on U.S. security, was immediately rejected by most members of the financial
community and China specialists.536 There are benefits to the domestic owners of assets
acquired by foreign investors, as well as by the host country consumers. If foreign
owners can operate acquired assets more efficiently that the domestic owners, they can
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afford to bid higher prices for the assets. It is also assumed that productivity gains
associated with the acquisition will be passed on to the domestic consumers in the form
of lower prices. The stronger the domestic competition, the more likely that consumers
will benefit.537 In spite of these advantages, the issues of political motives and threats to
national security continued to heat up as members scrambled to draft legislation to block
the Chinese proposal.
D. Bills Introduced and Debated in Congress
The socio-historical approach of institutional theory requires examining the
relationships of individuals and institutions.

This considers the bills which were

introduced in Congress after it was rumored that CNOOC was preparing a bid to
purchase Unocal. Examination of the legislative history gives insight into why members
of Congress politicized this particular business transaction.
At the end of 2004, the U.S. Trade Representative had issued its third annual
China WTO compliance report. Although the report stated that China’s efforts had been
“impressive” it reiterated that China’s performance in certain areas was less than
satisfactory and the country had a long way to go to reach compliance.538 The main areas
of concern included failure to protect U.S. intellectual property rights, undervaluing of
the Chinese currency by pegging it to the U.S. dollar, and lack of transparency of trade
laws. These deficiencies continued to persist while the trade imbalance between the U.S.
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and China continued to grow. This caused several members of Congress to call upon the
Bush Administration to take a more aggressive stance against China’s “unfair” trade
policies. At the same time, fearing a lack of executive action, a number of bills were
introduced to mandate changes in U.S.-China trade policy. A few of these bills are
relevant to the mood of Congress towards both the administration and China in 2005.
Representative Kirkpatrick (D-AZ) staged a direct attack against the Bush
Administration by introducing an amendment to H.R. 3055 (the FY2006 Appropriations
Act for various agencies) which prohibited the Department of Treasury from using funds
to recommend approval of the sale of Unocal to CNOOC.539 But the language was rather
extreme and was deleted by the Senate. It was not included in the Conference Report
which passed the House and Senate and was eventually signed into law, but Kirkpatrick
did make her point.540
Several other bills addressing the currency issue were introduced in the 109th
Congress. For example, S. 14 (Stabenow, D-MI), S. 295 (Schumer , D-NY), and H.R.
1575 (Myrick, R-NC) directed the Treasury secretary to negotiate with China to accept a
market-based system of currency valuation. These bills went so far as to impose a duty
on Chinese goods if the president were unable to certify to Congress that China had
stopped manipulating the exchange rate and was complying with accepted market-based
trade policies. Although President Bush had been known to criticize China’s currency
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peg, he had not made any progress with the issue.

On April 6, 2005, the Senate

leadership moved to allow a vote on S. 295 later in the session, and it may have passed,
but on June 30th Senator Schumer and the other sponsors agreed to delay consideration of
the bill after the Bush Administration informed them that China was expected to make
progress on the reforming its currency. These promises, however, did not assuage all the
members of Congress from wanting to send a strong message to the Chinese (and the
Bush Administration) about China’s trade policies, especially after news of the CNOOC
bid hit the press.
On June 17, 2005, two Republican members of Congress from California,
Representatives Richard W. Pombo and Duncan Hunter, wrote a letter to President Bush
stating that American companies would continue to have difficulty competing against the
Chinese and urged the president to initiate a review based on the Defense Production Act.
Then, on July 24, 2005, another group from the House of Representatives directed a letter
to the administration’s Secretary of Treasury Snow expressing concern about China’s
“ongoing and proposed acquisition of energy assets around the world, including assets of
U.S.-based energy and oil companies.” The letter stated specific issues for CFIUS to
review in order to protect U.S. energy security.
While ChevronTexaco may have been lobbying the California congressional
delegation to intervene in the hostile bid, Exxon Mobil Chief Executive Lee Raymond
warned against legislative interference. “To the extent that they preclude the Chinese
from buying assets here, it could easily come back and reflect that we won’t be able to
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buy assets in a foreign country.”541

According to Vice President for International

Economic Affairs for the National Association of Manufacturers Frank Vargo, American
businesses “have our issues with China, but investing in the U.S. is not one of them.”542
Similarly, Liu Jianchao, spokesman for the Chinese Foreign Ministry, claimed that it was
a “corporate issue” and that he could not comment on the case, however he
“encourage[d] the U.S. to allow normal trade relations to take place without political
interference.”543 In fact, Beijing energy consultant, He Jun, warned that if the United
States “treats China as a threat, it will inevitably have to find its own path to meet its
energy needs.”544

This, of course, would be contrary to the Bush Administration’s

interest in discouraging China from cultivating energy deals with “rogue” states.
On the other hand, Peter Robertson, Chevron-Texaco’s vice-chairman, accused
the Chinese of not competing fairly. “Clearly, this is not a commercial competition,” he
stated. “We are competing with the Chinese government, and I think that is wrong.”545
Robertson also contended that Chevron was in a better position to develop Unocal’s
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assets than CNOOC. He also hinted that CNOOC had less than honorable intentions and
might “steer natural gas produced in Indonesia to the Chinese market” rather than the
broader Asian market.546 Of course, this kind of comment from a rival company in a
merger and acquisition is not surprising. Todd M. Malan, executive director of the
Organization for International Investment, a Washington association that represents U.S.
subsidiaries of foreign companies, warned
If our process is viewed as merely a proxy for Chevron’s views or subject
to political intervention, and not a true national security review, then we
ought to be prepared for that to happen when a U.S. company wants to
make an investment in China.547
Meanwhile, the Bush Administration continued to avoid taking a position on the
issue. Secretary John W. Snow told the Senate Finance Committee that the question of a
national security review was “hypothetical” because the transaction had not yet occurred,
and Chairman of the Federal Reserve, Alan Greenspan, made no comment.548 This
perceived lack of interest, or support, from the administration was not well received by
Finance Committee members from both political parties. For example, Senator Ron
Weyden (D-OR) was put off by the administration’s diffidence, while Senator Jim
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Bunning (R-KY) said that the administration had made little progress in negotiations over
China trade policy, complaining that the CFIUS told them “to take a hike.”549
In spite of the sentiments of those on the Senate Finance Committee, it is unlikely
that the president was just brushing the issue aside. In fact, the proposed acquisition put
the Bush Administration in a difficult position. Responding to a push by conservatives,
President Bush had been taking a harder line toward China than previous presidents. At
the same time that the CNOOC bid had became a hot issue, the Pentagon and Defense
Department had been criticizing China for increasing its military spending while failing
to use economic pressure to convince North Korea to end its nuclear program. On the
economic front, Secretary Snow had already informed Congress about negotiations to
convince the Chinese to change their currency policy. In the administration’s view, it
would be counterproductive to take punitive action against China.550
Congress was not convinced and on June 30, 2005 the House passed H.Res.
344551

The resolution expressed the sense of the House of Representatives “that a

Chinese state-owned energy company exercising control of critical United States energy
infrastructure and energy production capacity could take action that would threaten to
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impair the national security of the United States.”552 Pursuant to the House rules, Mr.
Ney (R-OH) and Ms. Kilpatrick (D-AZ) each controlled 20 minutes on the floor. Mr.
Ney supported the immediate adoption of the resolution which asked that the president
initiate a thorough review of any potential takeover of Unocal by CNOOC “as soon as
any agreement of such a takeover is announced.”553 He justified the action on the
grounds that in times of rising energy prices “ready access to energy resources is a vital
element” to economic and national security. Furthermore, he cited differences in how a
“Communist government” and the U.S. government interpret trade agreements.

He

suggested that the Chinese government sees treaties as “the starting point for negotiation”
whereas the U.S. government views treaties as “documents that must be adhered to.”554
As a consequence, Mr. Ney was “skeptical” that CNOOC would honor assurances to
dedicate regional oil production to American consumption.

In his view, CNOOC’s

proposal was a means of perpetuating China’s unfair trade practices which would
threaten security “by holding out the prospect that every drop of oil, every unit of natural
gas produced by that company could end up being shipped to China.”555
Ms. Kilpatrick testified to her bipartisan support for not spending any money for a
“Communist-owned” company and not supporting further loss of technology to the
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Chinese when they do not protect intellectual property rights. Her primary concern was
protecting American business.556 Similarly, the chairman of the Committee on Energy
and Commerce, Mr. Barton (R-TX), supported the resolution because of the lack of
reciprocity in Chinese law which “does not allow a foreign company to have a controlling
interest in a company in China.” He was also concerned that the money for the purchase
was coming from a government loan which would more than double the debt.557
On the other hand, Mr. Moran (D-VA) stated he did not oppose CFIUS review of
the contract. Although he said he “[could] not stand State-controlled economies,” he
opposed Congress taking actions that would encourage the Chinese to invest in
governments that are a threat to the U.S. He also expressed the opinion that Chinese
acquisition of Unocal, which produced only one percent of U.S. oil and gas, would not
constitute a threat to national security. Furthermore, he reminded Congress that the U.S.
oil companies have drilling rights in China, off the coast, and “all over the world.” If
Congress were to pass this resolution and others like it, it would interfere with free
enterprise and the free global economy. He suggested that CNOOC’s American educated
CEO understood the market system, CNOOC had a good track record, and unlike its
competitor, ChevronTexaco, would preserve American jobs.558
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Mr. Paul (R-TX) indicated reservations over legislation in which the federal
government was “involving itself in the sale of a private American company” with
shareholders and a board of directors. Rather than creating security problems, he argued
that “international trade and economic activity tends to diminish tensions.”559 Similarly,
Mr. Pete Stark (D-CA) opposed the resolution, claiming that the Republican Majority
which “has already sold the entire farm to foreign central banks and multinational
corporations” was now trying to blame the Chinese for our dependence on foreign oil.
He used his time to boast that he had “proudly voted for renewable energy” and
legislation that supported American workers.560 This was an important statement to
interject since California voters were heavily dependent upon positive trade relationship
with China, but were also suffering from increasing gasoline prices.
The Chairman of the Committee on Armed Services, Mr. Duncan Hunter (R-CA),
supported the attempt to block the sale because it involved “a strategic asset and a
strategic lever for Communist China.”561 Mr. Michael Capuano (D-MA) stated that it
was a good resolution, but pointed out that CNOOC’s bid for Unocal was not the
“elephant in the room.” The real issue, he felt, was the exponential increase in the debt
owed to China, and the jobs, money and economic power we were sending overseas. Mr.
Robin Hayes (R-NC) emphasized the “strong signal” the legislation would send to China
559

Statements by Representative Paul on June 30, 2005, 109th Cong., 1st sess., Cong. Rec.
151, no. 90: H5576.
560

Statements by Representative Stark on June 30, 2005, 109th Cong., 1st sess., Cong.
Rec. 151, no. 90: H5576.

561

Statements by Representative Hunter on June 30, 2005, 109th Cong., 1st sess., Cong.
Rec. 151, no. 90: H5572.
238

– that the U.S. would no longer stand for the loss of jobs, currency manipulation, and
violation of intellectual property rights that were harming American business.562 Mr. Earl
Blumenauer (D-OR) also stressed the need to get our “fiscal house in order” and stop
making loans to the Chinese. He voiced the fear held by others that the Chinese might
start dumping our bonds and cause havoc with fiscal policy.563
Mr. J.D. Hayworth (R-AZ) called on his peers to put aside “campaign screed that
would criticize the opposing party” and “find some common agreement, apart from the
grandstanding and campaigning that is so easily enjoined.”564 Yet, Ms. Marcy Kaptur
(D-OH) could not resist the temptation to state that “America has lost her independence”
and the economy is worse under the current president.565 Mr. Bill Jefferson (D-LA) took
this opportunity to praise the fact that he had “supported free trade” since he had been in
Congress and was continuing to do so with this resolution. He stated that the more China
seeks control over assets for themselves, the more difficult it will become for the U.S. to
claim it is a free, market-based economy.566
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Mr. Michael Oxley (R-OH) refocused the debate on the fact that CFIUS review
was a slow process and that as chairman of the committee with jurisdiction over the
Defense Production Act,567 he felt it was critical that the administration act quickly. He
then recited a number of statistics relating to China’s increased oil consumption and
emphasis on “owning the import oil at the production point” which threatens the free
market.568 This concluded the debate and the vote was taken. The measure passed by a
vote of 398 to 15. The speed with which the resolution moved through the House and the
strong majority vote was testimony to the skill of the sponsors as well as to the timeliness
of the issue.
Less than two weeks later, the House Armed Services Committee held a hearing
on the proposed CNOOC-Unocal merger. In his opening remarks on July 13th, Duncan
Hunter (R-CA) addressed the issue of whether review of the CNOOC-Unocal merger was
outside the scope of national security reviews normally conducted by Congress. He said
it was within their jurisdiction because “energy is a strategic commodity” and the
infrastructure, drilling rights, and exploration capabilities that Unocal uses to bring
energy to the open market represent strategic assets. Even though Unocal was a small
producer in the U.S., Hunter said that the fact that the company was a major provider of
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natural gas in South East Asia and a primary investor in Central Asian oil pipelines
contributed to its strategic importance.569
In addition, Hunter seemed offended by the Chinese Foreign Ministry’s “demand
that the U.S. Congress correct its mistaken ways of politicizing economic and trade issues
and stop interfering in the normal commercial exchanges between enterprises of the two
countries.”570 On the other hand, ranking minority member Ike Skelton (D-MO) noted
that the hearing was taking the committee into uncharted territory and even though he
was sure no one wanted to impair the nation’s security, he cautioned committee members
that the CNOOC acquisition was just a “theoretical possibility” not an inevitability since
Unocal could accept ChevronTexaco’s offer.571
Emphasizing that Congress is accountable to the American people, not the
Chinese government, Hunter called upon the first witness, R. James Woolsey, former
director of Central Intelligence, for his testimony. Woolsey stated that China is the most
dominant dictatorship in the world and the strategic task of the Communist Party is “to
569
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secure a coordinated development of national defense and the economy to build
modernized, regularized, revolutionary armed forces.”572
Mr. Frank Gaffney, Jr., President and CEO of the neoconservative Center for
Security Policy, followed by stating that it would be “folly to abet” Communist China’s
efforts to acquire more of the world’s finite resources. If demand for oil were to grow at
the projected rate of 60 percent, then the U.S. and China are on a “collision course.”
Although the Chinese said the proposal was a “purely commercial transaction,” Gaffney
saw it as an “ominous” long-term, global strategy to dominate strategic energy
resources.573 To support his case, Gaffney suggested that CNOOC’s willingness to pay
above market prices only makes sense from a strategic perspective.

In advising

Congress, Gaffney indicated that the strategic nature of Unocal’s business and the
legislative intent of Exon-Florio to interpret the statute broadly made CFIUS review
mandatory. However, Gaffney reiterated that review should not take place until the issue
is ripe, which in this case would be after the August 10, 2005 shareholder decision.
Gaffney also reiterated the flaws in Exon-Florio, including lack of transparency in
the process and Congress’s failure to give itself oversight power. Since Congress has
exclusive power over commerce with foreign states under the Constitution, Gaffney
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recommended that Congress proceed to change the statute. On the other hand, Mr. Jerry
Taylor, Director of Natural Resources Studies at the libertarian Cato Institute, argued that
fears are “ill-founded” that the CNOOC transaction would harm national security by
making the U.S. more dependent upon foreign oil or by giving China a weapon to use
against the U.S.574 As an economist, he suggested that supply disruptions would increase
prices regardless of where they occur. Physical access to oil is irrelevant because oil is
available in world spot and futures markets. There are very few long-term contracts, and
even if there were, long-term contracts provide no guarantees that they may not be
broken, or that assets may be nationalized. If physical access were important, Mr. Taylor
suggested, other oil companies would have gotten into a bidding war against CNOOC.
But Mr. Taylor identified several reasons why they did not. First, the oil that might be
diverted to China would only displace what would have been imported otherwise.
Second, Unocal’s production was only about 0.23% of global production and would have
very little impact on the world market. Third, China and the U.S. have the same interest
in low prices, and in fact, high prices would hurt China more than the U.S. because its
economy cannot respond to price spikes as efficiently as the U.S. economy.575
When asked whether Mr. Taylor believed any of China’s acquisitions of foreign
corporations were strategic, Mr. Taylor responded that they were economically strategic.
He did not find it surprising that the Chinese government would want to diversify its
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investments away from U.S. debt and move towards investing in U.S. assets. In support
of his belief that the Unocal acquisition would not be a threat, Mr. Taylor stated that the
U.S. holds $105 billion worth of China’s assets while China only has $8 billion of U.S.
assets. Purely economic arguments led others to challenge Mr. Taylor’s assumptions and
expertise. Mr. Hunter argued that even though this one acquisition would only impact “a
quarter of one percent of world production” additional acquisitions could approach 5
percent or 10 percent and that could cause a spike in price. Admitting that 5 percent
would be significant, Mr. Taylor expressed the opinion that “It’s hard to imagine
[CNOOC] putting together that kind of portfolio.” “Historically,” he said, “reserves are
primarily controlled by producer states regardless of contract, and they’re not generally
controlled by those with contractual rights to exploit and sell.”576
Mr. Woolsey then commented that Mr. Taylor was an energy analyst with
“blinders on” and not a defense analyst. This led Mr. Weldon to interject that the real
concern in the CNOOC-Unocal debate was China’s growing military capability. In fact,
the Cox Commission on which he served several years earlier concluded by a 9-0 vote
that U.S. security was being harmed severely by China’s acquisition of American
technology.

Mr. Taylor agreed that “acquisition of military technology would be

worrisome,” but to his knowledge Unocal technology did not have any military
application and nothing was proprietary – anything Unocal had in the oil sector was
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available through contractors and private vendors. If there were any military applications
or proprietary technology, he said that a security review would provide restrictions.
The Armed Services Committee hearing turned into a heated debate regarding
U.S.-China trade policy and whether America was making progress towards democracy,
openness and transparency in China by assuming such a large trade deficit. Mr. Taylor
continued to emphasize that only “marginal producers can affect world price” for oil and
the only scenario he could conceive in which China would be a marginal producer would
be if it physically occupies Middle East oil reserves or developed an unknown field. But
Mr. Woolsey stressed that the U.S. may be on a “collision course” with China –
depending upon China’s domestic situation, Chinese leaders may “look for a foreign
enemy.” Mr. Gaffney agreed saying that Chinese leaders have been saying for years that
“war with the U.S. is inevitable.” Senator D’Amato agreed with what come called an
“alarmist view” and reiterated that little progress had been made between the U.S. and
China on major issues such as currency, intellectual property rights, subsidization, and
arms proliferation.
Mr. Taylor countered that military analysts have a history of overestimating
capabilities of other countries, just as the CIA did with the Soviet Union. He stressed that
“every country on the planet” has similar goals of “a robust economy,” and they will “use
their military and their national self-interest” to achieve it. Attempting perhaps to lower
the intensity of the debate, Representative Vic Snyder (D-AR) quoted Dr. Schlessinger
who said “If you call someone an enemy often enough, they will become your enemy.”
“And China is not our enemy today,” said Snyder.
245

Woolsey continued to take the stance that China’s economic growth was
dependent upon an aggressive military strategy. He quoted Zhu Feng, security expert at
Beijing University, to make his point:
Many people argue that oil interests are the driving force behind the Iraq
war. For China, it has been a reminder and a warming about how
geopolitical changes can affect its energy issues. So China has decided to
focus much more intently to address its security.
Walter Jones (D-NC) brought up a Washington Times article which quoted an
unidentified energy advisor to the Chinese government as saying, “No matter if it’s a
rogue oil or a friend’s oil, we don’t care. . . . Anyone who helps China with energy is our
friend.”577 Bringing the hearing back to the issue of the role of CFIUS in the proposed
Unocal bid, Jones’ stated his opinion that Congress had abdicated its constitutional
authority too many times. He emphasized how the loss of 1.5 million jobs to China
demonstrates that Congress and the administration need to “do what we can to influence
this sale if it comes about.”
Mr. D’Amato agreed. “The most important thing we can do is defend our own
interests.” He went on to say that “Congress has exclusive and complete power to
regulate these transactions if it so chose, because it has the sole authority under the
constitution to do so.” In his opinion, “the behavior of CFIUS over the years needs
complete review and I think that the power over foreign commerce needs to be re-exerted
by this body.” This statement sums up the issue underlying the Committee’s four hour
debate and points to the primary reason behind Congress’s politicization of the Unocal
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bid. That is, members of Congress were concerned about the efficacy of the Exon-Florio
Amendment and whether it was being implemented in a manner that would balance the
opposing interests of maintaining an open trade policy while protecting the nation’s
security.
While the House was debating its concerns about CNOOC’s bid for Unocal and
the issues surrounding presidential interpretation of the Exon-Florio Amendment, the
Senate was working on its own legislation. On July 15, 2005, Senator Byron Dorgan (DND) introduced Senate Bill 1412. Some of the highlights of the debate included concerns
that CNOOC was a state-controlled corporation, the Chinese government provided
CNOOC with deep subsidies which diminished competitveness of American
corporations, the Chinese government did not grant U.S. businesses reciprocal treatment
regarding acquisitions of Chinese companies, the CFIUS review process was inadequate,
and that, in spite of all these concerns, free trade with China should remain a priority.578
The rhetoric in Congress was intense, but perhaps the most decisive factor for the
Chinese was when Congress passed the Energy Policy Act of 2005 towards the end of
July. As enacted, section 1837 required a national security review of international energy
requirements. Specifically relating to the CNOOC offer was a clause that the findings
concerning China’s growing energy needs were to be reported to both Congress and the
President not more than 120 days after enactment of the Energy Policy Act.

This

provision prevented any instrumentality, including CFIUS, from concluding a national
security review concerning an investment in energy assets of any U.S. owned corporation
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by any entity owned or controlled by China until 21 days after the report was submitted
and the President had certified receipt of the report.579 This restriction was so prohibitive
that CNOOC could not compete with ChevronTexaco, even with the offer of more
money. With no other recourse, CNOOC withdrew its bid on August 2, 2005.
Afterwards, Senator Charles E. Schumer (D-NY) released the following
statement.
There was nothing wrong with CNOOC taking over Unocal and for that
reason I didn’t oppose the merger. But the furor over China treating
American companies and workers unfairly up and down the line is real.
And while it led to an incorrect result in this case, it must be dealt with.
For instance China likely wouldn’t allow an American company to buy a
similarly situated Chinese company. If China were open to American
companies buying Chinese companies, I think CNOOC would have had a
much easier time of it.580
Speaking from the House, Representative Pombo (R-CA) issued a statement that
“CNOOC’s withdrawal from this bidding process is good news for the free market, the
American consumer and U.S. national security.”581 He stated that it was “pure irony that
Congress expressed near-unanimous concern” over the CNOOC bid while many
legislators continue to oppose efforts such as development in ANWR, to increase our
domestic energy supplies. It was clear that Mr. Pombo used this opportunity to promote
579
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his own political agenda, but it is unclear as to whether his personal interests were in the
best interest of U.S.-China foreign policy.
E. How Politicization of CNOOC Bid Helped Expedite Exon-Florio Reform
Pursuant to law, the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission
released its Third Annual Report to Congress on November 9, 2005. The statute
mandates that the Commission “monitor and investigate and report to Congress on the
national security implications of the bilateral trade and economic relationship between
the United States and the People’s Republic of China.” 582 In doing so, the Commission
adhered to the central principle that “economic health and well-being are a fundamental
national security matter” and that during the year, the CNOOC proposed acquisition of
Unocal highlighted that linkage.583 The report further states that “far too little, if any”
progress was made in balancing economic and security issues during 2005.
On February 28, 2007, the House of Representatives passed H.R. 556
to ensure national security while promoting foreign investment and the
creation and maintenance of jobs, to reform the process by which such
investments are examined for any effect they may have on national
security, to establish the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United
States, and for other purposes.584
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The requirement to report on U.S-China trade relations was in place years before
Congress passed the 2005 Energy Policy Act with the more explicit requirement
concerning review of U.S. energy assets owned or controlled by China. For this reason,
some might argue that the stipulation in the Energy Policy Act was unnecessary, that is, if
it were not for the fact that Congress felt powerless to force the President to act
expeditiously on the proposed CNOOC bid.

V. CONCLUSION
“Foreign policy issues are most pronounced when there is a serious conflict
between domestic and international interests.”585

In the CNOOC case, heightened

concern about America’s vulnerability and the concern for increased national security
efforts conflicted with business interests in free trade and the potential impact of trade
restrictions on the domestic economy. Legislators took advantage of this conflict in 2005
to politicize the CNOOC bid for Unocal and make long-sought changes in the president’s
authority under the Exon-Florio Amendment. Congress’s political strength ruled the day,
in spite of CNOOC’s extensive planning and reliance upon experienced American
strategists.
Most analysts agree that American-educated CNOOC Chairman and Chief
Executive Officer Fu Chengyu was the motivating force behind the bid for Unocal. Of
China’s three oil companies, CNOOC was in the best position to take on Wall Street.

585

Barbara Farnham, “Impact of the Political Context on Foreign Policy DecisionMaking,” Political Psychology 25, no. 3 (2004): 458.
250

The company was not too large, but had a number of exploration and production joint
ventures with foreign oil companies, including Chevron, operating off the China coast.
Half of its eight board members were non-executive directors and were foreigners.
According to Fu, even though a state-owned parent owned the majority interest in the
company, it was run “no differently than Western companies” whose motivations “are
purely commercial.”586
But not all the CNOOC board members were one hundred percent behind the
proposed acquisition. When the acquisition was first conceptualized, executive board
members consisted of CEO Fu Chengyu, CFO Mark Qiu (an investment banker),
CNOOC President Zhou Shouwei, and CNOOC Vice President Luo Han. Zhou started
as an engineer in 1982 before being appointed to the board in 1999 and becoming
president in 2002. Luo represented CNOOC in its offshore production joint venture with
Chevron and Eni.
The board also included four independent nonexecutive directors in accordance
with Hong Kong stock market regulations where CNOOC, Ltd. is listed.

The

independents were Kenneth Courtis, professor of economics and Asia vice chairman at
Goldman Sachs; Erwin Schurtenberger, former ambassador to China who resigned in
April and was replaced by Aloysius Tse, former partner at KPMG; Royal Dutch/Shell
executive Evert Henkes; and Australian solicitor Chiu Hong Sung.
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Mr. Fu selected Charles Li, a senior banker at J.P. Morgan who had worked at
CNOOC in the 1970s and had assisted with tapping into Western capital markets, as a
key player in planning the Unocal bid. After learning English as a young man, Mr. Li
received a scholarship to attend the University of Alabama where he earned a Masters
degree in journalism. Then after earning a law degree at Columbia University, he was
hired by Brown & Wood which had a China practice. While working at Brown & Wood,
Mr. Li did some work for Merrill Lynch & Co. and was later recruited to join Merrill as a
banker.

During this time he worked on a secondary offering of China Mobile, a

landmark deal, which caught the attention of J.P Morgan. It was after moving to J.P.
Morgan, that Mr. Li first thought about putting together CNOOC’s bid for Unocal.587
With his experience, Mr. Li recognized that there are hurdles to cross in putting
together mergers and acquisitions, and Washington is one hurdle that must be considered.
CNOOC’s team consisted of foreign advisors, including Akin Gump Strauss Hauer &
Field, a Dallas law firm with ties to both political parties, which was selected to lead the
effort in Washington. Late in 2004, Goldman Sachs joined the CNOOC team with Bill
Wicker, the new head of Asian investment banking, leading the charge. The Brunswick
Group, a media-strategy firm, was hired for its specialization in mergers and acquisitions.
Public Strategies Inc. of Austin was selected to handle communications because of its
close ties to the Bush Administration. The “point person” for Public Strategies, Mark
Palmer, was an expert in crisis communications and emphasized the importance of
587

Kate Linebaugh, Matt Pottinger, Jason Singer, and Greg Hitt, “CNOOC’s Unocal Bid
Sheds Light on Revised Strategy: After Failed IPO, Oil Firm Resolved to Play to Win,”
Asian Wall Street Journal, June 27, 2005.
252

“getting people to see the business rational for this proposed merger.”588 In addition to
the communications advisors, CNOOC hired two law firms, Davis Polk & Wardwell and
Herbert Smith of Hong Kong. The independent directors, who expressed concerns about
the proposal, were advised by investment bank N.M. Rothschild & Sons, consulting firm
CRA International, and law firm Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom.589
In spite of the heavy hitters and the ties to the Bush Administration, the CNOOC
team was not able to overcome the political backlash in Congress. The timing might
have been better if it had not been for ChevronTexaco’s announced bid. This action
forced CNOOC to go public with a hostile bid during a politically volatile time. Just as
the Senate Finance Committee was holding its hearings on U.S.-China economic
relations, the Bush Administration was pushing Congress to pass the 2005 Energy Policy
Act. U.S.-China trade relations and security policies were at the center of the legislative
agenda and the CNOOC bid was being introduced as an example in debate after debate.
In this way, the timing of the CNOOC bid for Unocal played into the hands of key
legislators, some of whom had been trying for years to muster support for strengthening
the Exon-Florio.

After 41 members of Congress called for CFIUS review of the

proposal, Fu Chengyu attempted to neutralize opposition to the bid by writing a letter to
Congress stating:
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We know this bid is historic for both companies and will be closely
scrutinized by everyone involved. I want you to know we encourage that
review and welcome opportunity to participate.590
But CNOOC’s effort to go through the CFIUS process was not enough to overcome the
anger and mistrust that had been brewing among various legislators and within different
congressional committees. Not only did CNOOC have the disadvantage of taking the
brunt of criticism for all of the perceived shortcomings in U.S.-China trade negotiations,
it also suffered from misunderstanding and mistrust of a political and economic system
based on different assumptions and values.
Even those legislators who were supportive of the achievements that China had
made in opening up to the West, modernizing its society, and integrating into the global
economy, found a common platform for opposing the CNOOC acquisition. They were
united in their concern that the Exon-Florio Amendment was no longer effective in the
post-9/11 world. By failing to define national security, granting the president broad
discretionary powers to interpret the amendment, and being complacent about reporting
responsibilities, Congress had abdicated its powers under the Commerce Clause. The
combination of Congress’s desire to take back power from the executive branch and
strengthen its oversight authority, along with political pressure to mandate that China
adopt democratic values and the rule of law, and fears that the Chinese government was
scheming to overtake the U.S. as a world hegemony created a “perfect storm” resulting in
the demise of CNOOC’s first foray into the U.S. oil industry.
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CHAPTER 5
IMPLICATIONS OF THE UNOCAL CASE FOR FUTURE POLICY MAKING

In 2005, when Chinese-owned CNOOC proposed a hostile bid to acquire
American-owned Unocal it sparked an unexpected clash of events analogous to a “perfect
storm” in Washington. The expediency with which Congress reacted to CNOOC’s bid
provided a unique opportunity for observing and analyzing how U.S. foreign policy is
made and implemented.

This study adopted the theoretical approach of new

institutionalism as a means of understanding and explaining the roles that executive and
legislative branches play in forming, implementing, and overseeing foreign policy
initiatives.
New institutionalism emerged in response to the shortcomings of the realist
approach which focuses on the interaction of nation-states and diminishes the
significance of political values and collective choice in making foreign policy.

In

adopting the institutional approach, the analysis is redirected to the interaction between
institutions and institutional actors. The study assumes that institutions are infused with
values over time and the consistency provided by society’s acceptance of these values
creates both a sense of security for the populace as well as an obstacle for policy makers
who are confronted with the need to adapt to changing global environments.

The

theory’s explanatory power is particularly applicable in a new millennium characterized
by China’s explosive growth and increased influence over the global economy,
255

America’s phobia about China’s potential for global dominance, and an unprecedented
sense of vulnerability to terrorist attacks.
Although there have been efforts within the institutional school to bifurcate the
theory, this study focused on an integrated approach by adopting core elements of the
historical, rational choice, and sociological approaches to new institutionalism. The basic
premises were as follows:
(1)

An institution’s history is important because it creates values which

become imbedded in the system.
(2)

Actors attempt to make rational decisions but the maximization of utility

is often compromised by the democratic decision making process.
(3)

Due to formal constraints, political actors will try to identify informal

mechanisms for accomplishing their policy goals.
(4)

The success of a policy initiative in the U.S. Congress is dependent upon a

variety of factors, including public awareness, constituent support, party support,
presidential support, and timing.
In the American system of governance, the Constitution is fundamental. It grants
separate powers to Congress, the president, and the judiciary. It also incorporates a
system of “checks and balances” to keep any one of the three institutions from becoming
too powerful. As a result, policy making is often fragmented, inefficient, and difficult to
predict.

This was the case in 2005 when Congress was struggling with drafting

legislation that would balance conflicting objectives in the areas of open trade,

256

comparative advantage in a global economy, intellectual property rights protection,
natural resource development, and national security.
Achieving balance in the American political system is complicated by the
separation of powers among the institutionalizations of the president, the legislature, and
the judiciary. Over the years, both the presidency and Congress have gained autonomy
and have become more complex while preserving coherence and the ability to adapt to
change — elements that have strengthened the institutions without diminishing the
possibility that at any point in time one institution may dominate policy making. The
struggle between the institutions of the presidency and Congress is an on-going process.
At the same time, exogenous factors may arise that create windows of opportunity for
one of the institutions to assert its authority over the other. But the system constantly
seeks balance. Therefore, whenever the power is weighted towards one institution, actors
in the less dominant institution will look for a window of opportunity to rebalance the
system. Since windows of opportunity are temporary moments in time, political actors
must be prepared to act when the conditions are ripe.
After 9/11, the president was in a position of strength for implementing foreign
policy initiatives. The shock of the terrorist attacks combined with President Bush’s
strong rhetoric and decisive actions elevated his popularity to unprecedented levels in
American politics. This gave him a clear advantage in pushing his political agenda
through Congress, especially when the policies were concerned national security.
President Bush’s managerial style also served to place the White House and his cabinet in
a position to gain strong control over foreign policy decision making. Strong control
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over communications networks and relationships with the media also contributed to the
President Bush’s political success.
However, by 2005, when the CNOOC bid leaked to the press, the president’s
ratings were beginning to fall and support for him in Congress was no longer
unconditional. Political capital earned after 9/11 had been spent and Americans were
questioning policies that did not accomplish their stated goals, such as the failure to find
the weapons of mass destruction which had provided the rational for the war in Iraq and
failure of the Office of Homeland Security to provide first responder relief to victims of
Hurricane Katrina. It was amid events such as these that key legislators in Congress
found an opportunity in the CNOOC bid for demonstrating how presidents had
misinterpreted the 1988 Exon-Florio Amendment and the 1992 Byrd Amendment and
thereby failed to comply with the statutory intent of protecting Americans, their
resources, their economy, and their national security.
Senators Shelby (R) and Sarbanes (D) had suspected these shortcomings when
they asked for a GAO study of the president’s implementation of Exon-Florio a year
earlier in 2004. This type of request would not have been unusual coming from the
opposite party as the president’s. However, in this case, it was a bipartisan request
symbolizing an informal mechanism, permitted rather than required by the law, which
could serve to undermine the president’s performance and give Congress a political
advantage in shaping foreign investment decisions.
It is significant to this analysis that key Republicans joined with Democrats to
introduce legislation that would force the president’s hand in blocking the CNOOC
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transaction. House Resolution 344 was purely a political move. It was a non-binding
resolution on the part of one chamber in Congress to take a foreign policy stand, to make
a statement to the administration about how the United States should handle foreign
acquisitions of American corporations. The sponsors of the bill played on the public’s
heightened awareness of the nation’s vulnerabilities in an effort to intimidate the Chinese
to drop their proposal and consider making other foreign policy concessions. Support for
the resolution was overwhelming and it did make an impression on the Chinese
government – at least to the extent that Beijing expressed indignation over political
intervention in the business transaction even though Chinese leaders were loath to admit
that inexperience in capitalist markets may have contributed to the failed hostile takeover.
Although H.R. 344 received the most attention in the media, various other bills
debated in the 109th Congress focused on China. In analyzing the debates, it was obvious
that individual members in Congress had varying concerns about China’s foreign
policies, ranging from human rights to currency pegs and from intellectual property rights
to a military build-up. It also became obvious that the CNOOC acquisition was being
used as an example of the weaknesses in the Exon-Florio process, the need to reform the
statute, and the need for Congress to rein in the discretionary powers granted to the
president. Some of the changes members were suggesting were to specify timelines for
presidential action, to increasing agency reporting requirements, and to improve
opportunities for overall congressional oversight of CFIUS implementation of the
president’s statutory authority.
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Another reason for members to support legislation blocking the CNOOC deal was
revealed through analysis of the hearings and testimony. This was the desire to support
American businesses and American jobs and to discourage economic competition with
China. Even if CNOOC’s acquisition of Unocal was based on purely economic, rather
than political motives, the outcome was to the benefit of American-owned
ChevronTexaco.

In its 2005 Annual Report, ChevronTexaco announced that the

company had achieved annual earnings of $14.1 billion, the highest in its history. This
achievement was partially due to successful integration of Unocal’s exploration and
production operations which enhanced the company’s portfolio of assets in areas of
strategic importance.
In the previous two years, ChevronTexaco’s portfolio had declined at a higher
rate. The company claimed this had been due to damage to facilities and infrastructure
by hurricanes and tropical storms and to the sale of nonstrategic properties.

This

downward trend was offset by acquiring Unocal and properties that complimented and
enhanced ChevronTexaco’s position in the Gulf of Mexico and Permian Basin. During
the first five months after the acquisition, ChevronTexaco reported the net daily
production from former Unocal properties, averaged 53,000 barrels of crude oil and
natural gas liquids and 360 million cubic feet natural gas, or 113,000 barrels on an oil
equivalent basis.591
ChevronTexaco claims its U.S. portfolio was “anchored by mature assets” in the
United States and Gulf of Mexico and was improved by disposing of nonstrategic assets
591

Chevron Corporation, 2005 Supplement to the Annual Report, 14. Available at
www.chevron.com/documents.pdf (accessed September 23, 2009).
260

such as Unocal’s offshore assets in Canada. Already the largest holder of natural gas
resources in Australia, ChevronTexaco gained additional exploration blocks through the
Unocal acquisition. There were other benefits of the acquisition. For instance,
ChevronTexaco held 10.3% working interest in Azerbayan International Operating
Company (AIOC) and acquired 8.9% equity interest in the pipeline which transports
AIOC production from Baku Azerbaijian through Georgia to deep water port facilities in
Ceyhan, Turkey. ChevronTexaco also acquired interest in 3 production sharing contracts
in Bangladesh encompassing more than 3.5 million acres and by early 2006
ChevronTexaco supplied 20% of Bangladesh’s natural gas market.592
These downstream acquisitions complimented ChevronTexaco’s strategies for
upstream businesses, that is, to “grow profitability in core areas, build new legacy
positions, and commercialize natural resource base by targeting North American and
Asian Markets.”593 Unocal’s upstream portfolio of assets bolstered ChevronTexaco’s
position in the Asian-Pacific, Gulf of Mexico and Caspian regions.
From the perspective of ChevronTexaco, the politicization of CNOOC’s proposed
acquisition in 2005 certainly benefited the American corporation’s business interests.
Yet, the efforts of so many members of the 109th Congress to politicize the Unocal case
so as to facilitate reform of the 1988 Exon-Florio Amendment stalled after CNOOC
withdrew its bid in August of 2005. Nonetheless, the actions of key legislators were not
in vain as the stage was set for the proponents of reform to continue their mission during
592
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the second session in 2006.

Advocates for Exon-Florio reform had stirred up the

necessary momentum for mandating institutional change by shifting foreign policy
decision making powers back toward the legislative arena while giving Congress greater
oversight over foreign acquisitions of American corporations.
The coup de grâce for overcoming institutional resistance to change in the balance
of power between the presidency and Congress came when Congress learned through the
media, rather than the president, that United Arab Emirates-owned Dubai Ports World
was in the process of purchasing Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company
(P&O).

The London-based P&O was the world’s fourth largest port operator with

operations in over twenty U.S. ports from Maine to Texas. The port operator was
responsible for securing cargo coming in and out of ports, the port facilities themselves,
and the hiring of security personnel. The proposed transaction would transfer control of
substantial terminal functions at America’s major East and Gulf Coast ports to Dubai
Ports World.
In consideration of the port operator’s critical functions, on Monday, February 13,
2006, Senators Chuck Schumer (D-NY), Tom Coburn (R-OK), Frank Lautenberg (D-NJ),
and Chris Dodd (D-CT) joined Representatives Chris Shays (R-CT), Vito Fosselia (RNY), and Mark Foley (R-FL) in sending a bipartisan letter to Treasury Secretary John
Snow urging immediate CFIUS review and scrutiny of security issues as required by law.
The letter cited the requirement that “the President or his designee investigate the impact
on national security of a foreign acquisition if the acquisition ‘could result in control of a
person engaged in interstate commerce in the United States that could affect the national
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security of the United States.’” It emphasized that the “country’s maritime ports are
critical to our national security, vital to our military capability, and essential to our
economy. Some ninety-five percent of all goods imported to the U.S. arrive through our
ports.” Furthermore, the letter noted that Dubai “has been named as a key transfer point
for shipments of nuclear components that were shipped to Iran, North Korea, and Libya .
. . and the UAE was one of only 3 countries (including Pakistan and Saudi Arabia) that
recognized the Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan.” On February 27,
2006, Senator Schumer introduced legislation, with five Democrats and five Republicans
as sponsors, to deal with the Dubai Ports issue. Stating that “homeland security is a
number one priority,” Mr. Schumer raised the following questions: (1) whether CFIUS is
the right committee to conduct reviews since it was set up more than 20 years ago to
justify economic deals, (2) whether a report would serve a purpose if it is kept secret and
only provided to the President, and (3) whether Congress could be able to find a
constitutional way to disapprove the deal.594 Ms. Collins followed by introducing a joint
resolution disapproving the conclusion of the CFIUS regarding the Dubai Ports
acquisition.595
The next day, Ms. Harmon (D-CA), member of the House Intelligence Committee
and Homeland Security Committee introduced S.J. Res. 32 in the House and called for
the CFIUS to rescind the decision, conduct a formal 45-day investigation, and brief
594
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Congress before allowing the deal to proceed.596 On March 1st, Representative Corrine
Brown (D-FL) was one of many representatives to testify. She stated that she had been
lobbying the President for additional funds for the nation’s port and infrastructure,
especially in Florida. “This is absolutely the wrong time for our government to make a
decision that could give the impression of vulnerability,” stated Brown.597 Mr. Feeney
(R-FL) also from Florida had stated the previous day that homeland security is the
number one issue facing the nation and that the administration has a strong record, but
“Americans throughout my district expressed deep concern that this fast track deal has
not been given the type of scrutiny that all of us took an oath to do when we said we
would protect our country.”598
In March 2006, the Senate Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee held
a hearing on the Exon-Florio Amendment with a focus on Dubai Ports World’s proposed
acquisition of P&O.599 Chairman Richard Shelby opened the hearing by remarking that
the “credibility and integrity” of the CFIUS process is vital to American national
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security.600 In his opinion, the Dubai Ports World case once again raised the concerns
that Congress expressed over the 2005 CNOOC case. Mr. Shelby reiterated that there
were serious gaps in the CFIUS review process that prevented full assessment of
acquisitions, that the process lacked transparency and avoided congressional oversight.
Senator Sarbanes said he had long been concerned about how foreign purchases
of U.S. assets are evaluated which is why he and Senator Bayh had requested a GAO
report to address these concerns. What amazed Mr. Sarbanes was that the GAO report
had been delivered in September 2005 and the Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs
Committee had held two hearings to discuss weaknesses in the CFIUS process before the
Dubai controversy arose; and yet, CFIUS did not appear to have heeded any of the advice
in the report when allowing the Dubai Ports World transaction to move forward.
Every other member of the committee that spoke during the hearing expressed
similar concerns. Senator Allard (R-CO) opposed the transaction for security reasons
but, he said, the “much broader concern [is] how we even got to this point and the answer
lies in a flawed CFIUS process.”601 Senator Debbie Stabenow (D-MI) was emphatic that
the issue of homeland security “should not be negotiated, sidestepped, or ignored in any
of the processes that have been developed.” She was appalled that the importance of port
security was “ignored” and said that it would not have mattered what foreign company
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was involved. “I believe American companies accountable to the American people
should manage the operations of these vital national security interests,” Stabenow
added.602
The realization that the Dubai Ports World transaction had been in the works just
as Washington was settling down from the passionate debates over the CNOOC-Unocal
transaction and while Congress was deliberating over the GAO report was shocking to
these Committee members as well as others in Congress. It was all that the proponents of
reform needed to convince their peers that the CFIUS process was broken and needed to
be fixed.
During the second session of the 109th Congress, members introduced over two
dozen measures to address the various concerns that arose from the CNOOC and Dubai
Ports World acquisition bids. Some of the deficiencies addressed in these bills included:
(1)

CFIUS uses too much discretion in determining which transactions to

investigate;
(2)

CFIUS members incorrectly interpreted statutory requirements for

investigations of transactions involving firms owned or controlled by foreign
governments;
(3)

Commonly accepted definitions of national security were no longer

applicable in a post-9/11 world;
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(4)

Time constraints on CFIUS to complete reviews did not provide adequate

time for conducting thorough reviews and completing the necessary tasks;
(5)

Members of the CFIUS did not appear to be well-informed of the

outcomes of reviews and investigations regarding pending transactions; and
(6)

Reporting requirements did not provide Congress enough time to fulfill its

oversight responsibilities.603
The most prominent bills introduced in the second session of the 109th
Congress were H.R. 5337 and S. 3549. The stated purpose of H.R. 5337 was to
ensure national security while promoting foreign investment, creation of and
maintenance of jobs, and to establish the Committee on Foreign Investment in the
United States.604 The stated purpose of S.B. 3549 was “to strengthen government
review and oversight of foreign investment in the United States, to provide for
enhanced Congressional oversight with respect thereto. . . .”605
Both bills called for statutory establishment of the CFIUS. While H.R.
5337 would have retained the basic committee structure, S.B. 3549 would have
added the Director of National Intelligence and eliminated the members from the
White House staff.

Both bills sought to clarify significant definitions.

For
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example, the House bill defined “covered transactions” as any transaction which
could result in the control by any person engaged in interstate commerce in the
U.S. by a foreign government or entity acting by or on behalf of a foreign
government.”

National security was to include issues relating to homeland

security, including “critical infrastructure.”606
Although the bills gave CFIUS more authority to negotiate, they both also
sought more congressional oversight of the committee. While the House bill
required semi-annual reports, the Senate bill only required an annual report, but
specified the content of the report in great detail. In addition to tightening up
reporting requirements, the bills provided for greater intelligence review. The
Senate bill provided that governors of relevant states shall be notified in the
review process, while the House bill required that the departments of Treasury
and Homeland Security must agree on all decisions. The Senate bill also added
factors for the president to consider, such as “long term projections of U.S.
requirements for sources of energy and other critical resources and materials” and
the “effect on U.S. technology leadership in areas affecting national security.”607
Both House and Senate bills garnered support on July 26, 2006, and even though
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there were details to work out in conference, the 109th Congress adjourned before
the Conference Committee had time to convene.608
The issue was picked up again in the 110th Congress where Exon-Florio
was finally revised.609 As modified, the statute preserved the basic elements of
the

1988

Exon-Florio

Amendment,

such

as

voluntary reporting

and

confidentiality, but made significant changes regarding implementation and
congressional oversight. The most notable changes accomplished by the 2007
amendment are as follows:
(1)

The statute provided more structure and clarity to the process by requiring

Treasury to designate a lead agency for conducting the investigation, and by giving
CFIUS explicit authority to negotiate and enter into mitigation agreements with the
acquiring company based on risk analysis.
(2)

The scope of Exon-Florio review was expanded to include transactions

involving “critical infrastructure,” which was defined as any vital system or asset,
physical or virtual, whose destruction or incapacity would have a “debilitating impact” on
national security.
(3)

CFIUS was mandated to consider a country’s relationship with the United

States and record in supporting nonproliferation of arms and counterterrorism. This

608

U.S. Congressional Research Service, Exon-Florio Foreign Investment Provision:
Comparison of H.R. 5337 and S. 3549, January 24, 2007, by James K. Jackson,
(Washington, D.C., 2007), summary.
609

The Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007 (FINSA) was enacted on
October 24, 2007 to amend Section 721 of the Defense Production Act.
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included consideration of whether the country in question sells military goods to
countries which the Department of Defense has identified as a regional military threat.
(4)

The previous focus on national defense was expanded to include factors

which impact the nation’s ability to protect homeland security.

This includes

consideration of long-term energy supplies and the potential diversion of technology by
the acquiring company to military applications.
(5)

The statute closed the loophole in the Byrd Amendment by requiring

CFIUS perform an investigation within 45 days unless the Department of Treasury and
the head of the lead agency on the transaction jointly determine that the transaction would
not have an impact on national security.
(6)

CFIUS was given the authority to reopen review of previously approved

transactions based upon intentional or material breach of a mitigation agreement.
(7)

The secrecy issue was addressed by requiring that officials give Congress

prompt notice of approved transactions with an explanation of the rationale behind the
committee’s actions.

Congress was authorized to request classified briefings from

CFIUS.
Even after politicizing two major foreign investment cases – CNOOC’s proposed
acquisition of U.S.-based Unocal and the proposed acquisition of London-based P&O by
Dubai Ports World – it took two congressional sessions to revise the 1988 Exon-Florio
Amendment. It may seem that the passage of time and failure of the 109th Congress to
finalize the bill diminishes the impact of the two events. But time is relative, and the
accomplishment of the 110th Congress was significant when one considers that members
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had been trying to modify the 1988 Exon-Florio Amendment ever since the 102nd
Congress had realized the shortcomings of the 1992 Byrd Amendment.
Ushering legislation through Congress is difficult at best, and the process is
complicated by the constraints of formal rules and values, the political dynamics between
the president and Congress, the intervention of political parties and special interest
groups, and expectations of constituents. The more complex the system and the players,
the more difficult it is to develop effective policies. This is the dilemma that government
institutions face.
This study shows how the Constitution provided the foundation for conflict
between the executive and legislative branches by institutionalizing the system of
“checks and balances.” The founding fathers accomplished their goal of preventing any
one branch from becoming too powerful, but they did not foresee the complexity of
drafting and implementing policy in twenty-first century America. The institutions have
become more complex and have developed a life of their own. Today, it takes an
experienced politician to maneuver his or her way through formal rules and traditional
resistance to change to accomplish a policy goal. Long-time members of Congress have
a political edge over an incoming president, especially one that has not had extensive
experience in Washington, as it is not as easy to move a ship of hundreds of individuallyminded legislators. Every member comes to Washington with their own values and
personal commitments to their party and their constituents.
President Bush’s managerial style created an additional challenge for reformists.
While we might expect a unified Congress to be able to overcome the influence of a weak
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president over the policy making agenda, it was a different matter under the strong Bush
Administration. However, members of the 109th Congress were able to overcome the
obstacles of a tightly controlled cabinet and administrative staff, and a constituency that
was loyal to the president and his party, to unify Congress against the CNOOC’s
acquisition of Unocal in spite of executive preference for nonintervention.
Fortunately for the proponents of legislative reform, the timing of the CNOOC
proposal helped elevate concerns about implementation of the Exon-Florio Amendment
to the top of the policy agenda in 2005. What had seemed like a perfect storm to the
CNOOC directors was a fortuitous set of events for members of Congress yearning to
reform the 1988 Exon-Florio Amendment, impose more restrictive requirements for the
president and CFIUS in reviewing foreign acquisitions, and mandate more stringent
reporting requirements so that Congress could exercise its oversight authority.
Although Americans had long supported free and open trade policies, the events
of 9/11 had created a sense of vulnerability and urgency for developing and
implementing national security policies. At the same time, members who had been
struggling with China’s trade policies, and perceived violations of the rule of law, found a
venue for voicing their concerns, and hoped to make headway with new trade legislation.
The research shows how the Speaker of the House controls the legislative agenda
with the suspension of rules; how bills may or may not get to the floor through the gate
keeping Rules Committee; and how committee chairs play a critical role in manipulating
the content and tone of testimony in hearings. Getting legislation through all these
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obstacles requires more than an understanding of the formal process; it requires the
ability to finesse informal mechanisms that will create coalitions of power and support.
Members of the 109th Congress formed bipartisan coalitions to support legislative
reform so as to rebalance the power between the legislative and executive branches. The
tendency for members to support a president from their own party was clearly diminished
by the perception that the president was sidestepping his authority to promote free trade
at the expense of protecting national security, energy resources, and critical technology.
The real victory came in the 110th Congress when Republicans joined Democrats to
oppose the Republican president’s preference for avoiding additional legislative
constraints. Congressional members coalesced to provide the statutory basis under the
2007 modifications to the 1988 Exon-Florio Amendment for greater legislative oversight
of CFIUS review of foreign direct investments.
The difficulty of getting bills through each house of Congress and then reaching
consensus between the two houses cannot be overstated. The process is complicated by
the large number of participants and the preferences of their constituents, the multiplicity
of formal procedures and informal relationships within Congress, and interactions with
and loyalty to the administration. How members vote is often clouded by their personal
values, the information they receive, and trade-offs that must be made with regard to
other policy issues.
The ability of Congress to develop effective policies is diminished because
compromise is necessary to create winning coalitions. An open, democratic process may
increase responsiveness to the public and interest groups but it diminishes the potential
273

for passing responsible legislation.

Members often have short-term constituency

preferences and re-election takes precedence over long-term policy interests. Debates
have become platforms for gaining political support and often lack substantive solutions.
Therefore, in analyzing hearings and debates it is important to go beyond political
motives and innuendos to identify real policy concerns. In this study, that meant looking
beyond posturing vis-à-vis foreign trade with a “communist regime” in order to identify
common issues of concern. Here, the common thread was not just that China bases it
development on principles that are different from the capitalist West, but that the U.S.
executive office had failed repeatedly to implement safeguards against acquisitions of
U.S. corporations by a foreign government-owned corporations, such as CNOOC, which
may pose a threat to national security and the economic well being of American
enterprise.
In a post-9/11 world, business may no longer be “as usual” but will require
additional protection against the unforeseen perils which are bound to arise in a global
economy. This study shows how an overwhelming majority of legislators were able to
agree that the American predilection towards an open trade policy, which has contributed
so much to economic growth and prosperity, must be tempered with an element of
caution. In this case, this element of caution was accomplished by reforming the 1988
Exon-Florio Amendment to require that the president be more accountable to Congress
and the public for how he implements the policy governing foreign acquisitions of
American corporations.
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TABLE 4: AGENCIES REPRESENTED ON THE COMMITTEE ON
FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES610
Agencies
Year
Lead Office Mission
Represented
Added
Department of the
Treasury

1975

Office of International Investment: Coordinates policies toward
foreign investments in the U.S. and U.S. investments abroad

Department of
Commerce

1975

International Trade Administration: Coordinates Issues
concerning trade promotion, international commercial policy,
market access, and trade law enforcement

Department of
Defense

1975

Defense Technology Security Administration: Administers the
development and implementation of Defense technology security
policies on international transfers of defense-related goods,
services, and technologies

Department of State

1975

Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs: Formulates and
implements policy regarding foreign economic matters, including
trade and international finance and development

Office of U.S Trade
Representative

1980

Directs all trade negotiations of and formulates trade policy for
the United States

Council of Economic
Advisors

1980

Performs analyses and appraisals of the national economy for the
purpose of providing policy recommendations to the President

Department of
Justice

1988

Criminal Division: Develops, enforces, and supervises the
application of all federal criminal laws, except for those assigned
to other Justice Department divisions

Office of
Management and
Budget

1988

Evaluates, formulates, and coordinates management procedures
and program objectives within and among federal departments
and agencies, and controls administration of the federal budget

Office of Science and
Technology Policy

1993

Provides scientific, engineering, technological analyses for the
President with respect to federal policies, plans, and programs

National Economic
Council

1993

Coordinates the economic policymaking process and provides
economic policy advice to the President

National Security
Council

1993

Advises and assists the President in integrating all aspects of
national security policy as it affects the United States

Department of
Homeland Security

2003

Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection: Identifies
and assesses current and future threats to the homeland, maps
those threats against vulnerabilities, issues warnings, and takes
preventative and protective action

610

U.S. Government Accountability Office, Report to Congressional Requesters (GAO05-686), “Defense Trade: Enhancements to the Implementation of Exon-Florio Could
Strengthen the Law’s Effectiveness, (September 2005); 6.
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TABLE 5: LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AIOC

Azerbayan International Operation Company

ANWR

Arctic National Wildlife Refuge

APA

Administrative Procedure Act

ASEAN

Association of South East Asian Nations

ASML

ASM Lithography

BBL/D

Billion barrels per day

BEA

Bureau of Economic Analysis

BOB

Bureau of Budget

BTU

British Thermal Units

CATIC

China National Aero-Technology Import and Export Corporation

CEO

Chief Executive Officer

CFIUS

Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States

CIA

Central Intelligence Agency

CNOOC

Chinese National Offshore Oil Corporation

CNPC

Chinese National Petroleum Corporation

DOE/EIA

Department of Energy/Energy Information Administration

DOJ

Department of Justice

DPA

Defense Production Act

EOP

Executive Office of the President

FBI

Federal Bureau of Investigation

FDI

Foreign direct investment
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FDR

Franklin D. Roosevelt

FTC

Foreign Trade Commission

GAO

Government Accountability Office

GDP

Gross Domestic Product

GOP

Republican (“Grand Old”) Party

G-7

Group of Seven

HSAC

Homeland Security Advisory Council

IDA

International Development Association

IEA

International Energy Administration

IEEPA

International Emergency Economic Powers Act

IIE

Institute for International Economics

IMF

International Monetary Fund

INS

Immigration and Naturalization Service

LNG

Liquid Natural Gas

LRA

Legislative Reorganization Act

MFN

Most Favored Nation

NEPDG

National Energy Policy Development Group

NGO

Nongovernmental Organization

NDRC

National Development and Reform Commission

NSA

National Security Advisor

NSC

National Security Council

OECD

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
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OHS

Office of Homeland Security

OMB

Office of Management and Budget

OSI

Office for Strategic Initiatives

PNA

Premerger Notification Act

SEZ

Special Economic Zone

SETC

State Economic and Trade Commission

SINOPEC

China National Petrochemical Corporation

SVG

Silicon Valley Group, Inc.

UN

United Nations

WB

World Bank

WHO

White House Office

WTO

World Trade Organization

WWI

World War One

WWII

World War Two
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